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
THE
PHILOSOPHICAL
DICTIONARY:
OR, THE
OPINIONS
OF
MODERN PHILOSOPHERS
ON
METAPHYSICAL, MORAL,
AND
POLITICAL SUBJECTS.

IN FOUR VOLUMES.

VOL. III.

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PHILOSOPHICAL
DICTIONARY

OF
PRINCIPLES

OF
MODERN PHILOSOPHY

BY
J. G. F. MORLEY

IN
TWO VOLUMES

VOLUME
I

1870

LONDON

JOHN L. AND J. H. B. MORLEY

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C O N T E N T S

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T H E
PHILOSOPHICAL
DICTIONARY.

P.

POLYTHEISM.

THE belief of a plurality of gods is one of the great errors with which the moderns reproach the Greeks and Romans. There seems to be no reason to infer that they had more than one Supreme God. We may read in a thousand different parts of their writings, that Zeus Jupiter is the master of gods and men. *Jovis omnia plena.* And the Apostle Paul himself gives the same testimony with regard to the ancients: “*In God we live, move, and have our being, as one of your poets expresses it.*” After this testimony, shall we presume to accuse our masters of not acknowledging a Supreme God?

We are not here to examine, whether there was in former times a Jupiter, king of Crete; whether he was made a god; or whether the Egyptians had twelve great gods, or eight; or whether the Jupiter of the Latins was one of this number? The present object of inquiry is only to know, whether the Greeks or Romans acknowledged a Divine Being, supreme over the rest of heavenly beings? This they are for ever repeating, and therefore we cannot but believe them. Let us only look into the admirable epistle of the philosopher Maximus of Medavra to St Augustin. “There
“is one God (says he) without beginning, the
“common parent of all things, who has never be-
“gotten any one like himself. Who is the man
“so brutish or stupid, as to entertain a doubt
“thereof?” Thus does this Heathen, who wrote in the fourth century, declare the sentiments of all antiquity.

If I was to draw the veil of the Egyptian mysteries, I should there find the *Knef* by whom all things were produced, and who presides over all the other deities; I should find Methra among the Persians, Brama among the Indians; and it is more than probable, that I should be able to demonstrate, that every well governed nation acknowledged a Supreme Being, who had other inferior gods subordinate to him. The Chinese have never acknowledged any more than one sole God
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for upwards of 4000 years. The Greeks and Romans admitted numberless superstitions. There is no doubt of it. Every one knows they adopted the most ridiculous fables; and to this, I add, that they themselves laughed at them. The basis of their mythology, however, was founded in reason.

In the first place, allowing that the Greeks gave their heroes a place in heaven as a reward for their virtues; this was a most prudent and useful act of religion. What nobler incentive could have been proposed? The number of saints to whom the Catholics have raised temples and altars, infinitely exceed those of the Greek and Roman demigods and heroes. But their deified heroes, though they were admitted into the court, or partook of the favours of Zeus, the Demiurgos, the Eternal Lord, they did not share his throne or power.

The second subject of reproach we have against them, is for admitting such a number of gods into the government of the world. Neptune presides over the sea; Juno over the air; Eolus over the winds; Pluto or Veſta over the earth; Mars over the field of battle. Let us reject these genealogies, and condemn all their adventures, which never made any part of the basis of the Greek or Roman religion. But there seems no degree of folly in adopting beings of the second order, to
B 2 whom

whom some degree of power is given over us mortals. Do not we assign particular functions to several angels? There was a destroying angel who fought for the Jews: there was the angel of travellers, who served as a guide to Tobias. Michael was the tutelary angel of the Hebrew people. We are told in Daniel, that he fought with the angel of the Persians, and disputed with the angel of the Greeks. In the prophet Zachariah, we read of an angel of an inferior order, who gives an account to Michael of the state in which he found things upon earth. Every nation has its particular angel. The Septuagint version tells us in Deuteronomy, that the Lord divided the nations according to the number of the angels. The Apostle Paul in the Acts addresses himself to the angel of Macedonia. These celestial spirits are often called by the name of gods, *Eloim*, in scripture; and the word that answers to θεός, *Deus*, God, of all nations, does not constantly signify the Supreme Master of heaven and earth, but frequently a heavenly being, a being superior to man, though dependent on the Sovereign Lord of nature.

We may from hence conclude, that the ridicule or error does not lie in polytheism itself, but in the abuse made of that belief in the vulgar fables, and in the multitude of ridiculous deities which every one set up after his own fancy, which served as the amusements of the old women and children of Rome,

Rome, and proves that the word *Deus* had very different acceptations. It is certain, *Deus Crepitus* did not cause the same idea, as *Deus Divum*, and *Hominum Pater* the father of gods and men. The Roman pontiffs never gave a place in their temples to those little puppets, with which the good women used to fill their chambers and closets. The religion of the Romans was in the main extremely grave and rigid. Oaths were held inviolable. They could not begin a war till the college of the *Feciales* had declared it just. A vestal, that was convicted of having broke her vow of virginity, was condemned to die. All which bespeaks a people rather rigid than ridiculous in their morals.

It may be asked, How a senate who imposed chains and laws upon whole nations, could suffer so many extravagances, and countenance such a heap of absurd fables among their pontiffs? It may be answered, Wise men in all nations have made use of fools. They willingly left the people in possession of their favourite feasts, the Luper-calia and Saturnalia, as long as they continued obedient to authority. The holy chickens who foretold victory to their armies, were exempted from the spit and the pot. Never let us be surprised, that the wisest governments have permitted the most ridiculous customs or improbable fables. These customs, these fables, existed before those governments were formed; and we

do not pull down an extensive and irregular city, merely for the sake of building it again by rule and compass.

But how happens it, some may say, that on the one hand we perceive so much philosophy and science, and on the other so much fanaticism? It is because science and philosophy came to the world a little before Cicero, and fanaticism had already been in being for many ages. Policy then said to Folly and Fanaticism, let us all live together as comfortably as we can.

The ancients taught and were instructed to look upon utility, and not truth, as the end of the national religion. Their maxims with regard to the public worship were, *Quæ omnia sapiens servabit tanquam legibus jussa, non tanquam diis gratia.*

VOLTAIRE.

THE CAUSE OF THE LONG DURATION OF POLYTHEISM.

THE Pagan religion, despised by its own ministers, inveighed against by the philosophers, and neglected, the most frequently, by the people, was equally incapable of striking a deep root and of forming a code of doctrines difficult to be overthrown. The credit which it maintained during a length of time is, notwithstanding, unquestionable. To account, therefore, for all this, we must have

have recourse to some more distant cause: for it is not sufficient to demonstrate with Mr Hume, that Polytheism is the first religion which must have offered itself to an untutored set of men; it is not even sufficient to have discovered that this religion was mild, and that its modes of worship were agreeable and ingenious: on the one hand, it may be answered, that it existed during the most polished ages; and, on the other hand, that the pain and cruelty attending its practices, have been already proved. We must therefore lead our observations still further; and we shall then discover in the system of politics, the true reason of the long duration of Polytheism. Would we, in general, comprehend some circumstance from antiquity, we must not lose sight of two important facts; namely, that Asia hath been the cradle, as it were, of the sciences; and Greece, the cradle of poetry. From this single consequence a thousand considerations will naturally flow. The poets, the first amongst the Greeks who enjoyed the knowledge of any thing, have arranged, as well as they possibly could, all the materials which they were able to collect, from the sentiments of the Phenicians and Egyptians, relative to the origin of the world, and the generation of gods; but these poets forged many new fables, which they mixed with the ancient fables, and particularly laboured at attempts to circulate delusive accounts

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concerning the origin of the Greeks; an origin for which they blushed to have been indebted to merchants, or a people of slaves. Amidst these poets, Homer quickly obtained the first rank. He composed so many tales, and spoke of such a multitude of things, that his books, in this respect, like the Koran, were of themselves sufficient to found a religion. And yet the oracle of Delphos, another poet, Lycurgus, who made metrical laws, pretending indeed that they were dictated by Apollo, but which he had stolen from the Cretans, Hesiod, and many others, began to form, from a very small number of acquired intelligences, and from a very great number of ingenious conjectures, a monstrous and gigantic scaffolding of materials. From all these poems, and all these oracles, arose a particular language, styled *μῦθος*, in opposition to *λογος*, which was the language of reason, and which did not prevail until some time afterwards. But the *μῦθος* maintained its ground during whole ages; and as the poets had continually treated of the most interesting subjects, such as the origin of republics, the principles of legislation, the rights of magistracy, the limits of states, &c. poetry, or fable, or, if it be a more proper expression, religion, became, as it were, the general repository of archives, and the titles of the nobility of republics. From thence sprang the obligation which united polity with religion,

religion, and the necessity which preserved tenets and ceremonies.

CHATELLUR.

POLYTHEISM THE PRIMARY RELIGION OF MANKIND.

IT is a matter of fact incontestable, that about 1700 years ago all mankind were idolaters. The doubtful and sceptical principles of a few philosophers, or the theism, and that, too, not entirely pure, of one or two nations, form no objection worth regarding. Behold, then, the clear testimony of history. The further we mount up into antiquity, the more do we find mankind plunged into idolatry. The most ancient records of human race still present us with Polytheism as the popular and established system. Shall we assert, that, in more ancient times, before the knowledge of letters, or the discovery of any art or science, men entertained the principles of pure Theism? That is, while they were ignorant and barbarous, they discovered truth; but fell into error as soon as they acquired learning and politeness. This assertion contradicts probability and experience. The savage tribes of America, Africa, and Asia, are all idolaters. Not a single exception to this rule.

It seems certain, that according to the natural pro-

progress of human thought, the ignorant multitude must first entertain some groveling and familiar notion of superior powers, before they stretch their conception to that perfect Being, who bestowed order on the whole frame of nature. We may as reasonably imagine, that men inhabited palaces before huts and cottages, or studied geometry before agriculture, as assert, that the Deity appeared to them a pure spirit, omniscient, omnipresent, omnipotent, before he was apprehended to be a powerful, though limited, being, with human passions and appetites, limbs and organs. The mind rises gradually from inferior to superior: By abstracting from what is imperfect, it forms an idea of perfection: And slowly distinguishing the nobler parts of its frame from the grosser, it learns to transfer only the former, much elevated and refined, to its Divinity. Nothing could disturb this natural progress of thought, but some obvious and invincible argument, which might immediately lead the mind into the pure principles of Theism, and make it overleap at one bound the vast interval which is interposed between the human and the divine nature. But though the order and frame of the universe, when accurately examined, affords such an argument; yet this consideration could never have any influence on mankind when they formed their first rude notions of religion. The causes of such objects
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as are quite familiar to us, never strike our attention or curiosity; and however extraordinary or surprising these objects in themselves, they are passed over by the raw and ignorant multitude without much examination or inquiry. Adam rising at once in paradise, and in the full perfection of his faculties, would naturally, as represented by Milton, be astonished at the glorious appearances of nature, the heavens, the air, the earth, his own organs and members; and would be led to ask, Whence this wonderful scene arose? But a barbarous, necessitous animal (such as man is on the first origin of society), pressed by such numerous wants and passions, has no leisure to admire the regular face of nature, or make inquiries concerning the cause of objects, to which, from his infancy, he has been gradually accustomed. On the contrary, the more regular and uniform, that is, the more perfect nature appears, the more he is familiarized to it, and the less inclined to scrutinize and examine it. A monstrous birth excites his curiosity, and is deemed a prodigy. It alarms him from its novelty; and immediately sets him a trembling, and sacrificing, and praying. But an animal, complete in all its limbs and organs, is to him an ordinary spectacle, and produces no religious affection or opinion. Ask him from whence that animal arose? he will tell you, From the copulation of its parents. And these,

these, whence? from the copulation of theirs. A few removes satisfy his curiosity, and set the objects at such a distance that he entirely loses sight of them.

If men were at first led into the belief of one Supreme Being, by reasoning from the frame of nature, they could never possibly leave that belief in order to embrace idolatry; but the same principles of reason, which at first produced and diffused over mankind so magnificent an opinion, must be able, with great facility, to preserve it. The first invention, or proof of any doctrine, is much more difficult than the supporting and retaining it.

There is a great difference between historical facts and speculative opinions; nor is the knowledge of the one propagated in the same manner with that of the other. An historical fact, while it passes by oral tradition from eye-witnesses and contemporaries, is disguised in every successive narration, and may at last retain but very small, if any, resemblance of the original truth on which it was founded. The frail memories of men, their love of exaggeration, their supine carelessness; these principles, if not corrected by books and writing, soon pervert the account of historical events, where argument or reasoning have little or no place, nor can ever recal the truth which has once escaped those narrations. It is
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thus the fables of Hercules, Theseus, Bacchus, are supposed to have been originally founded in true history, corrupted by tradition. But with regard to speculative opinions, the case is far otherwise. If these opinions be founded in arguments so clear and obvious as to carry conviction with the generality of mankind, the same arguments which at first diffused the opinions will still preserve them in their original purity. If the arguments be more abstruse, and more remote from vulgar apprehension, the opinions will always be confined to a few persons; and as soon as men leave the contemplation of the arguments, the opinions will immediately be lost and be buried in oblivion. Which ever side of the dilemma we take, it must appear impossible, that Theism could, from reasoning, have been the primary religion of the human race, and have afterwards by its corruptions, given birth to idolatry, and to all the various superstitions of the heathen world. Reason, when obvious, prevents these corruptions. When abstruse, it keeps the principles entirely from the knowledge of the vulgar, who are alone liable to corrupt any principles or opinions.

HUME.

POLYTHEISM NOT THE PRIMARY RELI-
GION OF MANKIND.

DAVID HUME, in his Natural History of Religion, produces strong reasons to prove that the first religion was Polytheism; and that before improved reason came to see there could only be one Supreme Being, men began with believing several gods.

It may, however, on the contrary, be presumed, that they began with worshipping only one god, and that afterwards human weakness adopted several others. It is not to be doubted but villages and country towns were prior to large cities; and that men were divided into small republics before they were united into large empires. It is very natural that a town, terrified at the thunder, distressed by the rain of its harvest, insulted by a neighbouring town, daily feeling its weakness, and every where perceiving an invisible power, soon came to say, there is some being above us which does us good and hurt. It seems impossible that they should have said, there are two powers: For wherefore several? In every thing we begin with the simple, and then proceed to the compound; and often an improvement of knowledge brings us back again to the simple: this is the process of the human mind.

Which

Which being was first worshipped? Was it the sun? Was it the moon? It is hardly credible. Only let us take a view of children, they are pretty nearly on a footing with ignorant men. The beauty and benefit of that luminous body, which animates nature, make no impression on them; as insensible are they of the conveniences we derive from the moon, or of the regular variations of its course; they do not so much as think of these things; they are accustomed to them. What men do not fear, they never worship. Children look up to the sky with as much indifference as on the ground; but at a tempest the poor creatures tremble, and run and hide themselves. I am inclined to think it was so with the primitive men. They who first observed the course of the heavenly bodies, and brought them to be objects of admiration and worship, must necessarily have had a tincture of philosophy: the error was too exalted for rude illiterate husbandmen.

Thus the cry of a village would have been no more than this: There is a power which thunders, which sends down hail on us, which causes our children to die; let us by all means appease it: But which way? Why, we see that little presents will soothe angry people; let us try what little presents will do with this power. He must also, to be sure, have a name or title; and that which naturally presents itself first is, chief, master,

ster, lord: Thus is this power called My Lord. Hence it probably was that the first Egyptians called their god, Knef; the Syrians, Adoni; the neighbouring nations, Baal or Bel, or Molock or Meloc; the Scythians, Pape; all words signifying Lord, Master.

In like manner almost all America was found to be divided into multitudes of little colonies, all with their patron deity. The Mexicans and Peruvians, who were large nations, had but one only god; the latter worshipping Mango Kapack, and the other the god of war, whom they called Vilipusti, as the Hebrews had styled their Lord *Sabbaoth*. It is not from any superiority or exercise of reason that all nations began with worshipping only one deity; for had they been philosophers, they would have worshipped the universal God of nature, and not the god of a village; they would have examined the infinite testimonies acknowledged of a creating and preserving Being: they examined nothing; they only perceived: and such is the progress of our weak understanding. Every town perceived its weakness and want of a powerful protector. This tutelary and terrible being, they fancied to reside in a neighbouring forest, or mountain, or in a cloud. They fancied only one such power, because in war the town had but one chief. This being they imagined to be corporeal, it being impossible they could have
any

any other idea. They could not but believe that the neighbouring town had also its god. Accordingly Jephtha says to the inhabitants of Moab, "Wilt thou not possess that which Chemosh thy
"god giveth thee to possess? So whomsoever the
"Lord our God shall drive out from before us,
"them will we possess."

This speech from one foreigner to another is very extraordinary.

It is very natural that, from the heat of fancy and a vague increase of knowledge, men soon multiplied their gods, and assigned guardians to the elements, seas, forests, springs, and fields. The more they surveyed the heavenly bodies, the greater must their astonishment have been. Well might they who worshipped the deity of a brook pay their adorations to the sun; and the first step being taken, the earth was soon covered with deities; so that at length cats and onions came to be worshipped.

However, time must necessarily improve reason: accordingly it produced some philosophers, who saw that neither onions nor cats, nor even the heavenly bodies, had any share in the disposition of nature. All those philosophers, Babylonians, Persians, Egyptians, Scythians, Greeks, and Romans, acknowledged only one supreme God, rewarding and punishing.

This they did not immediately make known to
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the people; for a word against onions and cats, spoken before old women and priests, would have cost a man his life: Those good people would have stoned him.

Well, what was to be done? Orpheus and others instituted *mysteries*, which the initiated swear by execrable oaths never to reveal; and of these mysteries the principal is the worship of one only God. This great truth spreads over half the earth: the number of the initiated swells immensely: the ancient religion indeed still subsists; but not being contrary to the tenet of God's unity, it is connived at. The Romans had their Deus Optimus Maximus; the Greeks their Zeus, their supreme God. All the other deities are only intermediate beings; heroes and emperors were classed among the gods, which meant no more than the blessed; for it is not supposed that Claudius, Octavius, Tiberius, and Caligula, were accounted creators of heaven and earth.

In a word, it seems certain, that in Augustus's time, all who had any religion acknowledged one supreme eternal God, with several classes of secondary deities; the worshipping of whom has since been called *idolatry*.

VOLTAIRE.

RE-

RELIEF OF THE POOR.

THE best way of doing good to the poor, is not making them easy in poverty, but by driving them out of it. The more public provisions are made for the poor, the less they provide for themselves, and become poorer: And, on the contrary, the less is done for them, the more they do for themselves, and become richer. There is no country in the world where so many provisions are established for them as in England; so many hospitals to receive them when they are sick or lame, founded and maintained by voluntary charities; besides a general law made by the rich for the support of the poor. Under all these obligations, are the poor modest, humble, thankful, industrious? On the contrary, it may be affirmed, that there is no country in the world in which the poor are more idle, dissolute, drunken, and insolent. The day the parliament passed that law, it took away from before their eyes the greatest of all inducements to industry, frugality, and sobriety, by giving them a dependence on somewhat else than a careful accumulation during youth and health, for support in age and sickness. In short, a law to provide for the poor is a premium for the encouragement of idleness; and it has its effect in the increase of poverty. More will be done for
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the happiness of the poor by inuring them to provide for themselves, than could be done by dividing all the estates in the kingdom among them.

FRANKLIN.

THE POPULACE.

IT is the populace which compose the bulk of mankind: Those which are not in this class are so few in number that they are hardly worth notice. Man is the same creature in every state; therefore that which is the most numerous, ought to be most respected. To a man capable of reflection, all civil distinctions are nothing: He observes the same passions, the same feelings, in the clown and the man of quality. The principal difference between them consists in the language they speak; in a little refinement of expression: But if there be any real distinction, it is certainly to the disadvantage of the least sincere. The common people appear as they really are; and they are not amiable: If those in high life were equally undisguised, their appearance would make us shudder with horror. There is, say our philosophers, an equal allotment of happiness and misery to every rank of men; a maxim as dangerous as it is absurd. If all mankind are equally happy, it would be ridiculous to give ourselves any trouble to promote their felicity. Let each remain

remain in his situation: Let the slave endure the lash, the lame his infirmity, and let the beggar perish, since they would gain nothing by a change of situation. The same philosophers enumerate the pangs of the rich, and expatiate on the vanity of their pleasures. Was there ever so palpable a sophism! The pangs of a rich man are not essential to riches, but to the abuse of them. If he were even more wretched than the poor, he would deserve no compassion; because he is the creator of his own misery, and happiness was in his power. But the sufferings of the indigent are the natural consequences of his state; he feels the weight of his hard lot; no length of time nor habit can ever render him insensible of fatigue and hunger: Neither wisdom nor good-humour can annihilate the evils which are inseparable from his situation. What avails it an Epictetus to foresee that his master is going to break his leg? Doth that prevent the evil? On the contrary, his foreknowledge adds greatly to his misfortune. If the populace were really as wise as we suppose them stupid, how could they act otherwise than as they do?

ROUSSEAU.

POPULAR OPINION.

THE popular opinion, in many instances, is as contemptible as it is ill-founded. It is often times

times below the concern of a good man, and unworthy the notice of a wise one. A sovereign scorn of it has been esteemed the peculiar result of an elevation of soul, and an unequivocal indication of the truest wisdom. This superiority to current calumnies hath formed the poet's rhapsody, hath proved the philosopher's impenetrable armour, and supported the real patriot under the storms of obloquy, the pressure of exile, and the agonies of an ignominious death. On occasions of this sort, it is necessary, it is useful, it is laudable. It leads to generous plans of conduct, and it inspires resolution to attempt their accomplishment. It fortifies us against the probable event of ill success; and consoles us under the mortification of disappointment, the envious strife of tongues, and the envenomed shafts of low, illiberal reproach. When it is directed to these ends, and effects these purposes, it is the strength and blessing of those who possess it. But, then, its excellency entirely depends on this direction, and these effects. We are, unhappily, on many accounts, disposed to extend its influence, and to overstretch its tone. Self-deception obscures our moral discernment, and renders us unjust and incompetent judges of our own motives to action. We sometimes, perhaps, mistake them involuntarily. But, oftentimes through weakness which we might have prevented, or through wickedness which

which we are studious to conceal from our own view, we call that a contempt of popular rumour, which is no other than the lordly pride of intoxicated reason, or the sordid vanity of blind self-love.

*Populus me sibilat; at mihi plaudo
Ipse domi.*

For great occasions there are, when the public verdict is respectable, and the public censure awful!

Interdum vulgus rectum videt:

When enormous abuses extort a general and just disapprobation, then the “Vox populi” is, without a perversion of terms, “Vox Dei;” then God and man alike insulted, alike condemn. In this case, no station can justify inattention. An audience is due from the highest; and sovereigns themselves refuse to listen at the peril of their salvation. * *

POPULATION.

PEOPLE increase in proportion to the number of marriages; and that greater in proportion to the ease and convenience of supporting a family. When a family can be easily supported, more persons marry, and earlier in life. As the increase of people depends on the encouragement of marriages, the following things must diminish a nation,

tion, viz. 1. The being conquered. 2. Loss of territory. 3. Loss of trade. 4. Loss of food. 5. Bad government and insecure property. 6. Heavy taxes. 7. The introduction of slaves. The negroes brought into the English sugar islands have greatly diminished the Whites there; the poor are by these means deprived of employment, while a few families acquire vast estates, which they spend on foreign luxuries; and educating their children in the habit of those luxuries, the same income is needed for the support of one that might have maintained one hundred. The Whites who have slaves, not labouring, are enfeebled, and therefore not so generally prolific; the slaves being worked too hard, and ill fed, their constitutions are broken, and the deaths among them are more than the births; so that a continual supply is needed from Africa. The northern colonies having few slaves, increase in Whites. Slaves also pejorate the families that use them; the white children become proud, disgusted with labour; and being educated in idleness, are rendered unfit to get a living by industry. Hence the prince that acquires new territory, if he finds it vacant, or if he removes the natives to give his own people room; the legislator that makes effectual laws for promoting of trade, increasing employment, improving land by more and better tillage, providing more food by fisheries, securing property,

perty, &c. and the man that invents new trades, arts, manufactures, or new improvements in husbandry; may be properly called the *fathers* of *their* nation; as they are the cause of the generation of multitudes, by the encouragement they afford to marriage. As to privileges granted to the married (such as the *jus trium liberorum* among the Romans), they may hasten the filling a country that has been thinned by war or pestilence, or that has otherwise vacant territory; but cannot increase a people beyond the means provided for their subsistence. Foreign luxuries and needless manufactures, imported and used in a nation, do, by the same reasoning, increase the people of the nation that furnishes them, and diminish the people of the nation that uses them. Laws, therefore, that prevent such importations, and, on the contrary, promote the exportation of manufactures to be consumed in foreign countries, may be called (with respect to the people that make them) generative laws; as by increasing subsistence they encourage marriage. Such laws likewise strengthen a country doubly, by increasing its own people, and diminishing its neighbour's. Some European nations prudently refuse to consume the manufactures of East India. They should likewise forbid them to their colonies; for the gain to the merchant is not to be compared to the loss, by these means, of people to the nation.

tion. Home luxury in the great, increases the nation's manufacturers employed by it, who are many; and only tends to diminish the families that indulge in it, who are few. The greater the fashionable expence of any rank of people, the more cautious they are of marriage. Therefore luxury should never be suffered to become common. The great increase of offspring in particular families, is not always owing to greater fecundity of nature, but sometimes to examples of industry in the heads, and industrious education; by which the children are enabled to provide better for themselves, and their marrying early is encouraged from the prospect of good subsistence. To manners of this kind are owing the populousness of Holland, Switzerland, China, Japan, and most parts of Indostan, &c. in every one of which the force of extent of territory and fertility of soil is multiplied, or their want compensated by industry and frugality. Natural fecundity is hardly to be considered; because the *vis generandi*, as far as we know, is unlimited, and because experience shows, that the numbers of nations are altogether governed by collateral causes; and among these, none is of so much force as quantity of subsistence; whether arising from climate, soil, improvement of tillage, trade, fisheries, secure property, conquest of new countries, and other favourable circumstances.

FRANKLIN.

ON

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

THERE is in all men, both male and female, a desire and power of generation, more active than is ever universally exerted. The restraints which they lie under, must proceed from some difficulties in their situation, which it belongs to a wise legislature to observe and remove. Almost every man who thinks he can maintain a family will have one; and the human species, at this rate of propagation, would more than double every generation. How fast do mankind multiply in every colony, or new settlement, where it is an easy matter to provide for a family; and where men are no ways straitened or confined as in long established governments?—History tells us frequently of plagues, which have swept away the third or fourth part of a people: yet in a generation or two the destruction was not perceived, and the society had again acquired their former number. The lands which were cultivated, the houses built, the commodities raised, the riches acquired, enabled the people, who escaped, immediately to marry, and to rear families, which supplied the place of those who had perished. Where there is room for more people, they will always arise, even without the assistance of naturalization bills. It is remarked, that the provinces of Spain

Spain which send most people to the Indies, are most populous; which proceeds from their superior riches. Every wise, just, and mild government, by rendering the condition of its subjects easy and secure, will always abound most in people, as well as in commodities and riches. A country, indeed, whose climate and soil are fitted for vines, will naturally be more populous than one which produces only corn; and that more populous than one which is only fitted for pasturage. In general, warm climates, as the necessities of the inhabitants are there fewer, and vegetation more powerful, are likely to be most populous: But if every thing else be equal, it seems natural to expect, that wherever there are most happiness and virtue, and the wisest institutions, there will also be most people.

HUME.

THE POPULOUSNESS OF ANCIENT EUROPE.

IT has been contended by many, that Europe, when ignorant and barbarous, was more populous than at present. The answer to their numerous citations, is, That ten acres of wheat will nourish more men than a hundred acres of heath, pasturage, &c.; that Europe was formerly covered with vast forests; and that the Germans lived on the
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the produce of their cattle. This Cæsar and Tacitus affirms; and their testimony decides the question. A nation of herdsmen cannot be numerous. Civilized Europe is, therefore, necessarily more populous than it was when barbarous and savage. It is a folly to have recourse to historians concerning this matter, who are often untrue or ill informed, when we have before us evident proofs of their falsehood. A country cannot support a great number of people without agriculture, unless it be by a miracle; and miracles are much more rare than falsehoods.

HELVETIUS.

POSITIVE IDEAS FROM PRIVATIVE CAUSES.

WHATSOEVER is so constituted in nature, as to be able, by affecting our senses, to cause any perception in the mind, doth thereby produce in the understanding an idea, which, whatever be the external cause of it when it comes to be taken notice of by our discerning faculty, it is by the mind looked on and considered there to be a real positive idea in the understanding, as much as any other whatsoever; though, perhaps, the cause of it be but a privation in the subject.

Thus the idea of heat and cold, light and darkness, white and black, motion and rest, are equally

qually clear and *positive ideas* in the mind; though perhaps some of the *causes* which produce them are barely *privations* in those subjects from whence our senses derive those *ideas*. These the understanding, in its view of them, considers all as distinct *positive ideas*, without taking notice of the causes that produce them; which is an inquiry not belonging to the *idea* as it is in the understanding, but to the nature of things existing without us. These are two very different things, and carefully to be distinguished; it being one thing to perceive and know the *idea* of white and black, and quite another to examine what kind of particles they must be, and how ranged in the superficies, to make any object appear white or black.

A painter or dyer, who never inquired into their causes, hath the idea of white and black, and other colours, as clearly, perfectly, and distinctly in his understanding, and perhaps more distinctly, than the philosopher who hath busied himself in considering their natures, and thinks he knows how far either of them is in its cause positive or privative; and the *idea of black* is no less *positive* in his mind than that of white, *however the cause* of that colour in the external object may be only a *privation*.

I appeal to every one's own experience, whether the shadow of a man, though it consists in

thing but the absence of light, (and the more the absence of light is, the more discernible is the shadow) does not, when a man looks on it, cause as clear and positive an *idea* in the mind, as a man himself, though covered over with clear sunshine? And the picture of a shadow is a positive thing. Indeed, we have negative names which stand not directly for positive *ideas*, but for their absence, such as *insipid*, *silence*, *nihil*, &c. which words denote positive *ideas*, v. g. taste, sound, being, with a signification of their absence.

And thus one may truly be said to see darkness. For supposing a hole perfectly dark, from whence no light is reflected, it is certain one may see the figure of it, or it may be painted; or whether the ink I write with makes any other *idea*, is a question. The privative causes I have here assigned of positive *ideas*, are according to the common opinion; but in truth it will be hard to determine whether there be really any *ideas* from a privative cause, till it be determined, *Whether rest be any more a privation than motion.*

LOCKE.

THE

THE ORIGIN OF OPINION CONCERNING IN-
VISIBLE INTELLIGENT POWER.

IT must be allowed, that in order to carry mens attention beyond the present course of things,, or lead them into any inference concerning invifible intelligent power, they must be actuated by some paffion, which prompts their thought and reflection ; some motive, which urges their first inquiry. But what paffion fhall we here have recourse to, for explaining an effect of fuch mighty confequence ? Not speculative curiofity furely, or the pure love of truth. That motive is too refined for men in ignorant ages and barbarous nations, and would lead men into inquiries concerning the frame of nature ; a fubject too large and comprehensive for their grofs apprehenfions. No paffions, therefore, can be fupposed to work upon fuch barbarians, but the ordinary affections of human life ; the anxious concern for happinefs, the dread of future mifery, the terror of death, the thirft of revenge, the appetite for food and other neceffaries. Agitated by hopes and fears of this nature, efpecially the latter, men fcutinize, with a trembling curiofity, the courfe of future caufes, and examine the various and contrary events of human life. And in this difordered fcene, with eyes ftill more difordered

ordered and astonished, they see the first obscure traces of Divinity.—We are placed in this world, as in a great theatre, where the true springs and causes of every event are entirely unknown to us; nor have we either sufficient wisdom to foresee, or power to prevent, those ills with which we are continually threatened. We hang in perpetual suspense between life and death, health and sickness, plenty and want; which are distributed amongst the human species by secret and unknown causes, whose operation is often unexpected and always unaccountable. These *unknown causes*, then, become the constant object of our hope and fear; and while the passions are kept in perpetual alarm by an anxious expectation of the events, the imagination is equally employed in forming ideas of those powers on which we have so entire a dependence.—In proportion as any man's course of life is governed by accident, we always find that he increases in superstition; as may particularly be observed of gamesters and sailors, who though, of all mankind, the least capable of serious consideration, abound most in frivolous and superstitious apprehensions. The gods, says *Coriolanus* in *Dionysius*, have an influence in every affair; but above all in war, where the event is so uncertain. All human life, especially before the institution of order and good government, being subject to fortuitous accidents, it is natural
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that superstition should prevail every where in barbarous ages, and put men on the most earnest inquiry concerning those invisible powers who dispose of their happiness and misery.—Any of the human affections may lead us into the notion of invisible, intelligent power; hope as well as fear, gratitude as well as affliction: but if we examine our own hearts, or observe what passes around us, we shall find, that men are much oftener thrown on their knees by the melancholy than by the agreeable passions. Prosperity is easily received as our due; and few questions are asked concerning its cause or author. It begets cheerfulness, and activity, and alacrity, and a lively enjoyment of every social and sensual pleasure: and during this state of mind, men have little leisure or inclination to think of the unknown invisible regions. On the other hand, every disastrous accident alarms us, and sets us on inquiries concerning the principles whence it arose: apprehensions spring up with regard to futurity; and the mind, sunk in diffidence, terror, and melancholy, has recourse to every method of appeasing those sacred intelligent powers, on whom our fortune is supposed entirely to depend.—Even at this day, and in Europe, ask any of the vulgar, Why he believes in an Omnipotent Creator of the world? he will never mention the beauty of final causes, of which he is ignorant: He will not hold

hold out his hand, and bid you contemplate the suppleness and variety of joints in his fingers, their bending all one way, the counterpoise which they receive from the thumb, the softness and fleshy parts of the inside of his hand, with all the other circumstances which render that number fit for the use for which it was destined. To these he has been long accustomed; and he beholds them with listlessness and unconcern. He will tell you of the sudden and unexpected death of such a one; the fall and bruise of such another; the excessive drought of this season; the cold and rains of another. These he ascribes to the immediate operation of Providence: and such events, as with good reasoners are the chief difficulties in admitting a Supreme Intelligence, are with him the sole arguments for it.—Convulsions in nature, disorders, prodigies, miracles, though the most opposite to the plan of a wise superintendant, impress mankind with the strongest sentiments of religion: the causes of events seeming then the most unknown and unaccountable. We may conclude, therefore, upon the whole, that since the vulgar, in nations which have embraced the doctrine of Theism, still build it upon irrational and superstitious opinions, they are never led into that opinion by any process of argument, but by a certain train of thinking more suitable to their genius and capacity.

HUME.

THE

THE ORIGIN OF THE IDEA OF POWER.

WHEN we look about us towards external objects, and consider the operation of causes, we are never able, in any single instance, to discover any power or necessary connection, any quality, which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. We only find, that the one does actually, in fact, follow the other. The impulse of one billiard-ball is attended with motion in the second. This is the whole that appears to the *outward* senses. The mind feels no sentiment or *inward* impression from the succession of objects; consequently there is not, in any single particular instance of cause and effect, any thing which can suggest the idea of power or necessary connection.—From the first appearance of an object, we never can conjecture what effect will result from it. But were the power or energy of any cause discoverable by the mind, we could foresee the effect even without experience; and might, at first, pronounce with certainty concerning it, by the mere dint of thought and reasoning.

The scenes in the universe are continually shifting, and one object follows another in an uninterrupted course; but the power or force which actuates the whole machine, is entirely concealed

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from

from us, and never discovers itself in any of the sensible qualities of body. We know that, in fact, heat is a constant attendant of flame; but what is the connection between them, we have no room so much as to conjecture or imagine. It is impossible, therefore, that the idea of power can be derived from the contemplation of bodies in single instances of their operation; because no bodies discover any power which can be the original of this idea.

Mr Locke, in his chapter of Power, says, That finding, from experience, that there are several new productions in matter, and concluding that there must somewhere be a power capable of producing them, we arrive by this reasoning at the idea of power. But no reasoning can ever give us a new original simple idea; as this philosopher himself confesses. This, therefore, can never be the origin of that idea. Nor can external objects, as they appear to the senses, give us any idea of power or necessary connection by their operation in particular instances. This idea is derived from reflection on the operations of our own minds, and is copied from internal impressions. We are every moment conscious of internal power, while we feel that, by the simple command of our will, we can move the organs of our body, or direct the faculties of our minds, in their operation. An act of volition produces

motion in our limbs, or raises a new idea in our imagination. This influence of the will we know by consciousness. Hence we acquire the idea of power or energy; and are certain, that we ourselves, and all other intelligent beings, are possessed of power. This idea, then, is an idea of reflection, since it arises from reflecting on the operations of our minds, and on the command which is exercised by the will, both over the organs of the body and the faculties of the mind.

H U M E.

P R E J U D I C E.

THERE is a high degree of difficulty in questioning opinions established by time, by habit, and by education; every religious and political innovation is opposed by the timidity of some, the obstinacy and pride of others, and the ignorance of the bulk of mankind, who are incapable of attention to reasoning and argument; and must, if they have any opinions, have opinions of prejudice. All improvements therefore in religion and politics must be gradual. There was a time when the most part of the inhabitants of Britain would have been as much startled at questioning the truth of the doctrine of Transubstantiation, as they would, in this age, at the most sceptical doubts on the being of a God.

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ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

WHEN an opinion appears to me indifferent, it is by the balance of my reason I weigh its advantages. But if that opinion excite in me hatred, love, or fear, it is not my reason, but my passions, that judge of its truth or falsity. Now, the more vigorous my passions are, the less share will reason have in my judgments. To overcome the most gross prejudice, it is not enough to see its absurdity.—Have I demonstrated in the morning the nonexistence of apparitions? If I am at night alone in my chamber or a wood, and phantoms or apparitions seem to rise out of the floor or the earth, terror seizes me; the most solid reasoning cannot dissipate my fear. To stifle in me the fear of spectres, it is not sufficient to prove their nonexistence; I must have the reasons by which that prejudice is destroyed as habitually present with me, as constantly in my memory, as the prejudice itself. Now this is a work of time, and in some cases of a very long time; till this time I shall tremble in the dark at the very name of spectre and magician.—This is a fact proved by experience.

HELVETIUS.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

THERE is something exceedingly curious in the constitution and operations of prejudice. It has the singular ability of accommodating itself to all the possible varieties of the human mind. Some passions and vices are but thinly scattered among mankind, and find only here and there a fitness of reception. But prejudice, like the spider, makes every where its home. It has neither taste nor choice of place, and all that it requires is room. There is scarcely a situation, except fire and water, in which a spider will not live: So let the mind be as naked as the walls of an empty and forsaken tenement, gloomy as a dungeon, or ornamented with the richest abilities of thinking; let it be hot, cold, dark or light, lonely or inhabited; still prejudice, if undisturbed, will fill it with cobwebs, and live like the spider, where there seems nothing to live on. If the one prepares her food by poisoning it to her palate and her use, the other does the same; and as several of our passions are strongly characterized by the animal world, Prejudice may be denominated the spider of the mind.

TH. PAINE.

ON

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

THE Chinese theologian, who proves the nine incarnations of Wisthnou; and the Musselman, who, after the Koran, maintains, that the earth is carried on the horns of a bull; certainly found their opinions on ridiculous principles and prejudices: yet each of them, in his own country, is esteemed a person of sense. What can be the reason of this? It is because they maintain opinions generally received. In relation to religious truths, reason loses all her force against two grand missionaries, Example and Fear. Besides, in all countries, the prejudices of the great are the laws of the little. This Chinese and Musselman pass then for wise, only because they are fools of the common folly.—Certain countrymen, it is said, erected a bridge, and upon it carved this inscription: *The present bridge is built here*: If folly and stupidity of this kind must always excite laughter, why do not different absurdities in our own country make the same impression upon us? It is because people freely ridicule the folly from which they think themselves exempt, because nobody repeats after the countrymen, *The present bridge is built here*.

HELVETIUS.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

MEN are vain, full of contempt, and consequently unjust, whenever they can be so with impunity. For which reason all men imagine, that on this globe there is no part of it, in this part of the earth no nation, in the nation no province, in the province no city, in the city no society, comparable to their own. We, step by step, surprise ourselves into a secret persuasion that we are superior to all our acquaintance. If an oyster, confined within its shell, is acquainted with no more of the universe than the rock on which it is fixed, and therefore cannot judge of its extent; how can a man, in the midst of a small society, always surrounded by the same objects, and acquainted with only one train of thoughts, be able to form a proper estimate of merit without his own circle. Truth is never ingendered or perceived but in the fermentation of contrary opinions. The universe is only known to us in proportion as we become acquainted with it. Whoever confines himself to conversing with one set of companions, cannot avoid adopting their prejudices, especially if they flatter his pride. Who can separate himself from an error, when vanity, the companion of ignorance, has tied him to it, and rendered it dear to him?

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It is the philosopher alone who contemplates the manners, laws, customs, religions, and the different passions that actuate mankind, that can become almost insensible both to the praise and satire of his cotemporaries; can break all the chains of prejudice, examine with modesty and indifference the various opinions which divide the human species; pass, without astonishment, from a seraglio to a chartreuse, reflect with pleasure on the extent of human folly, and see, with the same eye, Alcibiades cut off the tail of his dog, and Mahomet shut himself up in his cavern; the one to ridicule the folly of the Athenians, and the other to enjoy the adoration of the world. He knows, that our ideas necessarily proceed from the company we keep, the books we read, and the objects presented to our sight; and that a superior intelligence might divine our thoughts from the objects presented before us, and from our thoughts divine the number and nature of the objects offered to the mind.—The Arab persuaded of the infallibility of his Khalif, laughs at the credulity of the Tartar, who believes the Great Lama immortal. In Africa, the negro who pays his adorations to a root, the claw of a lobster, or the horn of an animal, sees nothing on the earth but an immense mass of deities, and laughs at the scarcity of gods among us; while the ill-informed Musselman accuses us with acknowledging three.

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—If a sage, descended from heaven, and in his conduct consulted only the light of reason, he would universally pass for a fool. All are so scrupulously attached to the interest of their own vanity, that the title of wise is only given to the fools of the common folly. The more foolish an opinion is, the more dangerous it is to prove its folly. Fontenelle was accustomed to say, that if he held every truth in his hand, he would take great care not to open it to show them to men.

In destroying of prejudices, we ought to treat them with respect: like the doves from the ark, we ought to send some truths on the discovery, to see if the deluge of prejudices does not yet cover the face of the earth; if error begin to subside; and if there can be perceived here and there some isles, where virtue and truth may find rest for their feet, and communicate themselves to mankind.

HELVETIUS.

VIRTUES AND VICES OF PREJUDICE.

ALL those virtues originate from prejudice, the exact observance of which does not in the least contribute to the public happiness; such as the austerities of those senseless Fakirs with which the Indies are peopled: virtues that, being often indifferent, and even prejudicial to the state, are the punishment of those who make vows for the

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the performance of them. These false virtues in most nations (for many of them are to be found in every nation under heaven) are more honoured than the true virtues; and those that practise them held in greater venerations than good citizens.—Happy the people among whom the virtues which originate from prejudice and folly are only ridiculous, they are frequently extremely barbarous. In the capital of Cochin they bring up crocodiles; and whoever exposes himself to the fury of one of these animals, and is devoured, is reckoned among the elect. What is more barbarous than the institution of convents among the Papists? In Martemban, it is an act of virtue, on the day when the idol is brought out, for the people to throw themselves under the wheels of his chariot; and whoever offers himself to this death, is reputed a saint.—As there are virtues of prejudice, there are also vices of prejudice. It is one for a Bramin to marry a virgin. If, during the three months in which the people of Formosa are ordered to go naked, a man fastens upon him the smallest piece of linen, he wears, say they, a clothing unworthy of a man. The neglect, in Catholic countries, of fasts, confessions, penances, and pater nosters, is a crime of the first magnitude. And there is, perhaps, no country where the people have not a greater abhorrence of some of these crimes of pre-

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prejudice, than for villanies the most atrocious, and the most injurious to society.

HELVETIUS.

RELIGIOUS AND PHILOSOPHICAL PREJUDICES.

IT is a very true observation, and a very common one, that our affections and passions put frequently a bias so secret, and yet so strong, on our judgments, as to make them swerve from the direction of right reason: and on this principle we must account, in a great measure, for the different systems of philosophy and religion, about which men dispute so much, and fight and persecute so often. But it is not so commonly observed, though it be equally true, that as extensive as this principle is in itself, since it extends to almost all mankind, the action of it in one single man is sometimes sufficient to extend the effects of it to millions. Many a system, and many an institution, has appeared and thrived in the world as a production of human wisdom raised to the highest pitch, and even illuminated by inspiration, which was owing, in its origin, to the predominant passion, or to the madness of one single man. Authority comes soon to stand in the place of reason. Men come to defend what they never examined, and to explain what they never understood.

stood. Their system, or their institution, to which they were determined by chance, not by choice, is to them that rock of truth on which alone they can be saved from error: they cling to it accordingly; and doubt itself was this rock to the Academicians — *De rebus incognitis judicant, et ad quamcunque sunt disciplinam quasi tempestate delati, ad eam tanquam ad saxum adhærescunt.* (Acad. quæst. lib. 2.)

All errors, even those of ignorance and superstition, are hard to remove when they have taken long hold of the minds of men, and especially when they are woven into systems of religion. But there are some from which men are unwilling to depart, and of which they grow fond by degrees. As men advance in knowledge, their self-conceit and curiosity are apt to increase; and these are sure to be flattered by every opinion that gives man high notions of his own importance. What contradictions and inconsistencies are not huddled together in the human mind?—Superstition is produced by a sense of our weakness, philosophical presumption by an opinion of our strength; and superstition and presumption contribute alike to continue, to confirm, to propagate error.—Errors in rules of policy and law are easy to be corrected by experience, like errors in natural philosophy. Nay, the first are so the most; because how little regard so ever philosophers may have to experience, in ei-
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ther case, the truth will force itself upon them, or others; in one, by the course of affairs; whereas it must be sought, to be had in the other. But when it is sought, it is obtained. Errors in theology and metaphysics cannot be thus corrected. Systems of laws and politics may be various; nay, contrary to one another; and yet be such as right reason dictates, provided they do not stand in opposition to any of the laws of our nature. But in theological reasonings, and those which are called metaphysical, the various opinions may be all false; or if they are not all so, one alone can be true. This consideration should have two effects. It should render philosophers and divines more cautious in framing opinions on such subjects, and less positive in maintaining them from the beginning. The very contrary has happened, to such a degree of extravagance, as must seem delirious to every one who is not in the same delirium. Can he be less than mad, who pretends to contemplate an intellectual world, which he assumes in the dull mirror of his own mind; of which he knows little more than this, that it is both dull and narrow? Can he be less than mad, who perseveres dogmatically in this pretension, whilst he is obliged to own, that he arrives with many helps, much pains, and by slow degrees, to a little imperfect knowledge of the visible world which he inhabits; and concerning which he is, therefore,

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sober,

sober, and modest enough to reason hypothetically?—In a word, can he be less than mad, who boasts a revelation superadded to reason, to supply the defects of it; and who superadds reason to revelation, to supply the defects of this too, at the same time?—This is madness, or there is no such thing incident to our nature.—All men are apt to have a high conceit of their own understandings, and to be tenacious of the opinions they profess: and yet almost all men are guided by the understandings of others, not by their own; and may be said more truly to adopt, than to beget, their opinions. Nurses, parents, pedagogues, and after them all, and above them all, that universal pedagogue Custom, fill the mind with notions which it has no share in framing; which it receives as passively as it receives the impressions of outward objects; and which left to itself, it would never have framed, perhaps, or would have examined afterwards. Thus prejudices are established by education, and habits by custom. We are taught to think what others think, not how to think for ourselves: and whilst the memory is loaded, the understanding remains unexercised, or exercised in such trammels as constrain its motions, and direct its pace, till that which was artificial becomes in some sort natural, and the mind can go no other. It may sound oddly, but it is true in many cases, to say, that if men had learn-

ed less, their way to knowledge would be shorter and easier. It is indeed shorter and easier to proceed from ignorance to knowledge, than from error. They who are in the last, must unlearn, before they can learn to any good purpose: and the first part of this double task is not, in many respects, the least difficult; for which reason it is seldom undertaken. The vulgar, under which denomination we must rank, on this occasion, almost all the sons of Adam, content themselves to be guided by vulgar opinions. They know little, and believe much. They examine and judge for themselves in the common affairs of life sometimes: and not always even in these. But the greatest and noblest objects of the human mind are very transiently, at best, the object of theirs. On all these they resign themselves to the authority that prevails among the men with whom they live. Some of them want the means, all of them want the will, to do more: and as absurd as this may appear in speculation, it is best, perhaps, upon the whole, the human nature, and the nature of government considered, that it should be as it is.

BOLINGBROKE.

THE

THE INEFFICACY OF LAWS TO REGULATE THE PRICE OF PROVISIONS.

IT is impracticable to fix the rates and prices of provisions and commodities by civil laws; and if it were possible to reduce the price of food by any other expedient than introducing plenty, nothing could be more pernicious and destructive to the public. Where the produce of a year, for instance, falls so far short, as to afford full subsistence only for nine months, the only expedient for making it laste all the twelve, is to raise the prices, to put the people by that means on short allowance, and oblige them to spare their food till a more plentiful year.—But in reality, the increase of prices is a necessary consequence of scarcity; and laws, instead of preventing it, only increase the evil, by cramping and restraining commerce.

HUME.

PRIDE.

IT is a trite observation in philosophy, and even in common life and conversation, that it is our own pride which makes us so much displeased with the pride of other people; and that vanity becomes insupportable to us, merely because we are vain. The gay naturally associate themselves with the

gay, and the amorous with the amorous. But the proud never can endure the proud; and rather seek the company of those who are of an opposite disposition. As we are, all of us, proud in some degree, pride is universally blamed and condemned by all mankind; as having a natural tendency to cause uneasiness in others by means of comparison. And this effect must follow the more naturally, that those who have an ill-grounded conceit of themselves are for ever making those comparisons; nor have they any other way of supporting their vanity. A man of sense and merit is pleased with himself, independent of all foreign considerations; but a fool must always find some person that is more foolish, in order to keep himself in good humour with his own parts and understanding.

But though an overweening conceit of our own merit be vicious and disagreeable, nothing can be more laudable, than to have a value for ourselves where we really have qualities that are valuable. The utility and advantage of any quality to ourselves is a source of virtue, as well as its agreeableness to others; and it is certain, that nothing is more useful to us in the conduct of life, than a due degree of pride, which makes us sensible of our own merit, and gives us a confidence and assurance in all our own projects and enterprizes. Whatever capacity any one may be endowed with,
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it is entirely useless to him if he be not acquainted with it, and form not designs suitable to it. It is requisite on all occasions to know our own force; and were it allowable to err on either side, it would be more advantageous to over-rate our merit, than to form ideas of it below its just standard. Fortune commonly favours the bold and enterprising; and nothing inspires us with more boldness than a good opinion of ourselves. Thus self-satisfaction and vanity may not only be allowable, but requisite in a character. It is, however, certain, that good-breeding and decency require, that we should avoid all signs and expressions which tend directly to show that passion. We have all of us a wonderful partiality for ourselves; and were we always to give vent to our sentiments in this particular, we should mutually cause the greatest indignation in each other, not only by the immediate presence of so disagreeable a subject of comparison, but also by the contrariety of our judgments. The *rules of good-breeding* are, therefore, established, in order to prevent the opposition of mens pride, and render conversation agreeable and inoffensive. Nothing is more disagreeable than a man's overweening conceit of himself. Every one almost has a strong propensity to this vice. No one can well distinguish *in himself* betwixt the vice and virtue; or be certain that the esteem of his own merit is well founded. For

these reasons, all direct expressions of this passion are condemned; nor do we make any exceptions to this rule in favour of men of sense and merit. They are not allowed to do themselves justice openly, in words, no more than other people; and even if they show a reserve and secret doubt in doing themselves justice in their own thoughts, they will be more applauded. That impertinent, and almost universal propensity in men to over-value themselves, has given such a prejudice against self-applause, that we are apt to condemn it, by a *general rule*, wherever we meet with it; and it is with some difficulty we give a privilege to men of sense, even in their most secret thoughts. At least, it must be owned, that some disguise in this particular is absolutely requisite; and that if we harbour pride in our breasts, we must carry a fair outside, and have the appearance of modesty and mutual deference in all our conduct and behaviour. We must on every occasion be ready to prefer others to ourselves; to treat them with a kind of deference, even though they be our equals; to seem always the lowest and least in the company, where we are not very much distinguished above them. And if we observe these rules in our conduct, men will have more indulgence for our secret sentiments, when we discover them in an oblique manner.

It has never been believed by any one, who
hath

hath had any practice in the world, and can penetrate into the sentiments of men, that the humility which good-breeding and decency require of us, goes beyond the outside, or that a thorough sincerity in this particular is esteemed a real part of our duty. On the contrary, we may observe, that a genuine and hearty pride, or self-esteem, if well concealed and well-founded, is essential to a man of honour; and that there is no quality of the mind which is more indispensably requisite to procure the esteem and approbation of mankind. There are certain deferences and mutual submissions, which custom requires of the different ranks of men towards each other: and whoever exceeds in this particular, if through interest, is accused of meanness; if through ignorance, of simplicity. It is necessary, therefore, to know our rank and station in the world, whether it be fixed by our birth, fortune, employments, talents, or reputation. It is necessary to feel the sentiment and passion of pride in conformity to it, and to regulate our actions accordingly. And should it be said, that prudence may suffice to regulate our actions in this particular without any real pride; it may be observed, that here the object of prudence is to conform our actions to the general usage and custom; and that it is impossible those tacit airs of superiority should ever have been established and authoris'd by custom, unless men were

were generally proud, and unless that passion were generally approved when well-grounded.

In general, we may observe, that whatever we call *heroic virtue*, and admire under the character of greatness and elevation of mind, is either nothing but a steady and well-established pride and self-esteem, or partakes largely of that passion. Courage, intrepidity, ambition, love of glory, magnanimity, and all the other shining virtues of that kind, have plainly a strong mixture of self-esteem in them, and derive a great part of their merit from that origin. Accordingly, we find that many religious declaimers decry those virtues as purely Pagan and natural, and represent to us the excellency of the *Christian* religion, which places humility in the rank of virtues, and corrects the judgment of the world, and even of philosophers, who so generally admire all the efforts of pride and ambition. Whether this virtue of humility, has been rightly understood, it may not be easy to determine; but we must confess, that the world naturally esteems a well-regulated pride, which secretly animates our conduct, without breaking out into such indecent expressions of vanity as may offend the vanity of others.

HUME.

PRIESTS.

PRIESTS.

THE first priests were probably botanists, chemists, physicians, natural philosophers, and astronomers. These performed cures, showed wonders, and were in the rank of those impostors who, under the name of conjurers, continue to deceive the world. The poets took up the principles and actions of these men; personified some of them; and referred those they could not understand to the operations of invisible powers, with whom the impostors pretended to converse, and whose messengers and delegates they were supposed to be. These invisible beings, once introduced into the system of nature, and being supposed to cure diseases, to perform miracles, and to foretel events, men were soon prevailed upon, not only to consign their health and fortunes to their direction, but even their understandings and senses; and to receive rules from them for the conduct of life, which could only be derived from those senses and understandings: rules which gradually deviated from the effects of experience, until all attention was transferred from experience to the priest, and religion was set in opposition to morality.

WILLIAMS.

ON

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

THOUGH all mankind have a strong propensity to religion at certain times and in certain dispositions, yet are there few or none who have it to that degree, and with that constancy, which is requisite to support the character of this profession. It must therefore happen, that clergymen being drawn from the common mass of mankind, as people are to other employments, by the views of profit, the greatest part, though no Atheists or Free-thinkers, will find it necessary, on particular occasions, to feign more devotion than they are at that time possessed of; and to maintain the appearance of fervor and seriousness, even when jaded with the exercises of their religion, or when they have their minds engaged in the common occupations of life. They must not, like the rest of the world, give scope to their natural movements and sentiments: they must set a guard over their looks, and words, and actions: and in order to support the veneration paid them by the ignorant vulgar, they must not only keep a remarkable reserve, but must promote the spirit of superstition, by a continued grimace and hypocrisy. This dissimulation often destroys the candour and ingenuity of their temper, and makes an irreparable breach in their character.

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If by chance any of them be possessed of a temper more susceptible of devotion than usual, so that he has but little occasion for hypocrisy to support the character of his profession, it is so natural for him to overrate this advantage, and to think that it atones for every violation of morality, that frequently he is not more virtuous than the hypocrite. And though few dare openly avow those exploded opinions, *That every thing is lawful to the saints, and that they alone have property in their goods*; yet may we observe, that these principles lurk in every bosom, and represent a zeal for religious observances as so great a merit, that it may compensate for many vices and enormities. This observation is so common, that all prudent men are on their guard when they meet with any extraordinary appearance of religion; though, at the same time, they confess, that there are many exceptions to this general rule; and that probity and superstition, or even probity and fanaticism, are not altogether, and in every instance, incompatible.

Most men are ambitious; but the ambition of other men may commonly be satisfied, by excelling in their particular profession, and thereby promoting the interests of society. The ambition of the clergy can often be satisfied only by promoting ignorance, and superstition, and implicit faith, and pious frauds. And having got what
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Archimedes only wanted, (viz. another world on which he could fix his engines), no wonder they move this world at their pleasure.

Most men have an overweening conceit of themselves; but these have a peculiar temptation to that vice, who are regarded with such veneration, and are even deemed sacred, by the ignorant multitude.

Most men are apt to bear a particular regard for members of their own profession: but as a lawyer, or physician, or merchant, does each of them follow out his business apart, the interests of these professions are not so closely united as the interests of clergymen of the same religion; where the whole body gains by the veneration paid to their common tenets, and by the suppression of antagonists.

Few men bear contradiction with patience; but the clergy proceed even to a degree of fury on this article: because all their credit and livelihood depend upon the belief which their opinions meet with; and they alone pretend to a divine and supernatural authority, or have any colour for representing their antagonists as impious and prophane. The *odium theologicum*, or theological hatred, is noted even to a proverb; and means that degree of rancour which is the most furious and implacable.

Revenge is a natural passion to mankind; but
2 seems

seems to reign with the greatest force in priests and women. Because, being deprived of the immediate exertion of anger, in violence and combat, they are apt to fancy themselves despised on that account; and their pride supports their vindictive disposition.

Thus many of the vices in human nature are, by fixed moral causes, inflamed in that profession; and though several individuals escape the contagion, yet all wise governments will be on their guard against the attempts of a society who will for ever combine into one faction; and while it acts as a society, will for ever be actuated by ambition, pride, revenge, and a persecuting spirit.

The temper of religion is grave and serious; and this is the character required of priests, which confines them to strict rules of decency, and commonly prevents irregularity and intemperance among them. The gaiety, much less the excesses of pleasure, is not permitted in that body; and this virtue is, perhaps, the only one they owe to their profession. In religions, indeed, founded on speculative principles, and where public discourses make a part of religious services, it may also be supposed, that the clergy will have a considerable share in the learning of the times, though it is certain that their taste in eloquence will always be better than their skill in reasoning and philosophy. But whoever possesses the other

noble virtues of humanity, meekness, and moderation, as very many of them, no doubt, do, is beholden for them to nature or reflection, not to the genius of his calling.

It was no bad expedient in the old Romans, for preventing the strong effect of the priestly character, to make it a law, that none should be received into the sacerdotal office till he was past fifty years of age, (Dion. Hal. lib. 1.) The living a layman till that age, it is presumed, would be able to fix the character.

It is a trite, but not altogether a false maxim, That *priests of all religions are the same*; and though the character of the profession will not, in every instance, prevail over the personal character, yet is it sure always to predominate with the greater number. For, as chemists observe, that spirits when raised to a certain height are all the same, from whatever materials they are extracted; so these men, being elevated above humanity, acquire a uniform character, which is entirely their own, and which, in my opinion, is, generally speaking, not the most amiable that is to be met with in human society.

HUME.

PRI-

PRIMOGENITURE CONTRARY TO THE
REAL INTEREST OF FAMILIES.

WHEN land, like moveables, is considered as the means only of subsistence and enjoyment, the natural law of succession divides it, like them, among all the children of the family; of all of whom the subsistence and enjoyment may be supposed equally dear to the father. This natural law of succession accordingly took place among the Romans, who made no more distinction between elder and younger, between male and female, in the inheritance of lands, than we do in the distribution of moveables. But when land was considered as the means, not of subsistence merely, but of power and protection, it was thought better that it should descend undivided to one. In those disorderly times, every great landlord was a sort of petty prince. His tenants were his subjects. He was their judge, and in some respects their legislator in peace, and their leader in war. He made war according to his own discretion, frequently against his neighbours, and sometimes against his sovereign. The security of a landed estate, therefore, the protection which its owner could afford to those who dwelt on it, depended upon its greatness. To divide it was to ruin it, and to expose every part of it to be

be oppressed and swallowed up by the incursions of its neighbours. The law of primogeniture, therefore, came to take place, not immediately indeed, but in process of time, in the succession of landed estates, for the same reason that it has generally taken place in that of monarchies, though not always at their first institution. That the power, and consequently the security, of the monarchy may not be weakened by division, it must descend entire to one of the children. To which of them so important a preference shall be given, must be determined by some general rule, founded not upon the doubtful distinctions of personal merit, but upon some plain and evident difference which can admit of no dispute. Among the children of the same family, there can be no indisputable difference but that of sex, and that of age. The male sex is universally preferred to the female; and when all other things are equal, the elder every-where takes place of the younger. Hence the origin of the right of primogeniture, and of what is called lineal succession.

Laws frequently continue in force long after the circumstances which first gave occasion to them, and which could alone render them reasonable, are no more. In the present state of Europe, the proprietor of a single acre of land is as perfectly secure of his possession as the proprietor of a hundred thousand. The right of primogeniture,

geniture, however, still continues to be respected; and as of all institutions it is the fittest to support the pride of family-distinctions, it is still likely to endure for many centuries. In every other respect, nothing can be more contrary to the real interest of a numerous family, than a right which, in order to enrich one, beggars all the rest of the children.

Entails are the natural consequences of the law of primogeniture. They were introduced to preserve a certain lineal succession, of which the law of primogeniture first gave the idea, and to hinder any part of the original estate from being carried out of the proposed line, either by gift or devise, or alienation; either by the folly, or by the misfortune of any of its successive owners. They were altogether unknown to the Romans. Neither their substitutions nor fideicommisses bear any resemblance to entails, though some French lawyers have thought proper to dress the modern institution in the language and garb of those ancient ones.

When great landed estates were a sort of principalities, entails might not be unreasonable. Like what are called the fundamental laws of some monarchies, they might frequently hinder the security of thousands from being endangered by the caprice or extravagance of one man. But in the present state of Europe, when small as well as great

great estates derive their security from the laws of their country, nothing can be more completely absurd. They are founded upon the most absurd of all suppositions, the supposition that every successive generation of men have not an equal right to the earth, and to all that it possesses; but that the property of the present generation should be restrained and regulated according to the fancy of those who died perhaps five hundred years ago. Entails, however, are still respected through the greater part of Europe; in those countries particularly in which noble birth is a necessary qualification for the enjoyment either of civil or military honours. Entails are thought necessary for maintaining this exclusive privilege of the nobility to the great offices and honours of their country; and that order having usurped one unjust advantage over the rest of their fellow-citizens, lest their poverty should render it ridiculous, it is thought reasonable that they should have another. The common law of England, indeed, is said to abhor perpetuities, and they are accordingly more restricted there than in any other European monarchy; though even England is not altogether without them. In Scotland more than one-fifth, perhaps more than one-third part of the whole lands of the country, are at present supposed to be under strict entail.

Great tracts of uncultivated land were in this manner

manner not only engrossed by particular families, but the possibility of their being divided again was as much as possible precluded for ever. It seldom happens, however, that a great proprietor is a great improver. In the disorderly times which gave birth to those barbarous institutions, the great proprietor was sufficiently employed in defending his own territories, or in extending his jurisdiction and authority over those of his neighbours. He had no leisure to attend to the cultivation and improvement of land. When the establishment of law and order afforded him this leisure, he often wanted the inclination, and almost always the requisite abilities. If the expence of his house and person either equalled or exceeded his revenue, as it did very frequently, he had no stock to employ in this manner. If he was an œconomist, he generally found it more profitable to employ his annual savings in new purchases, than in the improvement of his old estate. To improve land with profit, like all other commercial projects, requires an exact attention to small savings and small gains, of which a man born to a great fortune, even though naturally frugal, is very seldom capable. The situation of such a person naturally disposes him to attend rather to ornament which pleases his fancy, than to profit for which he has so little occasion. The elegance of his dress, of his equipage, of his house and household-

household-furniture, are objects which from his infancy he has been accustomed to have some anxiety about. The turn of mind which this habit naturally forms, follows him when he comes to think of the improvement of land. He embellishes perhaps four or five hundred acres in the neighbourhood of his house, at ten times the expence which the land is worth after all his improvements; and finds, that if he was to improve his whole estate in the same manner, and he has little taste for any other, he would be a bankrupt before he had finished a tenth part of it. There still remain in both parts of the united kingdoms some great estates, which have continued without interruption in the hands of the same family since the times of feudal anarchy. Compare the present condition of those estates with the possessions of the small proprietors in their neighbourhood, and you will require no other argument to convince you how unfavourable such extensive property is to improvement.

A. SMITH.

PROBABILITY.

THERE is certainly a probability which arises from a superiority of chances on any side; and according as this superiority increases and surpasses the opposite chances, the probability receives

ceives a proportionable increase, and begets still a higher degree of belief or assent to that side in which we discover the superiority. If a dye were marked with one figure or number of spots on four sides, and with another figure or number of spots on the two remaining sides, it would be more probable that the former would turn up than the latter; though, if it had a thousand sides marked in the same manner, and only one side different, the probability would be much higher, and our belief or expectation of the event more steady and secure.—Mr Locke divides all arguments into demonstrative and probable. In this view we must say, that it is only probable all men must die, or that the sun will rise to-morrow. But, to conform our language more to common use, we should divide arguments into demonstrations, proofs, and probabilities: by proofs, meaning such arguments from experience as leave no room for doubt or opposition.

HUME.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

AS demonstration is the showing the agreement or disagreement of two ideas by the intervention of one or more proofs, which have a constant, immutable, and visible connection one with another; so probability is nothing but the appearance of
such

such an agreement or disagreement, by the intervention of proofs, whose connection is not constant and immutable, or at least is not perceived to be so, but is, or appears for the most part to be so, and is enough to induce the mind to judge the proposition to be true or false, rather than the contrary. For example: In the demonstration of it, a man perceives the certain immutable connection there is of equality between the three angles of a triangle and those intermediate ones which are made use of to show their equality to two right ones; and so, by an intuitive knowledge of the agreement or disagreement of the intermediate ideas in each step of the progress, the whole series is continued with an evidence, which clearly shows the agreement or disagreement of those three angles in equality to two right ones: and thus he has certain knowledge that it is so.—But another man, who never took the pains to observe the demonstration, hearing a mathematician, a man of credit, affirm the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right ones, assents to it, *i. e.* receives it for true: in which the foundation of his assent is the probability of the thing, the proof being such as for the most part carries truth with it; the man on whose testimony he receives it not being wont to affirm any thing contrary to or besides his knowledge, especially in matters of this kind. So that
that

that which causes his assent to this proposition, That the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, that which makes him take these ideas to agree without knowing them to do so, is the wonted veracity of the speaker in other cases, or his supposed veracity in this.

LOCKE.

GROUND S OF PROBABILITY.

PROBABILITY being to supply the defect of our knowledge, and to guide us where that fails, is always conversant about propositions whereof we have no certainty, but only some inducements to receive them for true.

The grounds of it are these two following:

First, The conformity of any thing with our own knowledge, observation, and experience.

Secondly, The testimony of others, vouching their observation, and experience. In the testimony of others is to be considered, 1. The number, 2. The integrity, 3. The skill of the witnesses. 4. The design of the author, where it is a testimony out of a book cited. 5. The consistency of the parts, and circumstances of the relation. 6. Contrary testimonies.

Probability wanting that intuitive evidence which infallibly determines the understanding and produces certain knowledge, the mind, if it
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would proceed rationally, ought to examine all the grounds of probability, and see how they make more or less, for or against, any proposition, before it assents to or dissents from it; and, upon a due balancing the whole, reject or receive it, with a more or less firm assent, proportionably to the preponderancy of the greater grounds of probability on one side or the other. For example:

If I myself see a man walk on the ice, it is past probability, it is knowledge: but if another tells me he saw a man in England, in the midst of a sharp winter, walk upon water hardened with cold; this has so great a conformity with what is usually observed to happen, that I am disposed by the nature of the thing itself to assent to it, unless some manifest suspicion attend the relation of that matter of fact. But if the same thing be told to one born between the tropics, who never saw nor heard of any such thing before, there the whole probability relies on testimony; and as the relators are more in number, and of more credit, and have no interest to speak contrary to the truth, so that matter of fact is like to find more or less belief. Though, to a man whose experience has always been quite contrary, and has never heard of any thing like it, the most untainted credit of a witness will scarce be able to find belief. As it happened to a Dutch ambassa-

dor,

dor, who entertaining the king of Siam with the particularities of Holland, which he was inquisitive after, amongst other things told him, that the water in his country would sometimes, in cold weather, be so hard, that men walked upon it, and that it would bear an elephant if he were there. To which the king replied, “ Hi-
“ therto I have believed the strange things you
“ have told me, because I look upon you as a fo-
“ ber fair man; but now I am sure you lie.”

Upon these grounds depends the probability of any proposition; and as the conformity of our knowledge, as the certainty of observations, as the frequency and constancy of experience, and the number and credibility of testimonies, do more or less agree or disagree with it; so is any proposition in itself more or less probable. There is another, I confess, which though by itself it be no true ground of probability, yet is often made use of for one, by which men most commonly regulate their assent, and upon which they pin their faith more than any thing else, and that is the opinion of others; though there cannot be a more dangerous thing to rely on, nor more likely to mislead one, since there is much more falsehood and error among men than truth and knowledge. And if the opinions and persuasions of others, whom we know and think well of, be a ground of assent, men have reason to be Hea-

thens in Japan, Mahometans in Turkey, Papists in Spain, Protestants in England, and Lutherans in Sweden. LOCKE.

TENDENCY AND EFFECTS OF PRODIGALITY.

CAPITALS are increased by parsimony, and diminished by prodigality and misconduct.

Whatever a person saves from his revenue he adds to his capital, and either employs it himself in maintaining an additional number of productive hands, or enables some other person to do so, by lending it to him for an interest, that is, for a share of the profits. As the capital of an individual can be increased only by what he saves from his annual revenue or his annual gains; so the capital of a society, which is the same with that of all the individuals who compose it, can be increased only in the same manner.

Parsimony, and not industry, is the immediate cause of the increase of capital. Industry indeed provides the subject which parsimony accumulates. But whatever industry might acquire, if parsimony did not save and store up, the capital would never be the greater.

Parsimony, by increasing the fund which is destined for the maintenance of productive hands, tends to increase the number of those hands whose labour adds to the value of the subject upon which it

it is bestowed. It tends therefore to increase the exchangeable value of the annual produce of the land and labour of the country. It puts into motion an additional quantity of industry, which gives an additional value to the annual produce.

What is annually saved is as regularly consumed as what is annually spent, and nearly in the same time too; but is consumed by a different set of people. That portion of his revenue which a rich man annually spends, is in most cases consumed by idle guests and menial servants, who leave nothing behind them in return for their consumption. That portion which he annually saves, as, for the sake of the profit, it is immediately employed as a capital, is consumed in the same manner, and nearly in the same time too, but by a different set of people; by labourers, manufacturers, and artificers, who reproduce with a profit the value of their annual consumption. His revenue, we shall suppose, is paid him in money. Had he spent the whole, the food, clothing, and lodging which the whole could have purchased, would have been distributed among the former set of people. By saving a part of it, as that part is for the sake of the profit immediately employed as a capital either by himself or by some other person, the food, clothing, and lodging, which may be purchased with it, are necessarily

reserved for the latter. The consumption is the same; but the consumers are different.

By what a frugal man annually saves, he not only affords maintenance to an additional number of productive hands for that or the ensuing year; but, like the founder of a public workhouse, he establishes as it were a perpetual fund for the maintenance of an equal number in all times to come. The perpetual allotment and destination of this fund, indeed, is not always guarded by any positive law, by any trust-right, or deed of mortmain. It is always guarded, however, by a very powerful principle, the plain and evident interest of every individual to whom any share of it shall ever belong. No part of it can ever afterwards be employed to maintain any but productive hands, without an evident loss to the person who thus perverts it from its proper destination.

The prodigal perverts it in this manner. By not confining his expence within his income, he encroaches upon his capital. Like him who perverts the revenues of some pious foundation to profane purposes, he pays the wages of idleness with those funds which the frugality of his forefathers had as it were consecrated to the maintenance of industry. By diminishing the funds destined for the employment of productive labour, he necessarily diminishes, so far as it depends upon

on him, the quantity of that labour which adds a value to the subject upon which it is bestowed, and consequently the value of the annual produce of the land and labour of the whole country, the real wealth and revenue of its inhabitants. If the prodigality of some was not compensated by the frugality of others, the conduct of every prodigal, by feeding the idle with the bread of the industrious, tends not only to beggar himself, but to impoverish his country.

Though the expence of the prodigal should be altogether in home-made, and no part of it in foreign commodities, its effect upon the productive funds of the society would still be the same. Every year there would be still a certain quantity of food and clothing, which ought to have maintained productive, employed in maintaining unproductive hands. Every year, therefore, there would still be some diminution in what would otherwise have been the value of the annual produce of the land and labour of the country.

This expence, it may be said indeed, not being in foreign goods, and not occasioning any exportation of gold and silver, the same quantity of money would remain in the country as before. But if the quantity of food and clothing, which were thus consumed by unproductive, had been distributed among productive hands, they would have reproduced, together with a profit, the full

value of their consumption. The same quantity of money would in this case equally have remained in the country, and there would besides have been a reproduction of an equal value of consumable goods. There would have been two values instead of one.

The same quantity of money, besides, cannot long remain in any country in which the value of the annual produce diminishes. The sole use of money is to circulate consumable goods. By means of it, provisions, materials, and finished work, are bought and sold, and distributed to their proper consumers. The quantity of money, therefore, which can be annually employed in any country, must be determined by the value of the consumable goods annually circulated within it. These must consist either in the immediate produce of the land and labour of the country itself, or in something which had been purchased with some part of that produce. Their value, therefore, must diminish as the value of that produce diminishes, and along with it the quantity of money which can be employed in circulating them. But the money which by this annual diminution of produce is annually thrown out of domestic circulation will not be allowed to lie idle. The interest of whoever possesses it requires that it should be employed. But having no employment at home, it will, in spite of all laws

laws and prohibitions, be sent abroad, and employed in purchasing consumable goods which may be of some use at home. Its annual exportation will in this manner continue for some time to add something to the annual consumption of the country beyond the value of its own annual produce. What, in the days of its prosperity, had been saved from that annual produce, and employed in purchasing gold and silver, will contribute for some little time to support its consumption in adversity. The exportation of gold and silver is, in this case, not the cause, but the effect of its declension; and may even, for some little time, alleviate the misery of that declension.

The quantity of money, on the contrary, must in every country naturally increase as the value of the annual produce increases. The value of the consumable goods annually circulated within the society being greater, will require a greater quantity of money to circulate them. A part of the increased produce, therefore, will naturally be employed in purchasing, wherever it is to be had, the additional quantity of gold and silver necessary for circulating the rest. The increase of those metals will in this case be the effect, not the cause, of the public prosperity. Gold and silver are purchased every where in the same manner. The food, clothing, and lodging, the revenue and maintenance of all those whose labour or
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stock is employed in bringing them from the mine to the market, is the price paid for them in Peru as well as in England. The country which has this price to pay, will never be long without the quantity of those metals which it has occasion for; and no country will ever long retain a quantity which it has no occasion for.

Whatever, therefore, we may imagine the real wealth and revenue of a country to consist in, whether in the value of the annual produce of its land and labour, as plain reason seems to dictate; or in the quantity of the precious metals which circulate within it, as vulgar prejudices suppose; in either view of the matter, every prodigal appears to be a public enemy, and every frugal man a public benefactor.

The effects of misconduct are often the same as those of prodigality. Every injudicious and unsuccessful project in agriculture, mines, fisheries, trade, or manufactures, tends in the same manner to diminish the funds destined for the maintenance of productive labour. In every such project, though the capital is consumed by productive hands only, yet as, by the injudicious manner in which they are employed, they do not reproduce the full value of their consumption, there must always be some diminution in what would otherwise have been the productive funds of the society.

It

It can seldom happen, indeed, that the circumstances of a great nation can be much affected either by the prodigality or misconduct of individuals; the profusion or imprudence of some being always more than compensated by the frugality and good conduct of others.

With regard to profusion, the principle which prompts to expence is the passion for present enjoyment, which, though sometimes violent and very difficult to be restrained, is in general only momentary and occasional. But the principle which prompts to save is the desire of bettering our condition; a desire which, though generally calm and dispassionate, comes with us from the womb, and never leaves us till we go into the grave. In the whole interval which separates those two moments, there is scarce perhaps a single instant in which any man is so perfectly and completely satisfied with his situation, as to be without any wish of alteration or improvement of any kind. An augmentation of fortune is the means by which the greater part of men propose and wish to better their condition. It is the means the most vulgar and the most obvious; and the most likely way of augmenting their fortune, is to save and accumulate some part of what they acquire, either regularly and annually, or upon some extraordinary occasions. Though the principle of expence, therefore, prevails in almost all
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men upon some occasions, and in some men upon almost all occasions; yet in the greater part of men, taking the whole course of their life at an average, the principle of frugality seems not only to predominate, but to predominate very greatly.

With regard to misconduct, the number of prudent and successful undertakings is every where much greater than that of injudicious and unsuccessful ones. After all our complaints of the frequency of bankruptcies, the unhappy men who fall into this misfortune make but a very small part of the whole number engaged in trade and all other sorts of business; not much more perhaps than one in a thousand. Bankruptcy is perhaps the greatest and most humiliating calamity which can befall an innocent man. The greater part of men, therefore, are sufficiently careful to avoid it. Some indeed do not avoid it; as some do not avoid the gallows.

Great nations are never impoverished by private, though they sometimes are by public prodigality and misconduct. The whole, or almost the whole, public revenue is in most countries employed in maintaining unproductive hands. Such are the people who compose a numerous and splendid court, a great ecclesiastical establishment, great fleets and armies, who in time of peace produce nothing, and in time of war acquire nothing which can compensate the expence of
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of maintaining them, even while the war lasts. Such people, as they themselves produce nothing, are all maintained by the produce of other mens labour. When multiplied, therefore, to an unnecessary number, they may in a particular year consume so great a share of this produce, as not to leave a sufficiency for maintaining the productive labourers, who should reproduce it next year. The next year's produce, therefore, will be less than that of the foregoing; and if the same disorder should continue, that of the third year will be still less than that of the second. Those unproductive hands, who should be maintained by a part only of the spare revenue of the people, may consume so great a share of their whole revenue, and thereby oblige so great a number to encroach upon their capitals, upon the funds destined for the maintenance of productive labour, that all the frugality and good conduct of individuals may not be able to compensate the waste and degradation of produce occasioned by this violent and forced encroachment.

This frugality and good conduct, however, is upon most occasions, it appears from experience, sufficient to compensate, not only for private prodigality and misconduct of individuals, but the public extravagance of government. The uniform, constant, and uninterrupted effort of every man to better his condition, the principle from which

which public and national as well as private opulence is originally derived, is frequently powerful enough to maintain the natural progress of things toward improvement, in spite both of the extravagance of government, and of the greatest errors of administration. Like the unknown principle of animal life, it frequently restores health and vigour to the constitution, in spite not only of the disease, but of the absurd prescriptions of the doctor.

A. SMITH.

CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH DETERMINE THE MERIT OF PROFESSORS IN UNI- VERSITIES.

IN countries where church-benefices are the greater part of them very moderate, a chair in a university is generally a better establishment than a church-benefice. The universities have, in this case, the picking and choosing of their members from all the churchmen of the country, who, in every country, constitute by far the most numerous class of men of letters. Where church benefices, on the contrary, are many of them very considerable, the church naturally draws from the universities the greater part of their eminent men of letters; who generally find some patron who does himself honour by procuring them

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church-perferment. In the former situation, we are likely to find the universities filled with the most eminent men of letters that are to be found in the country. In the latter, we are likely to find few eminent men among them; and those few among the youngest members of the society, who are likely too to be drained away from it, before they can have acquired experience and knowledge enough to be of much use to it. It is observed by M. de Voltaire, that Father Porree, a Jesuit of no great eminence in the republic of letters, was the only professor they had ever had in France whose works were worth the reading. In a country which has produced so many eminent men of letters, it must appear somewhat singular, that scarce one of them should have been a professor in a university. The famous Gassendi was, in the beginning of his life, a professor in the university of Aix. Upon the first dawning of his genius, it was represented to him, that by going into the church he could easily find a much more quiet and comfortable subsistence, as well as a better situation for pursuing his studies; and he immediately followed the advice. The observation of M. de Voltaire may be applied, I believe, not only to France, but to all other Roman Catholic countries. We very rarely find, in any of them, an eminent man of letters who is a professor in a university, except, perhaps,

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in the professions of law and physic ; professions from which the church is not so likely to draw them. After the church of Rome, that of England is by far the richest and best endowed church in Christendom. In England, accordingly, the church is continually draining the universities of all their best and ablest members ; and an old college tutor, who is known and distinguished in Europe as an eminent man of letters, is as rarely to be found there as in any Roman Catholic country. In Geneva, on the contrary, in the Protestant cantons of Switzerland, in the Protestant countries of Germany, in Holland, in Scotland, in Sweden, and Denmark, the most eminent men of letters whom those countries have produced, have, not all indeed, but the far greater part of them, been professors in universities. In those countries the universities are continually draining the church of all its most eminent men of letters.

A. SMITH.

PROMISES, AND THEIR OBLIGATION.

THE only intelligible reason why men ought to keep their promises is this, That it is for the advantage of society they should keep them ; and if they do not, that, as far as punishment will go, they should be made to keep them. It is for
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the advantage of the whole number that the promises of each individual should be kept; and, rather than they should not be kept, that such individuals as fail to keep them should be punished. If it be asked, How this appears? the answer is at hand:—Such is the benefit to gain, and mischief to avoid, by keeping them, as much more than compensates the mischief of so much punishment as is requisite to oblige men to it. Suppose the constant and universal effect of an observance of promises were to produce mischief, would it then be mens duty to observe them? Would it then be right to make laws, and apply punishment, to oblige men to observe them?—

“No, (it may perhaps be replied); but for this
 “reason: Among promises, there are some that,
 “as every one allows, are void: A promise that
 “is in itself void, cannot, it is true, create any ob-
 “ligation; but allow the promise to be valid,
 “and it is the promise itself that creates the obli-
 “gation, and nothing else.” The fallacy of this argument it is easy to perceive. For what is it then the promise depends on for its validity? What is it that being present makes it valid? What is it that being wanting makes it void? To acknowledge that any one promise may be void, is to acknowledge, that if any other is binding, it is not merely because it is a promise. That circumstance, then, whatever it be, on which the validity

validity of a promise depends, that circumstance, I say, and not the promise itself, must, it is plain, be the cause of the obligation which a promise is apt in general to carry with it, and not the intrinsic obligation of promises upon those who make them. Now this other principle that still recurs upon us, what other can it be than the principle of utility? the principle which furnishes us with that reason, which alone depends not on any higher reason, but which is itself the sole and all-sufficient reason for every point of practice whatsoever. J. BENTHAM.

PROPERTY.

Laws and conventions are necessary in order to unite duties with privileges, and confine justice to its proper objects. In a state of nature, where every thing is common, I owe nothing to those I have promised nothing; I acknowledge nothing to be the property of another, but what is useless to myself. In a state of society the case is different, where the rights of each are fixed by law. Each member of the community, in becoming such, devotes himself to the public from that moment, in such a state as he then is, with all his powers and abilities; of which abilities his possessions make a part. Not that in consequence of this act the possession changes its nature by
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changing hands, and becomes actual property in those of the sovereignty ; but as the power of the community is incomparably greater than that of an individual, the public possession is in fact more fixed and irrevocable, without being more lawful, at least with regard to foreigners. For every state is, with regard to its members, master of all their possessions by virtue of the social compact ; which in a state, serves as the basis of all other rights ; but with regard to other powers or states, it is master of them only by the right of prior occupancy, which it derives from individuals.—The right of prior occupancy, although more real than that of the strongest, becomes not an equitable right till after the establishment of property. Every man hath naturally a right to every thing which is necessary for his subsistence ; but the positive act by which he is made the proprietor of a certain possession excludes him from the property of any other. His portion being assigned him, he ought to confine himself to that, and hath no longer any right to a community of possession. Hence it is, that the right of prior occupancy, thought but of little force in a state of nature, is so respectable in that of society. The point to which we are chiefly directed in the consideration of this right, rather what belongs to another, than what does not belong to us.—Is is easy to conceive, how the united and con-

figuous estates of individuals become the territory of the public, and in what manner the right of sovereignty, extending itself from the subjects to the lands they occupy, becomes at once both real and personal; a circumstance which lays the possessors under a state of the greatest dependence, and makes even their own abilities a security for their fidelity. This is an advantage which does not appear to have been duly attended to by sovereigns among the ancients; who, by styling themselves only Kings of the Persians, the Scythians, the Macedonians, seemed to look on themselves only as chief of men, rather than as masters of a country. Modern princes more artfully style themselves the Kings of England, France, Spain, &c. and thus, by claiming the territory itself, are secure of the inhabitants.—What is very singular in this alienation is, that the community, in accepting the possessions of individuals, is so far from despoiling them thereof, that, on the contrary, it only confirms them in such possession, by converting an usurpation into an actual right, and a bare possession into a real property. The possessors also being considered as the depositories of the public wealth, while their rights are respected by all the members of the state, and maintained by all its force against a foreign power, they acquire, if I may so say, by a cession advantageous to the public, and still more so to themselves,

felves, every thing they ceded by it: a paradox which is easily explained by a distinction between the rights which the sovereign and the proprietor have in the same fund.—It may also happen, that men may form themselves into a society before they have any possessions; and that, acquiring a sufficient territory for all, they may possess it in common, or divide it among them either equally, or in such different proportions as may be determined by the sovereign. Now, in whatsoever manner such acquisition may be made, the right which each individual has to his own estate must be always subordinate to the right which the community hath over the possessions of all; for, without this, there would be nothing binding in the social tie, nor any real force in the exercise of the supreme power.

ROUSSEAU.

THE DISPOSAL OF PROPERTY BY TESTAMENT.

PUFFENDORF has demonstrated, from the very nature of the right of property, that it extends not beyond the life of the proprietor; but that the moment a man is dead, his estate no longer belongs to him. Thus, to prescribe the conditions according to which he is to dispose of it, is in reality less altering his right in appearance than

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extending it in fact.—In general, although the institution of the laws, which regulate the power of individuals to dispose of their effects, belongs only to the sovereign, the spirit of the laws, which government ought to follow in their application, is that of father to son, and from relation to relation, so that the estate of a family should go as little out of it and be as little alienated as possible. There is a very sensible reason for this in favour of children, to whom the right of property would be useless, if the father should leave them nothing, and who, besides having often contributed to their father's wealth, are associates with him in his right of property. But there is another reason more distant, though not less important; and this is, that nothing is more fatal to manners and to the republic than the continual shifting of rank and fortune among its members: these changes being the source of a thousand disorders; overturning and confounding every thing: for those who are elevated for one purpose are often qualified only for another; neither those who rise, nor those who fall, being able to adopt the maxims, or possess themselves of the qualifications requisite for their new condition, and still much less to discharge the duties of it.

ROUSSEAU.

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THE ORIGIN OF PROPERTY.

ACCORDING to Mr Locke, "A law is a rule
"prescribed to the people, with the sanction of
"some punishment or reward, proper to deter-
"mine their wills. All laws (according to him)
"suppose rewards or punishments attached to the
"observation or infraction of them."

The definition laid down, The man who violates, among a polished people, a convention not attended with this sanction, is not punishable: he is however unjust. But could he be unjust before the establishment of all convention, and the formation of a language proper to express injustice? No: for in that state man can have no idea of property, nor consequently of justice.—Injustice, therefore, cannot precede the establishment of a convention, a law, and a common interest. Now what does the establishment of laws suppose? The union of men in society, greater or less, and the formation of a language proper to communicate a certain number of ideas. Now, if there be savages whose language does not contain above five or six sounds or cries, the formation of a language must be the work of several centuries. Until that work be completed, men without convention and laws must live in a state of war. That condition is a state, it may be said,
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of misery; and misery being the creator of laws, must force men to accept them. Before the public interest has declared the law of first possession to be held sacred, what can be the plea of a savage inhabitant of a woody district, from which a stronger savage had driven him out? What right have you, he would say, to drive me from my possession? What right have you, says the other, to that possession? Chance, replies the first, led my steps thither: it belongs to me because I inhabit it, and land belongs to the first occupier.—What is that right of the first occupier? replies the other; if chance first led you to this spot, the same chance has given me the force necessary to drive you from it. Which of these two rights deserves the preference? Would you know all the superiority of mine? Look up to heaven, and see the eagle that darts upon the dove: turn thine eyes to the earth, and see the lion that preys upon the stag: look toward the sea, and behold the goldfish devoured by the shark. All things in nature show that the weak is a prey to the powerful. Force is the gift of the gods; by that I have a right to possess all that I can seize. Heaven, by giving me these nervous arms, has declared its will. Begone from hence; yield to superior force, or dare the combat. What answer can be given to the discourse of this savage, or with what injustice can he be accused, if the law

law of first occupation be not yet established?—Justice then supposes the establishment of laws. The observance of justice supposes an equilibrium in the power of the inhabitants. It is by a mutual and salutary fear that men are made to be just to each other. Justice is unknown to the solitary savage. It is at the period that men, by increasing, are forced to manure the earth, that they perceive the necessity of securing to the labourer his harvest, and the property of the land he cultivates. Before cultivation, it is no wonder that the strongest should think he has as much right over a piece of barren ground as the first occupier.

HELVETIUS.

PROPHECIES.

THE truth of prophecies can never be proved without the concurrence of three things, which cannot possibly happen. These are, that I should in the first place be a witness to the delivery of the prophecy; next, that I should also be a witness to the event; lastly, that it should be clearly demonstrated to me that such event could not have followed by accident: for though a prophecy were as precise, clear, and determinate as an axiom of geometry; yet as the perspicuity of the prediction, made at random, does not render
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the accomplishment of it impossible, that accomplishment, when it happens, proves nothing in fact concerning the foreknowledge of him who predicted it.

ROUSSEAU.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

ALL prophecies are real miracles; and as such only can be admitted as proofs of any revelation. If it did not exceed the capacity of human nature to foretel future events, it would be absurd to employ any prophecy as an argument for a Divine mission or authority from heaven.

HUME.

THE PRINCIPLES OF PROTESTANTISM.

WHEN the Reformers separated themselves from the church of Rome, they accused it of error; and in order to correct this error at the fountain-head, they interpreted the scriptures in a different sense from what the church had been accustomed to. When they were asked, On what authority they ventured thus to depart from received doctrines? they answered, On their own authority; on that of their reason. They said, the meaning of the Scriptures was plain and intelligible to all mankind, as far as they related to

salvation:

salvation: that every man was a competent judge of doctrines, and might interpret the Bible, which is the rule of faith, according to his own mind: that by this means all would agree as to essential points; and as to those on which they would not agree, they must be unessential.

Here then was private judgment established as the only interpreter of the Scriptures: Thus was the authority of the church at once rejected, and the religious tenets of individuals left to their own particular jurisdiction. Such are the two fundamental points of the Reformation; to acknowledge the Bible as the rule of belief, and to admit of no other interpreter of its meaning than one's self. These two points combined, form the principle on which the Protestants separated from the church of Rome: nor could they do less, without being inconsistent with themselves; for what authority of interpretation could they pretend to, after having rejected that of the church?—But it may be asked, How on such principles the Reformed could ever be united among themselves? How, every one having his own particular way of thinking, they could form themselves into a body, and make head against the Catholic Church? This it was necessary for them to do; and therefore they united with regard to this one point, they acknowledged every one to be a competent judge as far as related to

himself. They tolerated, as in such circumstances they ought, every interpretation but one, viz. that which prohibited other interpretations. Now this interpretation, the only one they rejected, was that of the Catholics. It was necessary for them unanimously to proscribe the Romish church, which in its turn equally proscribed them all. Even the diversity of their manner of thinking from all others was the common bond of union. They were so many little states in league against a great power, each losing nothing of its own independence by their general confederacy.

Thus was the Reformation established, and thus it ought to be maintained. It is true, that the opinion of the majority may be proposed to the whole, as the most probable manner, or as the most authentic. The sovereign may even reduce it into form, and recommend it to those who are appointed to teach it; because some rule and order ought to be observed in public instructions: and in fact, no person's liberty is infringed by it, as none are compelled to be taught against their will. But it does not hence follow that individuals are obliged directly to adopt the interpretations thus proposed to them, or that doctrine which is thus publicly taught. Every one remains, after all, a judge for himself, and in that acknowledges no other authority than his own.

Good instructions ought less to fix the choice
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we ought to make, than to qualify us for making such choice. Such is the true spirit of the Reformation; such its real foundation; according to which private judgment is left to determine in matters of faith, which are to be deduced from the common standard, *i. e.* the gospel. Freedom is so essential also to reason, that it cannot, if it would, subject itself to authority. If we infringe ever so little on this principle of private judgment, Protestantism instantly falls to the ground.

Now the liberty of interpreting the Scripture, not only includes the right of explaining its several passages, but that of remaining in doubt with regard to such as appear dubious, and also that of not pretending to comprehend those which are incomprehensible. The Protestant religion is tolerant from principle; it is essentially so, as much as it is possible for a religion to be; since the only tenet it does not tolerate is that of persecution.

ROUSSEAU.

PROVIDENCE, AND A FUTURE STATE.

WHEN we infer any particular cause from an effect, we must proportion the one to the other; and can never be allowed to ascribe to the cause any qualities but what are exactly sufficient to produce the effect. If the cause, assigned for any effect, be not sufficient to produce it, we

must either reject the cause, or add to it such qualities as will give it a just proportion to the effect. But if we ascribe to it other qualities, or affirm it capable of producing other effects, we indulge the licence of conjecture, and suppose qualities and energies without reason.—The same rule holds, whether the cause assigned be brute unconscious matter, or a rational intelligent being. If the cause be known only by the effect, we never ought to assign to it any qualities beyond what are precisely requisite to produce the effect: nor can we, by any rules of just reasoning, return back from the cause, and infer other effects from it beyond those by which alone it is known to us. No one, merely from the sight of one of Zeuxis's pictures, could know that he was also a statuary or architect, and was an artist no less skilful in stone and marble than in colours. Allowing, therefore, the gods to be the authors of the existence or order of the universe; it follows, that they possess that precise degree of power, intelligence, and benevolence, which appears in their workmanship; but nothing further can ever be proved. So far as any attribute at present appears, so far may we conclude these attributes to exist. The supposition of further attributes is mere hypothesis; much more the supposition, that in distant periods of time and place, there has been, or will be, a more magnificent

ficent display of these attributes, and a scheme of administration more suitable to such imaginary virtues.—The Divinity may possibly possess attributes which we have never seen exerted; may be governed by principles of action which we cannot discover to be satisfied. All this may be allowed. But still this is mere possibility and hypothesis. If there be any marks of a distributive justice in the world, we may conclude from thence, that since justice here exerts itself, it is satisfied. If there be no marks of a distributive justice in the world, we have no reason to ascribe justice, in our sense of it, to the gods. If it be said, that the justice of the gods at present exerts itself in part, but not in its full extent; I answer, that we have no reason to give it any particular extent, but only so far as we see it at present exert itself.

In works of human art and contrivance, it is allowable to advance from the effect to the cause, and, returning back from the cause, to form new inferences concerning the effect, and examine the alterations which it has probably undergone, or may still undergo. But what is the foundation of this manner of reasoning? Plainly this: That man is a being, whom we know by experience, whose motives and designs we are acquainted with, and whose projects and inclinations have a certain connection and coherence according to the laws which

which nature has established for the government of such a creature. When, therefore, we find, that any work hath proceeded from the skill and industry of man ; as we are otherwise acquainted with the nature of the animal, we can draw a hundred inferences concerning what may be expected from him ; and these inferences will all be founded in experience and observation. But did we know man only from the single work or production which we examine, it were impossible for us to argue in this manner ; because our knowledge of all the qualities which we ascribe to him, being in that case derived from the production, it is impossible they could point to any thing further, or be the foundation of any new inferences.

If we saw upon the sea-shore the print of one human foot, we should conclude from our other experience, that there was probably another foot, which also left its impression, though effaced by time or other accident. Here we mount from the effect to the cause ; and descending again from the cause, infer alterations in the effect : but this is not a continuation of the same simple chain of reasoning. We comprehend in this case a hundred other experiences and observations concerning the usual figure and members of that species of animal ; without which this method of argument would be fallacious and sophistical.

stical.—The case is not the same with our reasonings from the works of nature. The Deity is known to us only by his productions, and is a single being in the universe, nor comprehended under any species or genus, from whose experienced attributes or qualities we can, by analogy, infer any attribute or quality in him. As the universe shows wisdom and goodness, we infer wisdom and goodness. As it shows a particular degree of these perfections, we infer a particular degree of them, precisely adapted to the effect which we examine.—The great source of our mistake in all our reasonings on the works of nature is, that we tacitly consider ourselves as in the place of the Supreme Being; and conclude, that he will, on every occasion, observe the same conduct which we ourselves, in his situation, would have embraced as reasonable and eligible. But besides that the ordinary course of nature may convince us, that almost every thing is regulated by principles and maxims very different from ours; besides this, it must evidently appear contrary to all rule of analogy to reason from the intentions and projects of men, to those of a Being so different and so much superior, who bears much less analogy to any other being in the universe than the sun to a waxen taper; and who discovers himself only by some faint traces or
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outlines, beyond which we have no authority to ascribe to him any attribute or perfection.

It may, indeed, be matter of doubt whether it be possible for a cause to be known only by its effect (as we have all along supposed), or to be of so singular or particular a nature as to have no parallel and no similarity with any other cause or object that has ever fallen under our observation. It is only when two species of objects are found to be constantly conjoined that we can infer the one from the other; and were an effect presented which was entirely singular, and could not be comprehended under any known species, we could form no conjecture or inference at all concerning its cause. The universe is such an effect: it is quite singular and unparalleled, and supposed to be the proof of a Deity; a cause no less singular and unparalleled. If experience and observation and analogy be, indeed, the only guides in inferences of this nature; both the effect and cause must bear a similarity and resemblance to other effects and causes which we know, and which we have found, in many instances, to be conjoined with each other.

HUME.

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THE PROVINCES OF ABSOLUTE MONARCHIES BETTER TREATED THAN THOSE OF FREE STATES.

IT may easily be observed, that although free governments have been commonly the most happy for those who partake of their freedom; yet are they the most ruinous and oppressive to their provinces. When a monarch extends his dominions by conquest, he soon learns to consider his old and his new subjects as on the same footing; because, in reality, all his subjects are to him the same, except the few friends and favourites with whom he is personally acquainted. He does not, therefore, make any distinction between them in his *general* laws; and, at the same time, is careful to prevent all *particular* acts of oppression on the one as well as on the other. But a free state necessarily makes a great distinction; and must always do so, till men learn to love their neighbours as well as themselves. The conquerors in such a government are all legislators; and will be sure so to contrive matters, by restrictions of trade, and by taxes, as to draw some private as well as public advantages from their conquests. Provincial governors have also a better chance in a republic to escape with their plunder by means of bribery or intrigue; and their fellow-citizens,
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who find their own state to be enriched by the spoils of the subject-provinces, will be the more inclined to tolerate such abuses. Not to mention, that it is a necessary precaution in a free state to change the governors frequently; which obliges those temporary tyrants to be more expeditious and rapacious, that they may accumulate sufficient wealth before they give place to their successors. What cruel tyrants were the Romans over the world during the time of their commonwealth! It is true, they had laws to prevent oppression in their provincial magistrates: But Cicero informs us, that the Romans could not better consult the interest of the provinces than by repealing those very laws. For, in that case, says he, our magistrates having entire impunity, would plunder no more than would satisfy their own rapaciousness; whereas, at present, they must also satisfy that of their judges, and of all the great men of Rome, of whose protection they stand in need. Who can read of the cruelties and oppressions of *Verres* without horror and astonishment? And who is not touched with indignation to hear, that, after Cicero had exhausted on that abandoned criminal all the thunders of his eloquence, and had prevailed so far as to get him condemned to the utmost extent of the laws, yet that cruel tyrant lived peaceably to old age, in opulence and ease; and thirty years afterwards was put into
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the proscription of Mark Anthony, on account of his exorbitant wealth, where he fell with Cicero himself, and all the most virtuous men of Rome? After the dissolution of the commonwealth, the Roman yoke became easier upon the provinces, as Tacitus informs us; and it may be observed, that many of the worst emperors, Domitian, for instance, were careful to prevent all oppression on the provinces. In Tiberius's time, Gaul was esteemed richer than Italy itself. It does not appear that, during the whole time of the Roman monarchy, the empire became less rich or populous in any of its provinces; though indeed its valour and military discipline were always upon the decline. The oppression and tyranny of the Carthaginians over their subject states in Africa went so far, as we learn from Polybius, that, not content with exacting the half of all the produce of the ground, which of itself was a very high rent, they also loaded them with many other taxes. If we pass from ancient to modern times, we shall still find the observation to hold, The provinces of absolute monarchies are always better treated than those of free states. Compare the *Pais Conquis* of France with Ireland, and you will be convinced of this truth; though this latter kingdom, being in a good measure peopled from England, possesses so many rights and privileges, as should naturally make it challenge better treatment

ment than that of a conquered province. Corsica, also, is an obvious instance to the same purpose.

HUME.

PRUDENCE.

THE prudence so much boasted of, and sometimes so useful to individuals, is not, with respect to a whole nation, a virtue of such great utility as is imagined. Of all the gifts heaven could bestow upon a people, the most fatal, without dispute, would be that of prudence, if it was rendered common to all the citizens. What, in fact, is the prudent man?—He who keeps evils at a distance; an image strong enough for what balances in his mind the presence of a pleasure that would be fatal to him. Now, let us suppose that prudence was to descend on all the heads that compose a nation, where would be found the man who, for fivepence a-day, would, in battle, confront death, fatigue, and diseases? What woman would present herself at the altar of Hymen, to expose herself to the trouble of child-bearing, to the pain and danger of delivery, to the humours and contradiction of a husband, and to the vexations occasioned by the death or ill-conduct of children? What man, in consequence of the principles of his religion, would not despise the fleeting pleasures of this world, and entirely de-

voting

voting himself to the care of his salvation, seek only, in an austere life, the means of increasing the felicity that is to be the reward of sanctity? It is, then, to imprudence that posterity owes its existence. It is the presence or prospect of pleasure, its all-powerful view, that braves distant misfortune, and destroys foresight; it is, therefore, to imprudence and folly, that heaven attaches the preservation of empires, and the duration of the world.

Great talents and a prudent conduct are seldom united in the same person. Great abilities always suppose strong passions, which produce a thousand irregularities. On the contrary, good conduct is commonly the effect of the absence of the passions, and consequently the appendage of moderate abilities; and if some singular concurrence of circumstances have sometimes united them in the same man, yet they are very seldom blended together.

HELVETIUS.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

THE happy age is that in which a man is the dupe of his friends and his mistresses. Wo to him whose prudence is not the effect of experience! A premature distrust is the certain sign of a depraved heart and an unhappy temper. Who

knows whether he is not the most senseless of all mankind, who, that he may not be the dupe of his friends, exposes himself to the punishment of perpetual distrust?

HELVETIUS.

NO NECESSARY CONNECTION BETWEEN
PUBLIC SPIRIT AND PRIVATE VIR-
TUES.

GOOD laws may beget order and moderation in the government, where the manners and customs have instilled little humanity and justice into the tempers of men. The most illustrious period of the Roman history, considered in a political view, is that between the beginning of the first and end of the last Punic war; the due balance between the nobility and people being then fixed by the contest of the tribunes, and not being yet lost by the extent of conquests. Yet at this very time, the horrid practice of poisoning was so common, that during part of a season a prætor punished capitally for this crime above three thousand persons in a part of Italy; and found informations of this kind still multiplying upon him. There is a similar, rather a worse instance, in the more early times of the commonwealth. So depraved in private life were that people, whom in their histories we so much admire.

mire. It seems they were really more virtuous during the time of the two *triumvirates*; when they were tearing their common country to pieces, and spreading slaughter and desolation over the face of the earth merely for the choice of tyrants.

HUME.

PUBLIC WORKS, AND PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS, HOW TO BE MAINTAINED.

ONE of the duties of the sovereign or commonwealth is that of erecting and maintaining those public institutions and those public works, which, though they may be in the highest degree advantageous to a great society, are, however, of such a nature, that the profit could never repay the expence to any individual, or small number of individuals; and which it therefore cannot be expected that any individual, or small number of individuals, should erect or maintain. The performance of this duty requires, too, very different degrees of expence in the different periods of society.

After the public institutions and public works necessary for the defence of the society, and for the administration of justice, the other works and institutions of this kind are chiefly those for facilitating the commerce of the society, and those for

promoting the instruction of the people. The institutions for instruction are of two kinds; those for the education of the youth, and those for the instruction of people of all ages.

A. SMITH.

THE POWER OF PUNISHMENTS.

EXPERIENCE shows, that in countries remarkable for the lenity of their laws, the spirit of the inhabitants is as much affected by slight penalties as in other countries by severer punishments.

If an inconveniency or abuse arises in the state, a violent government endeavours suddenly to redress it; and instead of putting the old laws in execution, it establishes some cruel punishment, which instantly puts a stop to the evil. But the spring of government hereby loses its elasticity: the imagination grows accustomed to the severe as well as to the milder punishment; and as the fear of the latter diminishes, they are soon obliged in every case to have recourse to the former. Robberies on the highway were grown common in some countries: in order to remedy this evil, they invented the punishment of breaking upon the wheel; the terror of which put a stop for a while to this mischievous practice, but soon after robberies on the highways became as common as ever.

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Mankind must not be governed with too much severity; we ought to make a prudent use of the means which nature has given us to conduct them. If we inquire into the cause of all human corruptions, we shall find that they proceed from the impunity of criminals, and not from the moderation of punishments.

Let us follow nature, who has given shame to man for his scourge; and let the heaviest part of the punishment be the infamy attending it.

But if there be some countries where shame is not a consequence of punishment, this must be owing to tyranny, which has inflicted the same penalties on honest men and villains.—And if there are others where men are deterred only by cruel punishments, we may be sure that this must, in a great measure, arise from the violence of the government which has used such penalties for slight transgressions.—It often happens that a legislator, desirous of remedying an abuse, thinks of nothing else; his eyes are open only to this object, and shut to its inconveniences. When the abuse is redressed, you see only the severity of the legislator: yet there remains an evil in the state that has sprung from this severity; the minds of the people are corrupted, and become habituated to despotism.

There are two sorts of corruption: one when the people do not observe the laws; the other when

when they are corrupted by the laws: an incurable evil, because it is in the very remedy itself.

MONTESQUIEU.

PUNISHMENTS.

AMONG a people hardly yet emerged from barbarity, punishments should be most severe as strong impressions are required; but in proportion as the minds of men become softened by their intercourse in society, the severity of punishments should be diminished, if it be intended that the necessary relation between the object and the sensation should be maintained.—That a punishment may not be an act of violence of one, or of many, against a private member of society, it should be public, immediate, and necessary; the least possible in the case given; proportioned to the crime, and determined by the laws.

BECCARIA.

CAPITAL PUNISHMENTS.

THE frequency of executions is always a sign of the weakness or indolence of government. There is no malefactor who might not be made good for something; nor ought any person to be put to death, even by way of example, unless such as could not be preserved without endangering

ing the community. In a well-governed state there are but few executions; not because there are many pardoned, but because there are few criminals: Whereas, when a state is on the decline, the multiplicity of crimes occasions their impunity. Under the Roman republic, neither the senate nor the consuls ever attempted to grant pardons: even the people never did this, although they sometimes recalled their own sentence. The frequency of pardons indicates, that in a short time crimes will not stand in need of them; and every one may see the consequence of such conduct. ROUSSEAU.

THE INTENT OF PUNISHMENTS.

THE intent of punishments is not to torment a sensible being, nor to undo a crime already committed. Is it possible that torments and useless cruelty, the instrument of furious fanaticism, or of impotency of tyrants, can be authorised by a political body; which, so far from being influenced by passion, should be the cool moderator of the passions of individuals? Can the groans of a tortured wretch recal the time past, or reverse the crime he has committed?—The end of punishment, therefore, is no other than to prevent the criminal from doing further injury to society, and to prevent others from committing the like offence.

offence. Such punishments, therefore, and such a mode of inflicting them, ought to be chosen, as will make the strongest and most lasting impressions on the minds of others, with the least torment to the body of the criminal.

BECCARIA.

IMMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS.

THE more immediately after the commission of a crime a punishment is inflicted, the more just and useful it will be. It will be more just, because it spares the criminal the cruel and superfluous torment of uncertainty, which increases in proportion to the strength of his imagination and the sense of his weakness; and because the privation of liberty, being a punishment, ought to be inflicted before condemnation but for as short a time as possible. The time should be determined by the necessary preparation for the trial, and the right of priority in the oldest prisoners. The imprisonment should be attended with as little severity as possible. The confinement ought not to be closer than is requisite to prevent his flight or his concealing the proofs of his crime, and the trial should be conducted with all possible expedition. Can there be a more cruel contrast than that between the indolence of a judge and the painful anxiety of the accused; the comforts
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and pleasures of an insensible magistrate, and the filth and misery of the prisoner? The degree of the punishment, and the consequences of a crime, ought to be so contrived, as to have the greatest possible effect on others, with the least possible pain to the delinquent.—An immediate punishment is more useful; because the smaller the interval of time between the punishment and the crime, the stronger and more lasting will be the association of the two ideas, crime and punishment; so that they may be considered, one as the cause, and the other as the unavoidable and necessary effect.—It is then of the greatest importance, that the punishment should succeed the crime as immediately as possible, if we intend that, in the rude minds of the multitude, the seducing picture of the advantage arising from the crime should instantly awake the attendant idea of punishment. Delaying the punishment serves only to separate these two ideas; and thus affects the minds of the spectators rather as being a terrible sight, than the necessary consequence of a crime; the horror of which should contribute to heighten the idea of punishment.—There is another excellent method of strengthening this important connection between the ideas of crime and punishment; that is, to make the punishment as analogous as possible to the nature of the crime; in order that the punishment may lead the mind to
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consider the crime in a different point of view from that in which it was placed by the flattering idea of promised advantages. BECCARIA.

INFAMOUS PUNISHMENTS.

THE punishment of infamy is a mark of the public disapprobation. This is not always in the power of the laws. It is necessary that the infamy inflicted by the laws should be the same with that which results from the relations of things, from universal morality, or from that particular system adopted by the nation and the laws which governs the opinion of the vulgar. If, on the contrary, one be different from the other, either the laws will no longer be respected, or the received notions of morality and probity will vanish ; which are always too weak to resist the force of example. If we declare those actions infamous which are in themselves indifferent, we lessen the infamy of those which are really infamous. The punishment of infamy is properly adapted to those injuries which affect the honour of the citizens in any government: but it should not be too frequently inflicted, for the power of opinion grows weaker by repetition ; nor should it be inflicted on a number of persons at the same time, for the infamy of many resolves itself into the infamy of none. BECCARIA.

MILD

MILD PUNISHMENTS.

CRIMES are more effectually prevented by the certainty than the severity of punishment. The certainty of a small punishment will make a stronger impression than the fear of one more severe, if attended with the hopes of escaping; for it is the nature of mankind to be terrified at the approach of the smallest inevitable evil, whilst hope, the best gift of heaven, hath the power of dispelling the apprehension of a greater; especially if supported by examples of impunity, which weakness or avarice too frequently afford.— If punishments be very severe, men are naturally led to the perpetration of other crimes, to avoid the punishment due to the first.— In proportion as punishments become more cruel, the minds of men, as a fluid rises to the same height with that which surrounds it, grow hardened and insensible; and the force of the passions still continuing, in the space of an hundred years the wheel terrifies no more than formerly the prison. That a punishment may produce the effect required, it is sufficient that the evil it occasions should exceed the good expected from the crime; including in the calculation the certainty of the punishment and the privation of the expected advantage. All severity beyond this is superfluous, and therefore

fore tyrannical.—Men regulate their conduct by the repeated impression of evils they know, and not by those with which they are unacquainted. Let us, for example, suppose two nations, in one of which the greatest punishment is perpetual slavery, and in the other the wheel. Both will inspire the same degree of terror; and there can be no reasons for increasing the punishments of the first, which are not equally valid for augmenting those of the second to more lasting and ingenious modes of tormenting.—The most artful contrivance of punishments can never establish an exact proportion between the crime and the punishment; the human frame can only suffer to a certain degree, beyond which it is impossible to proceed, be the enormity of the crime ever so great. Severe punishments also occasion impunity. Human nature is limited no less in evil than in good. Excessive barbarity can never be more than temporary; it being impossible that it should be supported by a permanent system of legislation; for if the laws be too cruel they must be altered, or anarchy and impunity will succeed.

BECCARIA.

PROPORTION BETWEEN PUNISHMENTS
AND OFFENCES.

THE several circumstances and rules which, in establishing the proportion betwixt punishments and offences, are to be attended to, seem to be as follows :

I. On the part of the offence :

1. The profit of the offence ;
2. The mischief of the offence ;
3. The profit and mischief of other greater or lesser offences, of different sorts, which the offender may have to choose out of ;
4. The profit and mischief of other offences, of the same sort, which the same offender may probably have been guilty of already.

II. On the part of the punishment :

5. The magnitude of the punishment, composed of its intensity and duration ;
6. The deficiency of the punishment in point of certainty ;
7. The deficiency of the punishment in point of proximity ;
8. The quality of the punishment ;
9. The accidental advantage in point of qua-

lity of a punishment, not strictly needed in point of quantity ;

10. The use of a punishment of a particular quality, in the character of a moral lesson.

III. On the part of the offender :

11. The responsibility of the class of persons in a way to offend ;
 12. The sensibility of each particular offender ;
 13. The particular merits or useful qualities of any particular offender, in case of a punishment which might deprive the community of the benefit of them ;
 14. The multitude of offenders on any particular occasion.

IV. On the part of the public, at any particular conjuncture :

15. The inclinations of the people, for or against any quantity or mode of punishment ;
 16. The inclinations of foreign powers.

V. On the part of the law ; that is, of the public for a continuance :

17. The necessity of making small sacrifices, in point of proportionality, for the sake of simplicity.

There are some, perhaps, who, at first sight, may look upon the nicety employed in the adjustment

justment of such rules, as so much labour lost : for gross ignorance, they will say, never troubles itself about laws, and passion does not calculate. But the evil of ignorance admits of cure : and as to the proposition that passion does not calculate, this, like most of these very general and oracular propositions, is not true. When matters of such importance as pain and pleasure are at stake, and these in the highest degree (the only matters in short that can be of importance), who is there that does not calculate ? Men calculate, some with less exactness indeed, some with more : but all men calculate. I would not say, that even a madman does not calculate. Passion calculates, more or less, in every man : in different men, according to the warmth or coolness of their dispositions ; according to the firmness or irritability of their minds ; according to the nature of the motives by which they are acted on. Happily, of all passions, that is the most given to calculation, from the excesses of which, by reason of its strength, constancy, and universality, society has most to apprehend, I mean that which corresponds to the motive of pecuniary interest : so that these niceties, if such they are to be called, have the best chance of being efficacious, where efficacy is of the most importance.

J. BENTHAM.

OBJECTS OF PUNISHMENT.

THE general object of all laws is to prevent mischief, when it is worth while: and in that case there are four subordinate designs or objects, which, in the course of his endeavours to compass, as far as may be, that one general object, a legislator, whose views are governed by the principle of utility, comes naturally to propose to himself.

1. His first, most extensive, and most eligible object, is to prevent, in as far as it is possible, and worth while, all sorts of offences whatsoever; in other words, so to manage, that no offence whatsoever may be committed.

2. But if a man must needs commit an offence of some kind or other, the next object is to induce him to commit an offence less mischievous, rather than one more mischievous: in other words, to choose always the least mischievous, of two offences that will either of them suit his purpose.

3. When a man has resolved upon a particular offence, the next object is to dispose him to do no more mischief than is necessary to his purpose: in other words, to do as little mischief as is consistent with the benefit he has in view.

4. The last object is, whatever the mischief be, which it is proposed to prevent, to prevent it at as cheap a rate as possible.

J. BENTHAM.

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REASON.

OF all the words in our language the meaning of the word *reason* is the most ambiguous. Sometimes it is taken for that fitness in subjects to one another which is natural and independent on will and pleasure; as when we say, that such or such a thing is agreeable or contrary to the reason of things. Sometimes it is taken for human capacity and comprehension; as in that trite observation, That many things are *above* our reason which are *not contrary* to our reason: for the meaning of that sentence must be, if it has any meaning at all, that there are many things which we have no capacity to comprehend. And this indeed every man, who reflects ever so little upon human nature, must be fully convinced of; for

we can no more argue upon such subjects, than we can describe objects which are confessedly out of sight. Sometimes the word *reason* is taken for the cause or inducement which prevailed upon us to act after this or that manner rather than any other; as when we say, This was my reason for acting thus or thus. Sometimes it signifies the argument by which we prove any truth or detect any falsehood; as we say, a thing must be true or false for this or that reason. Sometimes it signifies the human intellect or understanding; which is that faculty of the mind by which it perceives objects suitable to it, and which may be communicated to it by various means. Sometimes by reason we mean the moral sense, moral virtue in general, or more particularly the virtue of justice; as when we say, it is contrary to reason to make one law for ourselves, and another for other people: and thus we call a man good, who is governed more by reason than appetite and passion. And sometimes it is taken for the power of judging or drawing a conclusion from premises; which is the greatest mean by which we arrive at knowledge. The difference between the knowledge of God and of his intelligent creatures is, that he knows and sees all things, with all their possible combinations and circumstances, by intuition at one view: whereas we come to our knowledge by slow degrees, and after many deductions

tions of one thing from another. But as all good things come from God, we could not possibly have any knowledge at all, unless he had been pleased to communicate to us some portion of his own divine knowledge, and made us to perceive and see by intuition, and at the first view, some certain truths that we call Axioms, Data, or Self-evident Principles; which by the use of our reason or faculty of comparing and judging should lead us on to other truths, and raise us step by step to larger views, and more extensive knowledge. This is the most proper use of the word Reason; and this includes the intellectual, the moral, and the discursive powers of the mind: the two former as certain principles; the latter as the power of comparing objects which are thus presented to us with each other, and thereby finding out wherein they agree or disagree. This is what we commonly call reasoning or exercising our reason. This is the characteristic of human nature; this distinguishes man from all the other animals of the earth, and makes him wiser than the beasts that perish.

ROBERTSON.

FAITH AND REASON.

I FIND every sect, as far as reason will help them, make use of it gladly: and where it fails them, they cry out, it is matter of faith, and
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above reason. And I do not see how they can argue with any one, or ever convince a gainfayer who makes use of the same plea, without setting down strict boundaries between faith and reason; which ought to be the first point established in all questions where faith has any thing to do.

Reason, therefore, here, as contradistinguished to faith, I take to be the discovery of the certainty or probability of such propositions or truths which the mind arrives at by deduction made from such ideas, which it has got by the use of its natural faculties, viz. by sensation or reflection.

Faith, on the other side, is the assent to any proposition, not thus made out by the deductions of reason, but upon the credit of the proposer, as coming from God, in some extraordinary way of communication. This way of discovering truths to men we call Revelation.

First, then, I say, that no man inspired by God can by any revelation communicate to others any new simple ideas which they had not before from sensation and reflection. For whatsoever impressions he himself may have from the immediate hand of God, this revelation, if it be of new simple ideas, cannot be conveyed to another, either by words, or any other signs. Because words, by their immediate operations on us, cause no other ideas but of their natural sounds: and it is by the custom of using them for signs that they excite
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and revive in our minds latent ideas; but yet only such ideas as were there before. For words seen or heard, recall to our thoughts those ideas only which to us they have been wont to be signs of; but cannot introduce any perfectly new and formerly unknown simple ideas. The same holds in all other signs, which cannot signify to us things of which we have before never had any idea at all.

Thus, whatever things were discovered by the Apostle Paul, when he was wrapt up into the third heaven, whatever new ideas his mind there received, all the description he can make to others of that place is only this, That there are such things “as eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor
“hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive.” And supposing God should discover to any one, supernaturally, a species of creatures inhabiting, for example, Jupiter or Saturn, (for that it is possible there may be such, nobody can deny) which had six senses, and imprint on his mind the ideas conveyed to theirs by that sixth sense, he could no more, by words, produce in the minds of other men those ideas imprinted by that sixth sense, than one of us could convey the idea of any colour by the sounds of words into a man, who, having the other four senses perfect, had always totally wanted the fifth of seeing. For our simple ideas then, which are the foundation and sole mat-

matter of all our notions and knowledge, we must depend wholly on our reason, I mean our natural faculties; and can by no means receive them, or any of them, from traditional revelation; I say traditional revelation, in distinction to original revelation. By the one, I mean that first impression which is made immediately by God on the mind of any man, to which we cannot set any bounds; and by the other, those impressions delivered over to others in words, and the ordinary ways of conveying our conceptions one to another.

Secondly, I say, that the same truths may be discovered, and conveyed down from revelation, which are discoverable to us by reason, and by those ideas we naturally may have. So God might, by revelation, discover the truth of any proposition in Euclid; as well as men, by the natural use of their faculties, come to make the discovery themselves. In all things of this kind, there is little need or use of revelation; God having furnished us with natural and surer means to arrive at the knowledge of them. For whatsoever truth we come to the clear discovery of from the knowledge and contemplation of our own ideas, will always be more certain to us, than those which are conveyed to us by traditional revelation. For the knowledge we have, that this revelation came at first from God, can never be so sure, as the knowledge

ledge we have from the clear and distinct perception of the agreement or disagreement of our own ideas; *v. g.* if it were revealed some ages since, that the three angles of a triangle were equal to two right ones, I might assent to the truth of that proposition, upon the credit of the tradition, that it was revealed; but that would never amount to so great a certainty, as the knowledge of it, upon the comparing and measuring my own ideas of two right angles and the three angles of a triangle. The like holds in matter of fact, knowable by our senses; *v. g.* the history of the deluge is conveyed to us by writings, which had their original from revelation; and yet nobody, I think, will say he has as certain and clear a knowledge of the flood as Noah that saw it; or as he himself would have had, had he then been alive, and seen it. For he has no greater an assurance than that of his senses, that it is written in the book supposed written by Moses inspired: but he has not so great an assurance that Moses wrote that book, as if he had seen Moses write it. So that the assurance of its being a revelation is less still than the assurance of his senses.

LOCKE.

REASON AND FAITH NOT OPPOSITE.

THERE is a use of the word reason, wherein it is opposed to faith; which, though it be in itself

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a very improper way of speaking, yet common use has so authoris'd it, that it would be folly either to oppose or hope to remedy it. Only I think it may not be amiss to take notice, that however faith may be oppos'd to reason, faith is nothing but a firm assent of the mind: which if it be regulated, as is our duty, cannot be afforded to any thing but upon good reason; and so cannot be opposite to it. He that believes without having any reason for believing, may be in love with his own fancies; but neither seeks truth as he ought, nor pays the obedience due to his Maker, who would have him use those discerning faculties he has given him, to keep him out of mistake and error. He that does not this to the best of his power, however he sometimes lights on truth, is in the right but by chance; and I know not whether the luckiness of the accident will excuse the irregularity of his proceeding. This, at least, is certain, that he must be accountable for whatever mistakes he runs into: whereas he that makes use of the light and faculties God has given him, and seeks sincerely to discover truth by those helps and abilities he has, may have this satisfaction in doing his duty as a rational creature, that, though he should miss truth, he will not miss the reward of it: for he governs his assent right, and places it as it should, who, in any case and matter whatsoever, believes or disbelieves according as reason directs

directs him. He that doth otherwise transgresses against his own light; and misuses those faculties which were given him to no other end, but to search and follow the clearer evidence and greater probability.

LOCKE.

NATURE AND REASON SUFFICIENT TO
TEACH US MORALITY AND THE TRUE
WORSHIP OF THE DEITY.

WHAT purity of morals, what system of faith useful to man, or honourable to the Creator, can we deduce from any positive doctrines, that we cannot deduce as well without them from a good use of our natural faculties? Let any one show me what can be added, either for the glory of God, the good of society, or my own advantage, to the obligations we are laid under by nature; let him show me what virtue can be produced from any new worship which is not the consequence of natural religion. The most sublime ideas of the Deity are inculcated by reason alone. Take a view of the works of nature, listen to the voice within, and then tell me what God hath omitted to say to our sight, our conscience, our understandings? Where are the men who can tell us more of him than he thus tells us of himself? Their revelations only debase the Deity, in ascribing to him human passions. So

far from giving us enlightened notions of the Deity, their particular tenets, in my opinion, give us the most obscure and confused ideas. To the inconceivable mysteries by which the Supreme Being is hid from our view, they add the most absurd contradictions. They serve to make mankind proud, persecuting, and cruel: instead of establishing peace on earth, they bring fire and sword. I ask myself, To what good purpose tends all this? without being able to resolve the question. Artificial religion presents to my view only the wickedness and miseries of mankind. It is said, indeed, that revelation is necessary to teach mankind the manner in which God would be served: As a proof of this, they bring the diversity of whimsical modes of worship which prevail in the world; and that without remarking, that this very diversity arises from the whim of adopting revelations. Ever since men have taken it into their heads to make the Deity speak, every people make him speak in their own way, and say what they like best. Had they listened only to what the Deity hath said in their hearts, there would have been but one religion on earth. It may be said, that it is necessary that the worship of God should be uniform; it may be proper: but is this a point so very important, that the whole apparatus of divine power was necessary to establish it? Let us not confound the ceremonials of religion with religion

ligion itself. The worship of God demands that of the heart; and this, when it is sincere, is ever uniform. Men must entertain very ridiculous notions of the Deity indeed, if they imagine he can interest himself in the dress of a priest, in the order of the words he pronounces, or in the ceremonies of the altar. God requires to be worshipped in spirit and in truth: this is a duty incumbent on men of all religions and countries. With regard to exterior forms, it is merely an affair of government; the administration of which, surely, requires not the aid of revelation.

ROUSSEAU.

GENERAL REASONINGS AND PARTICULAR DELIBERATIONS, AND THEIR DIFFERENCE.

GENERAL reasonings seem intricate, merely because they are general: nor is it easy for the bulk of mankind to distinguish, in a great number of particulars, that common circumstance in which they all agree, or to extract it pure and unmixed from the other superfluous circumstances. Every judgment or conclusion, with them, is particular. They cannot enlarge their view to those universal propositions, which comprehend under them an infinite number of individuals, and include a whole science in a single theorem. Their

eye is confounded with such an extensive prospect; and the conclusions derived from it, even though clearly expressed, seem intricate and obscure. But however intricate they may seem, it is certain that general principles, if just and sound, must always prevail in the general course of things. It may be added, that it is also the chief business of politicians; especially in the domestic government of the state, where the public good, which is, or ought to be their object, depends on the concurrence of a multitude of cases; not, as in foreign politics, on accidents and chances, and the caprices of a few persons.

There are certainly many cases where no reasoning is to be trusted, but what is natural and easy. When a man deliberates concerning his conduct in any *particular* affair, and forms schemes in politics, trade, œconomy, or any business in life, he never ought to draw his arguments too fine, or connect too long a chain of consequences together. Something is sure to happen that will disconcert his reasoning, and produce an event different from what he expected. But when we reason upon general subjects, one may justly affirm, that our speculations can scarcely ever be too fine, provided they be just. From hence, therefore, we may observe the difference between *particular* deliberations and *general* reasonings; and that subtlety and refinement are
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much more suitable to the latter than to the former.

HUME.

THE REFORMATION.

IT will easily be conceived, that though the balance of evil prevailed in the Romish church, this was not the chief reason which produced the Reformation. A concurrence of incidents must have contributed to forward that great work. Pope Leo X. by his generous and enterprising temper, had very much exhausted his treasury, and was obliged to make use of every invention which might yield money, in order to support his projects, pleasures, and liberalities. The scheme of selling indulgences was suggested to him, as an expedient which had often served in former times to draw money from the Christian world, and to make devout people willing contributors to the grandeur and riches of the court of Rome. The church, it was supposed, was possessed of a great stock of merit, as being intitled to all the good works of the saints beyond what was employed in their own justification; and even to the merits of Christ himself, which were infinite and unbounded: and from this unexhausted treasury the Pope might retail particular portions, and by that traffic acquire money, to be employed in pious purposes, the resisting the Turk or subduing schismatics.

matics. When the money came into his treasury, the greatest part of it was usually diverted to other purposes. It is commonly believed that Leo, from the penetration of his genius and his familiarity with literature, was fully acquainted with the ridicule and fallacy of the doctrines which, as supreme pontiff, he was obliged by his interest to promote: and it is the less wonder, therefore, that he employed for his profit those pious frauds which his predecessors, the most ignorant and credulous, had always, under plausible pretences, made use of for their selfish purposes. He published the sale of a general indulgence; and as his expences had not only exhausted his usual revenue, but even anticipated the income of this extraordinary expedient, the several branches of it were openly given away to particular persons, who were intitled to levy the imposition. The produce, particularly of Saxony and the countries bordering on the Baltic, was assigned to his sister Magdalene, married to Cibo, natural son to Innocent the VIII.; and she, in order to enhance her profit, had farmed out the revenue to one Arcemboldi a Genoese, now a bishop, formerly a merchant, who still retained all the lucrative arts of his former profession. The Austin friars had usually been employed in Saxony to preach the indulgences, and from this trust had derived both profit and consideration: but Arcemboldi,

boldi, fearing lest practice might have taught them means to secrete the money, and expecting no extraordinary success from the ordinary methods of collection, gave this occupation to the Dominicans. These monks, in order to prove themselves worthy of the distinction conferred on them, exaggerated the benefit of indulgences by the most unbounded panegyrics; and advanced doctrines on that head, which, though not more ridiculous than those already received, were such as the ears of the people were not fully accustomed to. To add to the scandal, the collectors of this revenue are said to have lived very licentious lives, and to have spent in taverns, gaming-houses, and places still more infamous, the money which devout persons had saved from their usual expences in order to purchase a remission of sins. All these circumstances might have given offence; but would have been attended with no event of any importance, had there not arisen a man qualified to take advantage of the incident. Martin Luther, an Austin friar, professor in the university of Wirtemberg, resenting the affront put upon his order, began to preach against these abuses in the sale of indulgences; and being naturally of a fiery temper, and being provoked by opposition, he proceeded even to decry indulgences themselves; and was thence carried, by the heat of dispute, to question the authority of the Pope, from which
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his adversaries derived their chief arguments against him. Still as he enlarged his reading in order to support these tenets, he discovered some new abuse or error in the church of Rome; and finding his opinions greedily hearkened to, he promulgated them by writing, discourses, sermons, conferences; and daily increased the number of his disciples. All Saxony, all Germany, all Europe, were in a very little time filled with the voice of this daring innovator; and men, roused from that lethargy in which they had so long slept, began to call in question the most ancient and most received opinions. The Elector of Saxony, favourable to Luther's doctrine, protected him from the violence of the papal jurisdiction: the republic of Zurich even reformed their church according to the new model: many sovereigns of the empire, and the imperial diet itself, showed a favourable disposition towards it: and Luther, a man naturally inflexible, vehement, opinionative, was become incapable, either from promises of advancement or terrors of severity, to relinquish a sect of which he was himself the founder, and which brought him a glory superior to all others, the glory of dictating the religious faith and principles to multitudes *. The quick and surprising progress

* I was told (says M. d'Alembert, in his account of the destruction of the Jesuits in France) by a person extremely

gress of this bold sect may justly in part be ascribed to the late invention of printing and revival of learning: Not that reason bore any considerable part in opening mens eyes with regard to the impostures of the Romish church; for of all branches of literature, philosophy had as yet, and till long afterwards, made the most inconsiderable progress; neither is there any instance where argument has been able to free the people from that enormous load of absurdity with which superstition has every where overwhelmed them: not to mention that the rapid advance of the Lutheran doctrine, and the violence with which it was embraced, prove sufficiently that it owed not its success to reason and reflection. The art of printing and the revival of learning forwarded its progress in another manner. By means of that art, the books of Luther and his sectaries, full of vehemence, declamation, and a rude eloquence, were propagated more

tremely worthy of credit, that he was particularly acquainted with a Jesuit, who had been employed twenty years in the missions of Canada, and who, while he did not believe a God, as he owned privately to this friend, had faced death twenty times for the sake of the religion which he had preached with success to the savages.—

This friend represented to the Jesuit the inconsistency of his zeal. “Ah!” replied the missionary, “you have
“no idea of the pleasure which is felt in commanding
“the attention of twenty thousand people, and in persuading them to what we believe not ourselves.”

more quickly, and in greater numbers. The minds of men, somewhat awakened from a profound sleep of so many centuries, being prepared for every novelty, scrupled less to tread in any unusual path which was opened to them. And as copies of the Scripture and other ancient monuments of the Christian faith became more common, men perceived the innovations which were introduced after the first centuries; and though argument and reasoning could not give conviction, an historical fact, well supported, was able to make impression on their understandings. Many of the powers, indeed, assumed by the church of Rome were very ancient, and were prior to almost every political government established in Europe. But as the ecclesiastics would not agree to possess their privileges as matters of civil right, which time could render valid, but appealed still to a divine origin, men were tempted to look into their primitive charter; and they could, without much difficulty, perceive its defect in truth and authenticity.—In order to bestow on this topic the greater influence, Luther and his followers, not satisfied with opposing the pretended divinity of the Romish church, and displaying the temporal inconveniences of that establishment, carried matters much further, and treated the religion of their ancestors as abominable, detestable, damnable, foretold by sacred writ itself as the source
of

of all wickedness and pollution. They denominated the Pope Antichrist, called his communion the scarlet whore, and gave to Rome the appellation of Babylon; expressions which, however applied, were to be found in Scripture, and which were better calculated to operate on the multitude than the most solid arguments. Excited by contest and persecution on the one hand, by success and applause on the other, many of the reformers carried to the greatest extremity their opposition against the church of Rome; and, in contradiction to the multiplied superstitions with which that communion was loaded, they adopted an enthusiastic strain of devotion, which admitted of no observances, rites, or ceremonies; but placed all merit in a mysterious species of faith, in inward vision, rapture, and ecstasy. The new sectaries, seized with this spirit, were indefatigable in the propagation of their doctrine, and set at defiance all the anathemas and punishments with which the Roman pontiff endeavoured to overwhelm them. That the civil power, however, might afford them protection against the ecclesiastical jurisdiction, the Lutherans advanced doctrines favourable in some respects to the temporal authority of sovereigns. They inveighed against the abuses of the court of Rome, with which men were at that time generally discontented; and exhorted princes to reinstate themselves in those powers,

powers, of which the encroaching spirit of the ecclesiastics, and especially of the sovereign pontiff, had so long bereaved them. They condemned celibacy and monastic vows; and they thereby opened the doors of the convents to those who were either tired of the obedience and chastity, or disgusted with the licence in which they had hitherto lived. They blamed the excessive riches, the idleness, the libertinism of the clergy; and pointed out their treasures and revenues as lawful spoil to the first invader. And as the ecclesiastics had hitherto conducted a willing and stupid audience, and were totally unacquainted with controversy, much more with every species of true literature, they were unable to defend themselves against men armed with authorities, citations, and popular topics, and qualified to triumph in every altercation or debate.—Such were the advantages with which the reformers began their attack of the Roman hierarchy; and such were the causes of their rapid and astonishing success.

HUME.

REFORMATION, AND ITS EFFECTS.

THE authority of the church of Rome was in a state of declension, when the disputes which gave birth to the Reformation began in Germany, and soon spread themselves through every
2 part

part of Europe. The new doctrines were every where received with a high degree of popular favour. They were propagated with all that enthusiastic zeal which commonly animates the spirit of party when it attacks established authority. The teachers of those doctrines, though perhaps in other respects not more learned than many of the divines who defended the established church, seem in general to have been better acquainted with ecclesiastical history, and with the origin and progress of that system of opinions upon which the authority of the church was established; and they had thereby some advantage in almost every dispute. The austerity of their manners gave them authority with the common people, who contrasted the strict regularity of their conduct with the disorderly lives of the greater part of their own clergy. They possessed too, in a much higher degree than their adversaries, all the arts of popularity and of gaining proselytes; arts which the lofty and dignified sons of the church had long neglected, as being to them in a great measure useless. The reason of the new doctrines recommended them to some, their novelty to many; the hatred and contempt of the established clergy to a still greater number; but the zealous, passionate, and fanatical, though frequently coarse and rustic, eloquence with which they

were almost every where inculcated, recommended them to by far the greatest number.

The success of the new doctrines was almost every where so great, that the princes who at that time happened to be on bad terms with the court of Rome, were by means of them easily enabled, in their own dominions, to overturn the church; which, having lost the respect and veneration of the inferior ranks of people, could make scarce any resistance. The court of Rome had disobliged some of the smaller princes in the northern parts of Germany, whom it had probably considered as too insignificant to be worth the managing. They universally, therefore, established the Reformation in their own dominions. The tyranny of Christiern II. and of Troll archbishop of Upsal, enabled Gustavus Vasa to expel them both from Sweden. The Pope favoured the tyrant and the archbishop, and Gustavus Vasa found no difficulty in establishing the Reformation in Sweden. Christiern II. was afterwards deposed from the throne of Denmark, where his conduct had rendered him as odious as in Sweden. The Pope, however, was still disposed to favour him; and Frederick of Holstein, who had mounted the throne in his stead, revenged himself by following the example of Gustavus Vasa. The magistrates of Berne and Zurich, who had no particular quarrel with the Pope, established with great ease

ease the Reformation in their respective cantons, where just before, some of the clergy had, by an imposture somewhat grosser than ordinary, rendered the whole order both odious and contemptible.

In this critical situation of its affairs, the Papal court was at sufficient pains to cultivate the friendship of the powerful sovereigns of France and Spain, of whom the latter was at that time emperor of Germany. With their assistance it was enabled, though not without great difficulty and much bloodshed, either to suppress altogether, or to obstruct very much, the progress of the Reformation in their dominions. It was well enough inclined too to be complaisant to the king of England. But, from the circumstances of the times, it could not be so without giving offence to a still greater sovereign, Charles V. king of Spain and emperor of Germany. Henry VIII. accordingly, though he did not himself embrace the greater part of the doctrines of the Reformation, was yet enabled, by their general prevalence, to suppress all the monasteries, and to abolish the authority of the church of Rome in his dominions. That he should go so far, though he went no further, gave some satisfaction to the patrons of the Reformation; who having got possession of the government in the reign of his son and successor, completed,

completed without any difficulty the work which Henry VIII. had begun.

In some countries, as in Scotland, where the government was weak, unpopular, and not very firmly established, the Reformation was strong enough to overturn not only the church, but the state likewise for attempting to support the church.

Among the followers of the Reformation, dispersed in all the different countries of Europe, there was no general tribunal, which, like that of the court of Rome, or an œcumenical council, could settle all disputes among them, and with irresistible authority prescribe to all of them the precise limits of orthodoxy. When the followers of the Reformation in one country, therefore, happened to differ from their brethren in another, as they had no common judge to appeal to, the dispute could never be decided; and many such disputes arose among them. Those concerning the government of the church, and the right of conferring ecclesiastical benefices, were perhaps the most interesting to the peace and welfare of civil society. They gave birth accordingly to the two principal parties or sects among the followers of the Reformation, the Lutheran and Calvinistic sects; the only sects among them, of which the doctrine and discipline have ever yet been established by law in any part of Europe.

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The followers of Luther, together with what is called the church of England, preserved more or less of the episcopal government, established subordination among the clergy, gave the sovereign the disposal of all the bishopricks and other consistorial benefices within his dominions, and thereby rendered him the real head of the church; and without depriving the bishop of the right of collating to the smaller benefices within his diocese, they, even to those benefices, not only admitted, but favoured the right of presentation both in the sovereign and in all other lay-patrons. This system of church-government was from the beginning favourable to peace and good order, and to submission to the civil sovereign. It has never, accordingly, been the occasion of any tumult or civil commotion in any country in which it has once been established. The church of England in particular has always valued herself, with great reason, upon the unexceptionable loyalty of her principles. Under such a government the clergy naturally endeavour to recommend themselves to the sovereign, to the court, and to the nobility and gentry of the country, by whose influence they chiefly expect to obtain preferment. They pay court to those patrons, sometimes, no doubt, by the vilest flattery and assentation, but frequently too by cultivating all those arts which best deserve, and which are therefore most likely

to gain them the esteem of people of rank and fortune; by their knowledge in all the different branches of useful and ornamental learning; by the decent liberality of their manners; by the social good-humour of their conversation; and by their avowed contempt of those absurd and hypocritical austerities which fanatics inculcate and pretend to practise, in order to draw upon themselves the veneration, and upon the greater part of men of rank and fortune, who avow that they do not practise them, the abhorrence of the common people. Such a clergy, however, while they pay their court in this manner to the higher ranks of life, are very apt to neglect altogether the means of maintaining their influence and authority with the lower. They are listened to, esteemed and respected by their superiors; but before their inferiors they are frequently incapable of defending, effectually and to the conviction of such hearers, their own sober and moderate doctrines, against the most ignorant enthusiastic who chooses to attack them.

The followers of Zuinglius, or more properly those of Calvin, on the contrary, bestowed upon the people of each parish, whenever the church became vacant, the right of electing their own pastor; and established at the same time the most perfect equality among the clergy. The former part of this institution, as long as it remained in vigour,

vigour, seems to have been productive of nothing but disorder and confusion, and to have tended equally to corrupt the morals both of the clergy and of the people. The latter part seems never to have had any effects but what were perfectly agreeable.

As long as the people of each parish preserved the right of electing their own pastors, they acted almost always under the influence of the clergy, and generally of the most factious and fanatical of the order. The clergy, in order to preserve their influence in those popular elections, became, or affected to become, many of them, fanatics themselves, encouraged fanaticism among the people, and gave the preference almost always to the most fanatical candidate. So small a matter as the appointment of a parish-priest occasioned almost always a violent contest, not only in one parish, but in all the neighbouring parishes, who seldom failed to take part in the quarrel. When the parish happened to be situated in a great city, it divided all the inhabitants into two parties; and when that city happened either to constitute itself a little republic, or to be the head and capital of a little republic, as is the case with many of the considerable cities in Switzerland and Holland, every paltry dispute of this kind, over and above exasperating the animosity of all their other factions, threatened to leave behind

hind it both a new schism in the church, and a new faction in the state. In those small republics, therefore, the magistrate very soon found it necessary, for the sake of preserving the public peace, to assume to himself the right of presenting to all vacant benefices. In Scotland, the most extensive country in which this Presbyterian form of church-government has ever been established, the rights of patronage were in effect abolished by the act which established Presbytery in the beginning of the reign of William III. That act at least put it in the power of certain classes of people in each parish, to purchase, for a very small price, the right of electing their own pastor. The constitution which this act established was allowed to subsist for about two and twenty years; but was abolished by the 10th of Queen Anne, ch. 12. on account of the confusions and disorders which this more popular mode of election had almost every where occasioned. In so extensive a country as Scotland, however, a tumult in a remote parish was not so likely to give disturbance to government as in a smaller state. The 10th of Queen Anne restored the rights of patronage. But though in Scotland the law gives the benefice without any exception to the person presented by the patron; yet the church requires sometimes (for she has not in this respect been very uniform in her decisions) a certain concurrence of

of the people, before she will confer upon the presentee what is called the cure of souls, or the ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the parish. She sometimes at least, from an affected concern for the peace of the parish, delays the settlement till this concurrence can be procured. The private tampering of some of the neighbouring clergy sometimes to procure, but more frequently to prevent this concurrence, and the popular arts which they cultivate in order to enable them upon such occasions to tamper more effectually, are perhaps the causes which principally keep up whatever remains of the old fanatical spirit, either in the clergy or in the people of Scotland.

The equality which the Presbyterian form of church-government establishes among the clergy, consists, first, in the equality of authority or ecclesiastical jurisdiction; and, secondly, in the equality of benefice. In all Presbyterian churches the equality of authority is perfect; that of benefice is not so. The difference, however, between one benefice and another is seldom so considerable as commonly to tempt the possessor even of the small one to pay court to his patron, by the vile arts of flattery and assentation, in order to get a better. In all the Presbyterian churches, where the rights of patronage are thoroughly established, it is by nobler and better arts that the established clergy in general endeavour to gain the
favour

favour of their superiors; by their learning, by the irreproachable regularity of their life, and by the faithful and diligent discharge of their duty. Their patrons even frequently complain of the independency of their spirit, which they are apt to construe into ingratitude for past favours, but which at worst, perhaps, is seldom any more than that indifference which naturally arises from the consciousness that no further favours of the kind are ever to be expected. There is scarce perhaps to be found any where in Europe a more learned, decent, independent, and respectable set of men, than the greater part of the Presbyterian clergy of Holland, Geneva, Switzerland, and Scotland.

Where the church-benefices are all nearly equal, none of them can be very great; and this mediocrity of benefice, though it may no doubt be carried too far, has, however, some very agreeable effects. Nothing but the most exemplary morals can give dignity to a man of small fortune. The vices of levity and vanity necessarily render him ridiculous; and are, besides, almost as ruinous to him as they are to the common people. In his own conduct, therefore, he is obliged to follow that system of morals which the common people respect the most. He gains their esteem and affection by that plan of life which his own interest and situation would lead him to follow. The common people look upon him with that kindness

ness with which we naturally regard one who approaches somewhat to our own condition, but who, we think, ought to be in a higher. Their kindness naturally provokes his kindness. He becomes careful to instruct them, and attentive to assist and relieve them. He does not even despise the prejudices of people who are disposed to be so favourable to him, and never treats them with those contemptuous and arrogant airs which we so often meet with in the proud dignitaries of opulent and well-endowed churches. The Presbyterian clergy, accordingly, have more influence over the minds of the common people than perhaps the clergy of any other established church. It is accordingly in Presbyterian countries only that we ever find the common people converted, without persecution, completely, and almost to a man, to the established church.

A. SMITH.

NATIONAL REFORMATIONS.

THERE is no abuse so great in civil society as not to be attended with a great variety of beneficial consequences; and, in the beginnings of reformation, the loss of these advantages is always felt very sensibly, while the benefit resulting from the change is the slow effect of time, and is seldom perceived by the bulk of a nation.

HUME.

R E-

RELIGION.

THERE is naturally every where a religion affirmative or negative, (some religions indeed partake of both), and which enter deeply in forming the habits and manners of the people. Where religion is affirmative, *i. e.* consists of forms and ceremonies, it gives a loose and enthusiam to the fancy, which conveys a spirit into the air and manners. A negative religion being formed in direct opposition to the first, its measures are regulated accordingly, much pains are taken to root out, and to remove, every thing that can give wing to the imagination, and to regulate the external conduct by a torpid, inanimate composure, gravity, and indifference. Some religions appear to be the grave of arts and sciences, of genius, of sensibility, and of all the finer and spiritual parts of the human faculties. Other religions have been the nurse and mother of them; they have embraced all the arts, poetry, painting, music, architecture; every effort of ingenuity have been employed in giving a force and furtherance to their views. If the Greeks had been of the same leaven with our Quakers, Puritans, and Mahometans, they would not only have been without an Apelles, or a Phidias; but (the connection of things considered) perhaps without poets,

poets; and without any thing that could be a proof, that there was either genius or imagination amongst them.

* *

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

RELIGION, in general, at its origin, is believed literally as it is professed; and it is afterwards rather refined by the learned, than debated by the ignorant. The institution of a religion has been, in every country, the first step towards an emersion from savage barbarism and the establishment of civil society. The human mind, at that period when reason is just beginning to dawn, and science is yet below the horizon, has by no means acquired that facility of invention, and those profound habits of thinking, which are necessary to strike out and arrange a connected, consistent chain of abstruse-allegory. The vulgar and illiterate have always understood the mythology of their country in its most simple and literal sense; and there was a time to every nation, when the highest rank in it was equally vulgar and illiterate with the lowest: we have therefore no right to expect in them a greater capability of refinement than in the modern vulgar. The progress of science is slow and gradual; men start not up at once into divines and philosophers; yet it may be fairly presumed, that when the man-

ners of a people become polished, and their ideas enlightened, attempts will be made to revise and refit their religious creed into a conformity with the rest of their improvements; and that those doctrines which the ignorant ancestor received with reverence and conviction, as the literal exposition of undoubted fact, the philosophic divine will strive to gloss over by *à posteriori* constructions of his own, and in the fury of symbol and allegory obscure and distort the text, which the simplicity of its author never suspected as liable to the possibility of such mutilation. These innovations, however, have always been screened with most scrupulous attention from the general view of mankind: and if a hardy sage hath, at any time, ventured to remove the veil, his opinions have usually been received with detestation, and his person hath frequently paid the forfeit of his temerity. The Eleusinian mysteries were not coëval with the Pagan mythology, to whose disapproval they owed their establishment: probably the institution was formed at a more advanced period of science, when the minds of the learned were eager to pierce through the obscurity of superstition; and when the vanity of superior penetration made them ashamed, literally, to believe those tenets which popular prejudices would not suffer them absolutely to renounce.

Preface to GENTOO Laws.
ON

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

THE religions, instituted by human, under the mask of divine authority, though they might be intended to restrain and reform mankind, to give stronger sanctions to the law of nature, and to be subservient to government, have served in all ages to very different purposes. They have promoted false conceptions of the Deity, they have substituted superstition in the place of those real duties which we owe to God and man; they have added new occasions to those that subsisted before of enmity and strife; and infociableness has increased as they have flourished. Nay, the first principles have been laid in it, in direct opposition to the religion of nature and reason; the first principle of which is a sociableness that flows from universal benevolence. We are obliged to except out of the religions instituted by human authority the Jewish and the Christian; but we cannot except even these, as one of them was taught originally, as the other of them has been taught in the course of it, and as both of them have been practised, out of the religions that have served to the ill purposes here mentioned, to that principally of infociableness. On the contrary, no religions have rendered the professors of them so infociable to other men, as those which have claimed, truly.

or falsely, to be immediate revelations of the Supreme Being, and have exacted an implicit faith as well as an implicit obedience. Infocibility was at the first, and continues still, the great characteristic of Judaism. So it was, and so it is, of Mahometism: so it was not of Gospel Christianity, but so it is become of theological Christianity; if it be allowed to make a distinction, which will justify itself in every instance of comparison.

BOLINGBROKE.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

A CHRISTIAN, who takes his religion from the gospel, and not from systems of theology, far from being under any obligation of believing, is under the strongest of rejecting, every law, whether perpetual or occasional; whether given to the Jews alone, or to them and to others, that is evidently repugnant to the law of nature and of right reason and to the precepts of the gospel. If this was the Spirit of God in the days of Christ, it was the Spirit of God in the days of Moses: and whatever differences there might be in the several dispensations and the objects of them, God could have effected his purposes without contradicting his Spirit. We may believe any thing sooner than this, that immutability admits of change; and yet we must admit both the contradiction

tradiction and the change, if we give entire credit to all that we find related, and as it stands related in the books of the Old Testament. Father Simon, a divine of the faculty of Paris, held that the authenticity of these books, and the divine inspiration of their authors, should be understood to extend no further than to matters purely of doctrine, or to such as have a necessary connection with these. Upon the same, or even a stronger principle of reason, we may assert, that as the sacred writers have no claim to inspiration when they write on other subjects; so neither have they when they write any thing on these which are evidently inconsistent with right reason, in matters that are proper objects of reason, and with the first principles of natural law, and which are at the same time the first principles of Christianity. The all-perfect Being cannot contradict himself; but he would contradict himself, if the laws contained in the 13th chapter of Deuteronomy, to mention no others here, were his laws, since they contradict those of nature. From these indisputable premises we must conclude, that all those expressions in the text, which ascribe these laws to God, are uninspired, perhaps interpolated, but undoubtedly false; or we must impute to the Author of nature what we are forced to own unjust and cruel according to the laws of nature.

BOLINGBROKE.

THE

THE INCONVENIENCE OF TRANSPLANTING A
RELIGION FROM ONE COUNTRY TO
ANOTHER.

THERE are many local laws in various religions; and when Montezuma with so much obstinacy insisted, that the religion of the Spaniards was good for their country, and his for Mexico, he did not assert an absurdity; because, in fact, legislators could never help having a regard to what nature had established before them.—The opinion of the Metempsychosis is adapted to the climate of India. An excessive heat burns all the country; they can breed but very few cattle; they are always in danger of wanting them for tillage; their black cattle multiply but indifferently; and they are subject to many distempers: a law of religion that preserves them is therefore more suitable to the policy of the country.

When the meadows are scorched up, rice and pulse, by the assistance of water, are brought to perfection: a law of religion which permits only this kind of nourishment must therefore be extremely useful to men in those climates.

The flesh of cattle in that country is insipid, but the milk and butter which they receive from them serves for a part of their subsistence: therefore

fore the law which prohibits the eating and killing of cows is in India not unreasonable.

Athens contained a prodigious multitude of people, but its territory was barren. It was therefore a religious maxim with this people, that those who offered some small presents to the gods, honoured them more than those who sacrificed an ox.

It follows from hence, that there are frequently many inconveniences attending the transplanting a religion from one country to another. “The
“ hog (says M. de Boulainvilliers) must be very
“ scarce in Arabia, where there are almost no
“ woods, and hardly any thing fit for the nourish-
“ ment of those animals: besides, the saltiness of
“ the water and food renders the people most
“ susceptible of cutaneous disorders.” This local law could not be good in other countries as in China, where the hog is almost an universal, and in some sort a necessary nourishment.

Sanctorius has observed, that pork transpires but little, and that this kind of meat greatly hinders the transpiration of other food; he has found that this diminution amounts to a third. Besides, it is known that the want of transpiration forms or increases the disorders of the skin. The feeding on pork ought therefore to be prohibited, in climates where the people are subject to these
dis

disorders; as in Palestine, Arabia, Egypt, and Libya.

Sir John Chardin says, that there is not a navigable river in Persia except the Kur, which is at the extremity of the empire. The ancient law of the Gaurs, which prohibited sailing on rivers, was not therefore attended with any inconveniences in this country, though it would have ruined the trade of another.

Frequent bathings are extremely useful in hot countries. On this account they are ordained in the Mahometan law, and in the Indian religion. In India it is a meritorious act to pray to God in the running stream: But how could these things be performed in other climates?

When a religion adapted to the climate of one country clashes too much with the climate of another, it cannot be there established; and whenever it has been introduced, it has been afterwards discarded. It seems to all human appearance, as if the climate had prescribed the bounds of the Christian and Mahometan religions.

It follows from hence, that it is almost always proper for a religion to have particular doctrines and a general worship. In laws concerning religious worship, there ought to be but few particulars: for instance, they should command mortification in general, and not a certain kind of mortification. Christianity is full of good sense: abstinence

stinence is of divine institution; but a particular kind of abstinence is ordained by human authority, and may therefore be changed.

MONTESQUIEU.

OF THE MOTIVES OF ATTACHMENT TO DIFFERENT RELIGIONS.

THE different religions of the world do not give to those who profess them equal motives of attachment: this depends greatly on the manner in which they agree with the turn of thought and perceptions of mankind. We are extremely addicted to idolatry, and yet have no great inclination for the religion of idolaters: we are not very fond of spiritual ideas, and yet are most attached to those religions which teach us to adore a spiritual being. This proceeds from the satisfaction we find in ourselves at having been so intelligent as to choose a religion which raises the Deity from that baseness in which he had been placed by others. We look upon idolatry as the religion of an ignorant people; and the religion which has a Spiritual Being for its object, as that of the most enlightened nations.

When, with a doctrine that gives the idea of a spiritual Supreme Being, we can still join those of a sensible nature, and admit them into our worship, we contract a greater attachment to religion; because

cause those motives which we have just mentioned are added to our natural inclination for the objects of sense. Thus the Catholics, who have more of this kind of worship than the Protestants, are more attached to their religion than the Protestants are to theirs, and more zealous for its propagation.

When the people of Ephesus were informed, that the fathers of the council had declared they might call the Virgin Mary the *Mother* of God, they were transported with joy; they kissed the hands of the bishops, they embraced their knees, and the whole city resounded with acclamations.

When an intellectual religion superadds a choice made by the Deity, and a preference of those who profess it to those who do not, this greatly attaches us to religion. The Mahometants would not be so good Musselmans if, on the one hand, there were not idolatrous nations who make them imagine themselves champions of the unity of God; and, on the other, Christians to make them believe that they are the objects of his presence.

A religion burthened with many ceremonies attaches us to it more strongly than that which has a fewer number. We have an extreme propensity to things in which we are continually employed; witness the obstinate prejudices of the Mahometans and the Jews, and the readiness with which barbarous and savage nations change their religion;

religion; who, as they are employed entirely in hunting or war, have but few religious ceremonies.

Men are extremely inclined to the passions of hope and fear; a religion, therefore, that had neither a heaven nor a hell would hardly please them. This is proved by the ease with which foreign religions have been established in Japan, and the zeal and fondness with which they were received.

In order to raise an attachment to religion, it is necessary that it should inculcate pure morals. Men who are knaves by retail, are extremely honest in the gross: they love morality. This appears remarkably evident in our theatres: we are sure of pleasing the people by moral sentiments; we are sure of shocking them by those it disapproves.

When external worship is attended with great magnificence, it flatters our minds, and strongly attaches us to religion. The riches of temples and those of the clergy greatly affect us. Thus even the misery of the people is a motive that renders them fond of a religion, which has served as a pretext to those who were the cause of their misery.

MONTESQUIEU.

THE

THE TRUTH OR FALSITY OF A DOCTRINE
IN RELIGION ARE NOT OF SO MUCH CON-
SEQUENCE TO GOVERNMENT AS THE USE
OR ABUSE OF IT.

THE most true and holy doctrines may be attended with the very worst consequences, when they are not connected with the principles of society; and, on the contrary, doctrines the most false may be attended with excellent consequences, when contrived so as to be connected with these principles. The religion of Confucius disowns the immortality of the soul; and the sect of Zeno did not believe it. These two sects have drawn from their bad principles consequences, not just indeed, but most admirable as to their influence on society. Those of the religion of Tao, and of Fo, believe the immortality of the soul; but from this sacred doctrine they draw the most frightful consequences. The doctrine of the immortality of the soul falsely understood, has almost in every part of the globe, and in every age, engaged women, slaves, subjects, friends, to murder themselves, that they might go and serve in the other world the object of their respect or love in this. Thus it was in the West Indies; thus it was among the Danes; thus it is at present in Japan, in Macassar, and many other places.

These customs do not so directly proceed from the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, as from that of the resurrection of the body; from whence they have drawn this consequence, that, after death, the same individual will have the same wants, the same sentiments, the same passions. In this point of view, the doctrine of the immortality of the soul has a prodigious effect on mankind; because the idea of only a simple change of habitation, is more within the reach of the human understanding, and more adapted to flatter the heart, than the idea of a new modification. It is not enough for religion to establish a doctrine, it must also direct its influence. This the Christian religion performs in the most admirable manner; particularly with regard to the doctrines of which we have been speaking. It makes us hope for a state which is the object of our belief; not for a state which we have already experienced or known: Thus every article, even the resurrection of the body, leads us to spiritual ideas.

The sacred books of the ancient Persians, say, *If you would be holy, instruct your children; because all the good actions which they perform will be imputed to you.* They advise them to marry betimes; because children at the day of judgment will be as a bridge, over which those who have none cannot pass. These doctrines were false, but extremely useful.

MONTESQUIEU.

VOL. III.

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THE ONE TRUE RELIGION NOT TO BE
DISCOVERED WITHOUT AN EXAMINATION
OF ALL RELIGIONS.

AMONG the many different religions, each of which proscribes and excludes the other, one only can be true: if, indeed, there be such a one among them all. Now, to discover which this is, it is not enough to examine that one: it is necessary to examine them all; as we should not, on any occasion whatever, condemn without a hearing. It is necessary to compare objections with proofs, and to know what each objects to in the rest, as well as what the others have to offer in their defence. The more clearly any sentiment or opinion appears demonstrated, the more narrowly it behoves us to inquire what are the reasons which prevent its opponents from subscribing to it. To form a proper judgment of any religion, we are not to deduce its tenets from the books of its professors; we must go and learn it among the people. Each sect have their peculiar traditions, their customs, prejudices, and modes of acceptation, which constitute the peculiar mode of their faith; all which should be taken into consideration when we form a judgment of their religion.

We have three principal religions in Europe; one admits only of one revelation, another of two,
and

and the third of three. Each holds the other in detestation; anathematizes its professors, accuses them of ignorance, obstinacy, and falsehood. What impartial person will presume to decide between them, without having first examined their proofs, and heard their reasons? That which admits of only one revelation is the most ancient, and seems the least disputable: that which admits of three is the most modern, and seems to be the most consistent: that which admits of two, and rejects the third, may possibly be the best, but it hath certainly every prepossession against it; its inconsistency stares one full in the face.

In all these three revelations, the sacred books are written in languages unknown to the people who believe in them. The Jews no longer understand Hebrew; the Christians neither Greek nor Hebrew; the Turks and Persians understand no Arabic; and even the modern Arabs themselves speak not the language of Mahomet. Is not this a very simple manner of instructing mankind, by talking to them always in a language which they do not comprehend? But these books, it will be said, are translated; but who can assure us they are faithfully translated, or that it is even possible they should be so? Who can give us a sufficient reason why God, when he hath a mind to speak to mankind, should stand in need of an interpreter?

Among the doctors of the Sorbonne, it is as clear as day-light, that the predictions concerning the Messiah relate to Jesus Christ. Among the Rabbins of Amsterdam, it is just as evident they have no relation at all to him. At Constantinople, the Turks make known their reasons, and we durst not publish ours; there it is our turn to submit. Two thirds of mankind are neither Jews, Mahometans, nor Christians; how many millions of men, therefore, must there be who never heard of Moses, of Jesus Christ, or of Mahomet!

If there be in the world but one true religion, and every man be obliged to adopt it, it is necessary to spend our lives in the study of all religions, to visit the countries where they have been established, and examine and compare them with each other. No man is exempted from the principal duty of his species; and no one hath a right to confide in the judgment of another. The artisan who lives only by his industry, the husbandman who cannot read, the timid and delicate virgin, the feeble valetudinarian; all without exception must study, meditate, dispute, and travel the world over in search of truth: there would be no longer any settled inhabitants in a country; the face of the earth being covered with pilgrims, going from place to place at great trouble and expence, to verify, examine, and compare the several different systems and modes of worship to be

be met with in various countries. We must in such a case bid adieu to arts and sciences, to trade, and all the civil occupations of life. Every other study must give place to that of religion; while the man who should enjoy the greatest share of health and strength, and make the best use of his time and his reason, for the greatest term of years allotted to human life, would, in the extreme of old age, be still perplexed where to fix; and it would be a great thing after all, if he should learn before his death, what religion he ought to have believed and practised during life.

ROUSSEAU.

THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION FOUNDED ON FAITH.

IF we examine the miracles in the Pentateuch according to reason, and not as the word or testimony of God himself, but as the production of a mere human writer and historian, we shall find that book presented to us by a barbarous and ignorant people, written in an age when they were still more barbarous, and in all probability long after the facts which it relates; corroborated by no concurring testimony, and resembling those fabulous accounts which every nation gives of its origin. Upon reading this book, we shall find it full of prodigies and miracles. It gives an account.

count of a state of the world and of human nature entirely different from the present: of our fall from that state: of the age of man extended to near 1000 years: of the destruction of the world by a deluge: of the arbitrary choice of one people as the favourites of heaven; and that people the countrymen of the author: of their deliverance from bondage by prodigies the most astonishing imaginable. Would not the falsehood of such a book, supported by such a testimony, be more extraordinary and miraculous than all the miracles it relates? Upon the whole, we may conclude, that the *Christian religion* not only was at first attended with miracles, but even at this day cannot be believed by any reasonable person without one. Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of its veracity: and whoever is moved by faith to assent to it, is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience.

HUME.

NATURAL RELIGION.

AS a knowledge of the essential differences of things may lead men, who know not God, to a knowledge of the morality of actions; so do these
essential

essential differences serve as so many clues, by which the Theist may guide himself through all the intricacies of error and disputation, to a knowledge of the will of God. Since infinite wisdom, that must always proportion means to ends, has made happiness the end or instinctive object of all his human creatures; and has so constituted them, and the system in which he has placed them, that they can neither attain to this happiness, nor be secure in the possession of it, by any other means than the practice of morality or the social virtues; it is demonstrated, that God wills we should pursue these means to arrive at this end. We know more certainly the will of God in this way, than we can know it in any other. We may take the word of men for the word of God; and, in fact, this has been, and is still the case of many. But we can never mistake the works of God for the works of men; and may be therefore assured that a revelation, evidently manifested in them, is a divine revelation. But though natural religion is an object of knowledge, and all other religions, even that of the Gospel, can rest on nothing more than probability; yet may that probability be such as will and ought to force our assent. There are sanctions implied in the religion of nature, because it assumes, and to be sure very justly, that the general happiness or misery depends on the observation of its precepts; and that the degrees
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of one and the other bear always a proportion to the exercise, and to the neglect, of public and private virtue in every community. But these motives are such as particular men will be apt to think do not immediately, nor directly, concern them; because they are apt to consider themselves as individuals, rather than as members of society, and to catch at pleasure without any regard to happiness. To give an additional strength, therefore, to these motives, that are determining in their own nature, but not so according to the imperfection of ours; decisive to our reason, but not so to our appetites and passions; the ancient Theists and Polytheists, philosophers or legislators, invented another; that, I mean, of future rewards and punishments, represented under various forms, but always directed to the same purpose.

This motive, every man who believes it, may, and must apply to himself, and hope the reward and fear the punishment, for his secret as well as public actions; nay, for his thoughts as well as his actions. What effect this motive had in remote antiquity we cannot say; but it had lost its force long before the institution of Christianity. The fear of hell, particularly, was ridiculed by some of the greatest moralists; and to show how little it was kept up in the minds of the vulgar, we may observe, that Tully treated it in some of his public pleadings as he would have avoided scrupu-

scrupulously to do, whatever he thought of it himself, if this fear had been at that time prevalent even among the vulgar. Human reason, says Mr Locke, unassisted by revelation, in its great and proper business of morality, never made out an entire body of the law of nature from unquestionable principles, or by clear deductions. Scattered sayings—incoherent apophthegms of philosophers and wise men—could never make a morality—could never rise to the force of a law. These assertions now are in part, and in part only, true.

But when he comes to contrast this supposed imperfect knowledge of the religion of nature, which the heathen had, with that supposed perfect knowledge which is communicated by the Gospel, what he advances stands in direct contradiction to truth. It is not true, that Christ revealed an entire body of ethics, proved to be the law of nature from principles of reason, and reaching all the duties of life. If mankind wanted such a code, to which recourse might be had on every occasion as to an unerring rule in every part of the moral duties, such a code is still wanting; for the Gospel is not such a code. Moral obligations are occasionally recommended and commanded in it, but no where proved from principles of reason, and by clear deductions, unless allusions, parables, and comparisons, and promises, and threats, are to pass for such. Were all the precepts

cepts of this kind, that are scattered about in the whole New Testament, collected, like the short sentences of ancient sages in the memorials we have of them, and put together in the very words of the sacred writers, they would compose a very short, as well as unconnected system of ethics. A system thus collected from the writings of ancient heathen moralists; of Tully, of Seneca, of Epictetus, and others; would be more full, more entire, more coherent, and more clearly deduced from unquestionable principles of knowledge. If there was any thing like a complete system of morality in the Gospel, we should find it in the Sermon on the Mount, preached by Christ himself, not on any particular doctrine, but on the whole duty of man. What now do we find in this sermon? Many excellent precepts of morality, no doubt, intermingled with, and enforced by several considerations drawn from his own revelations; and yet such as the religion of nature enjoins, or implies, and as have been practised by philosophers, and other good men among the heathen. Some of these, and some others which are interspersed in the Gospel, require great purity and perfection. Thus, for instance, wherever marriage has been instituted, adultery has been forbid. It was so by the Mosaic law, and it is so by the religion of nature; for though marriage is not directly instituted by the religion of nature, yet

yet every wrong, every invasion of another man's property, and every injustice, is forbid by it. Now the Gospel carries this duty much further; and declares, that whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in his heart. The law that forbids a crime, does certainly imply that we should not desire to commit it: for to want the desire, or to be able to extinguish it, is the best security of our obedience; though he who is unable to extinguish it, and yet abstains from the sin, has in the eye of reason a greater degree of merit. Reason commands what a man may by the force of reason perform. Revelation commands what it is impossible to obey, without an assistance unknown to reason. Thus, again, murder is forbid by the law of nature; but even anger is forbid by this; and universal benevolence, that great principle of the first, is strained by the last to the love of our enemies and persecutors: a precept so sublime, that I doubt whether it was ever exactly observed any more under the law of grace than under the religion of nature; though some appearances of it may be found, perhaps, under both; and at least as many under one as under the other. These sublime precepts have not been observed by the professors of Christianity, either ancient or modern. The Quaker, who says, Yea, yea, and Nay, nay, and doth not swear at all, does not willingly
part

part with his coat as well as his cloak, nor give away one because the other has been taken from him; neither does the good man neglect to lay up some treasures on earth, where moth and rust corrupt, and where thieves break through and steal.

There are besides these general duties, and others of the same kind commanded or recommended by the Gospel, some that seem directed to the Jews only, and some that seem directed more immediately to the disciples of Christ. Of the first sort, is that injunction which restrains divorces to the case of adultery; whereas by the law of Moses, as well as by those of other legislators, a man who did not like his wife, nor care to cohabit with her, might give her a letter of divorce, and turn her out of his doors; for which express leave is given in the xxivth chapter of Deuteronomy. Of the same sort are those directions which tend to render the worship of God more intellectual, and the practice of good works less ostentatious. Of the second sort, are certain duties which seem fit enough for an order of men like the Essenians, but are by no means practicable in the general society of mankind. To resist no injury, to take no care for to-morrow, to neglect providing for the common necessities of life, and to sell all to follow Christ, might be properly exacted from those who were his companions, and his disciples in a stricter sense, like the scholars

lars of Pythagoras, admitted within the curtain; but reason and experience both show, that, considered as general duties, they are impracticable, inconsistent with natural instinct, and quite destructive of society. The religion of nature is therefore the plainest of all laws; and if the heavens do not declare the will as well as the glory of God, the earth and the inhabitants of it declare both. The will of God has been revealed in his works to all those who have applied themselves to the contemplation of them; even to those who did not discover him in them, from the time that men have used their reason: and where reason improved, and knowledge increased, morality was carried as high in speculation, and in practice too, by some of the heathen worthies, as by any of the Christian saints.

BOLINGBROKE.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

BY natural religion, I mean the principles of morality common to mankind. Newton believed, that God having given the same senses to all men, the same wants, the same sentiments; consequently the same rude notions, every where the foundation of society, prevail among all mankind. It is certain, that God has given to bees and ants something to induce them to live in common,

which he has not given to wolves nor falcons. It is certain, from all mens living in society, there is in their essence a secret tie, by which God intended to connect them together. Now, if at a certain age, the ideas flowing from the senses to men, all organized in the same manner, did not gradually give them the same principles necessary to society, it is certain that such society could not subsist. This is the reason why truth, gratitude, friendship, &c. are esteemed from Siam to Mexico.

It has always seemed strange to me, that so wise a man as Locke should have advanced, that there is no notion of good and evil common to all men. This is a mistake. It is founded on the narratives of travellers; who say, that in some countries it is customary for parents to eat their children, and to eat women when past child-bearing; that in others, certain enthusiasts, who make use of she-asses instead of women, are honoured with the name of saints. But there is nothing more common than for them to see through a false medium, give a false account of what they have seen; to mistake the intention, especially in a nation to whose language they are strangers; and, in fine, to judge of the manners of a whole people by a particular fact, whose circumstances are to them unknown.

Were a Persian at Lisbon, at Madrid, at Goa,
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on the day of an Auto-da-Fe, he would think, and not without an appearance of reason, that the Christians sacrificed men to God. Let him look into the almanacks, sold all over Europe among the lower class, and he will conclude, that we all believe in the effects of the moon; though this is so far from being true, that we laugh at them. Thus, should a traveller tell me, for instance, that the savages eat their parents from filial affection; I should answer, that, first, the fact is dubious; secondly, if it be true, it will be so far from destroying the idea of respect due to parents, that it is probably a barbarous manner of showing tenderness; a horrible mistake of the law of nature. For possibly they kill their parents from mere duty, to free them from the troubles of old age, or the fury of an enemy: and if they thus give their parents a tomb within their own bodies, instead of being devoured by savage conquerors, this custom, however shocking it may appear to human nature, necessarily flows from a goodness of heart. Natural religion is nothing more than this law known through the world, *Do as you would be done by*. Now the savage who kills his father to save him from the enemy, and who buries him in his breast, that he may not find a grave in the bowels of his enemy, wishes that his son may treat him in the same manner if reduced to the same exigency. This law of treating our

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neighbour as ourselves, flows naturally from the rudest notions, and sooner or later is heard in the hearts of all men; for having all the same reason, the fruits of that tree must have a resemblance: and they do, in reality, resemble each other; for in every society, the name of virtue is given to whatever is thought useful to the society.

Name me a country upon earth, or a society of ten persons, where, what tends to promote the common good, is not esteemed; and when you have done this, I will allow there is no natural law. This law is doubtless infinitely varied; but can we infer from thence any thing more than that it exists? Matter every where receives different forms; yet every where retains its nature. It is in vain to say, that theft was enjoined at Lacedemon; it is nothing more than an abuse of words. What we call theft, was not enjoined at Lacedemon; but in a city where every thing was common, a permission to take dexterously what private persons appropriated to themselves contrary to law, was a method of punishing the spirit of appropriation prohibited among that people. *Meum* and *tuum* was a crime, for which what we call theft was the punishment; and among them, as among us, there was some order made by God for us all, as he made for the ants to live in society. The disposition which we all have for living

ving in society, is the foundation of the law of nature. VOLTAIRE.

THE RELIGION OF THE FIRST MEN.

AFTER the formation of societies, it is credible that there was some religion, a kind of rustic worship. Man entirely occupied with his wants, could not soar to the Author of life. He could not be acquainted with those causes and effects, which to the wise proclaim an eternal Architect.

The knowledge of a God, creator, requiter, and avenger, is the fruit of cultivated reason, or of revelation.

All people were for ages what the inhabitants of the several coasts of Africa, of several islands, and half the Americans, are at present. Those people have no idea of a sole God, creator of all things, omnipresent, and existing of himself from all eternity. They should not, however, be called Atheists in the usual sense; for they do not deny a Supreme Being; they are not acquainted with him; they have no idea of him. The Caffres take an insect for their protector, the Negroes a serpent. Among the Americans, some adore the moon, others a tree. Several have no worship whatever.

The Peruvians, when they became polished, adored the sun. Either Mango Capac had

made them believe that he was the sun of that planet, or a dawn of reason made them think they owed some acknowledgment to the planet which animated nature. In order to know how these different doctrines and superstitions gained ground, it seems to me necessary to follow the career of human understanding left alone without a guide.—The inhabitants of a village, who are little better than savages, perceive the fruits which should nourish them perish: an inundation carries away some cabins; others are destroyed by thunder. Who has done them this mischief? It could be none of their fellow-citizens, for they have all equally suffered. It is therefore some secret power that has afflicted them, and must therefore be appeased. How is it to be effected? By using it as they do those whom they are desirous of pleasing; in making it some small presents. There is a serpent in the neighbourhood; it is very likely the serpent: they offer him milk near the cavern whither he retires; from that time he becomes sacred: he is invoked when they are at war with the neighbouring village, who, on their side, have chosen another protector.

Other little colonies find themselves in the same situation. But there being no object near them to excite their terror and adoration, they call in general the being whom they suspect has done them

them mischief, the Master, the Lord, the Chief, the Ruler.

This idea being more conformable than the others to the dawn of reason, which increases and strengthens with time, possesses every one's head when the nation is become more numerous. Thus we find that many nations have had no other god than their master, their lord. Such was Adonai among the Phenicians; Baal, Milkom, and Adad, with the people of Syria. All these names signify nothing more than, The lord, The powerful.

This was doubtless the origin of that opinion, which so generally and so long prevailed, that every people was really protected by the divinity they had chosen. This idea was so deeply rooted in men, that in after-times it was adopted by the Jews themselves.

Nothing was more common than to adopt strange gods. The Greeks acknowledged those of the Egyptians; not Apis's bull and Anubis's dog, but Ammon, and the twelve great gods. The Romans adored all the gods of the Greeks. Except in the time of war and bloody fanaticism, all nations were well satisfied that their neighbours had their own particular gods, and imitated frequently the worship and ceremonies of strangers. The Jews themselves imitated the circumcision of the Arabs and Egyptians; they often adored the Baal and Belphegor of their neighbours.

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The most polished people of Asia, on this side the Euphrates, adored the planets. The Chaldeans, before the time of Zoroaster, paid homage to the sun; as did afterwards the Peruvians in another hemisphere. This error must be very natural to man, as it has had so many followers in Asia and America. A small and half savage tribe has but one protector. Does it become more numerous? The number of its gods is increased. The Egyptians began by adoring Isbeth of Isis, and they at last adored cats. The first homage the rustic Romans paid was to Mars; that of the Romans, masters of Europe, was to the goddess of marriage and the god of thieves. Yet Cicero, all the philosophers, and those initiated, acknowledge a Supreme and Omnipotent God. They were all brought back to that point of reason from whence savage men had departed by instinct.

The Apotheosis could not have been devised till long after the first kinds of worship. It is not natural immediately to make a god of a man whom we saw born like ourselves; suffer like us maladies, chagrin, the miseries of humanity; subject to the same humiliating wants; die, and become food for worms. But this is what happened to all nations after the revolutions of several ages.

A man who had done great things, who had been serviceable to human nature, could not in truth

truth be looked upon as a god by those who had seen him tremble with the ague, and seek for clothing: but enthusiasts persuaded themselves, that, being possessed of eminent qualities, he had them from a god, and that he was the son of a god. In the same manner gods produced children all over the world; Bacchus, Perseus, Hercules, Castor and Pollux, were sons of gods. Romulus was a son of god; Alexander was proclaimed a son of god in Egypt; Odin, with us northern nations, was a son of god; Mango Capac was son of the sun in Peru. The historian of the Moguls, Abulgazi, relates, that one of the grandmothers of Gengiskan, named Alanku, when a girl, was impregnated by a celestial ray. Gengiskan himself passed for the son of God. And when Pope Innocent sent brother Afulin to Batoukan, grandson to Gengis, this monk, who could not be presented but to one of the viziers, said he came from the vicar of God; the minister replied, "Is this vicar ignorant that he should
" pay homage and tribute to the son of God, the
" great Batoukan his master?"

With men fond of the marvellous, there is no great distance between a son of god and god. After two or three generations, the son partakes of the father's dominion. Thus temples were raised to all those who were supposed to be born from

from the supernatural correspondence of the Divinity with our wives and daughters.

From hence we may conclude, that the majority of mankind were for a long time in a state of insensibility and imbecillity; and that, perhaps, the most insensible of all were those who wanted to discover a signification in those absurd fables, and to ingraft reason upon folly.

VOLTAIRE.

THE RELIGION AND TOLERATION OF THE ROMANS.

THE Romans adopted or allowed the doctrines of every other people, after the example of the Greeks; and, in reality, the Senate and the Emperors always acknowledged one supreme God, as well as the greatest part of the philosophers and poets of Greece.—The toleration of all religions was a natural law, engraven on the hearts of all men. For what right can one created being have to compel another to think as he does? But when a people are united, when religion is become a law of the state, we should submit to that law. Now the Romans, by their law, adopted all the gods of the Greeks, who themselves had altars for the gods unknown.—The twelve tables ordained, *Separatim nemo haberet deos neve advenas nisi publice adscitos*; “That no one should have foreign
“ or

“ or new gods without the public sanction.” This sanction was given to many doctrines; and all the others were tolerated. This association of all the divinities in the world, this kind of divine hospitality, was the law of nations from all antiquity, except one or two small nations.

As there were no dogmas, there was no religious war. It is also very remarkable, that, amongst the Romans, no one was ever persecuted for his way of thinking. There is not a single example, from the time of Romulus down to Domitian; and amongst the Greeks Socrates is the only exception.—It is incontestable that the Romans, as well as the Greeks, adored one supreme God, *Deus optimus maximus*. With this knowledge of one God, with this universal indulgence, which are every where the fruits of cultivated reason, were blended innumerable superstitions; which were the ancient fruits of reason, erroneous and in its dawn. The sacred fowls, the goddesses Pertunda, and the goddesses Cloacina, were ridiculous.—Why did not the conquerors and legislators of so many nations abolish such nonsense? Because, being ancient, it was dear to the people, and was no way prejudicial to the government. The Scipios, the Paulus Emilius's, the Ciceros, the Catos, the Cæsars, had other employment than that of combating popular superstition. When an ancient error is established, policy avails
itself

itself of it, as a bit which the vulgar have put into their own mouth, till such time as another superstition arises to destroy it; and policy profits of this second error, as it did of the first.

VOLTAIRE.

THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGIONS ON THE MORAL CONDUCT OF MANKIND.

MEN, of more piety than knowledge, have imagined, that the virtues of a nation, its humanity, and the refinements of its manners, depend on the purity of its worship. The hypocrites, interested in propagating this opinion, have published without believing it; and the common people have believed it without examination. This error, once asserted, has been almost every where received as a certain truth. Experience and history teach us, however, that the prosperity of a people does not depend on the purity of their worship, but on the excellence of their legislation. Of what importance, in fact, is their belief? That of the Jews was pure; and the Jews were the dregs of nations: they have never been compared either to the Egyptians or the ancient Persians.—It was under Constantine that Christianity became the ruling religion. It did not, however, restore the Romans to their primitive virtues. There was not then seen a Decius who de-

voted himself for the good of his country; or a Fabricius, who preferred seven acres of land to all the riches of the empire.—At what period did Constantinople become the sink of all the vices? At the very time the Christian religion was established. Its worship did not change the manners of its sovereigns; their piety did not make them better. The most Christian kings have not been the greatest of monarchs. Few of them have displayed on the throne the virtues of Titus, Trajan, or Antoninus. There are in every country a great many sound believers, and but few virtuous men. Why? Because religion is not virtue. All belief, and all speculative opinions, have not commonly any influence on the conduct and probity of man. The dogma of fatality is almost the general opinion of the East: it was that of the Stoics. This dogma, it is said, is destructive of all virtue. The Stoics, however, were not less virtuous than the philosophers of other sects; nor are the Mahometan princes less faithful to their treaties than the Catholic; nor the fatalist Persian less honest in his commerce than the French or Portuguese Christian. Purity of manners is therefore independent of purity of doctrines. The Pagan religion, with regard to its morality, was founded, like every other, on what they call the law of nature. With regard to its theologic or mythologic part, it was not very edifying. We

cannot read the history of Jupiter and his loves, and especially the treatment of his father Saturn, without allowing that the gods did not preach virtue by example. Yet Greece and ancient Rome abounded in heroes and virtuous citizens; while modern Greece and Rome produce, like Brazil and Mexico, none but vile slothful wretches, without talents, virtue, or industry. Now if, since the establishment of Christianity in the monarchies of Europe, the sovereigns have not been more valiant or intelligent; if the people have not had more knowledge and humanity; if the number of patriots has not been in any degree augmented; of what use, then, are religions? Why place, then, so much importance in the belief of certain revelations, that are frequently contestable, and always contested? What does the history of religions teach us? That they have everywhere lighted up the torch of intolerance, strewed the plains with carcases, embrued the fields with blood, burned cities, and laid waste empires; but that they have never made men better. Their goodness is the work of the laws. Punishment and contempt restrain vice. Religion regulates our belief, and the laws our manners and our virtues. What is it that distinguishes the Christian from the Jew, the Guebar, and the Mussulman? Is it an equity, a courage, an humanity, a beneficence, particular to one and not known to the others?

No;

No; they are known by their several professions of faith.

Let not, therefore, honesty be ever confounded with orthodoxy. In every country the orthodox is he that believes such particular doctrines; and throughout the whole earth, the virtuous man is he that does such actions as are humane, and conformable to the general interest. The evils that arise from false religions are real; the good imaginary. Of what use, in fact, can they be? Their precepts are either contrary, or conformable, to the law of nature; that is, to what mature reason dictates to societies for their greatest happiness. In the first case, the precepts of such religion must be rejected as contrary to the public welfare. In the second, they must be admitted. But then, of what use is a religion which teaches nothing that sound sense does not teach without it? The precepts of reason, it may be said, when consecrated by a revelation, will at least appear more respectable. Yes, in the first moments of fervor; for then maxims believed to be true, because they are supposed to be revealed, act more forcibly on the imagination: but that enthusiastic spirit is soon dissipated. A revelation merely from its being uncertain and contestable, far from fortifying the demonstration of a moral principle, must, in time, obscure its evidence. Truth and falsehood are two heterogeneous be-

ings: They never go together. Beside, all men are not actuated by religion; all have not faith. An honest man will always obey his reason in preference to revelation; for it is, he will say, more certain that God is the author of human reason, that is, of the faculty in man of distinguishing the true from the false, than that he is the author of any particular book. It is more criminal in the eyes of a wise man to deny our own reason, than to deny any revelation whatever. The conduct of men and nations is rarely consistent with their belief, or even their speculative principles. Duelling was for a long time fashionable in Europe, especially in France. Religion forbade it, yet they fought every day. Luxury has since softened the manners of the French: Duelling is punished with death. The delinquents are almost all obliged to fly their country. There is no longer any duelling. From whence arises the present security of Paris? From the devotion of its inhabitants? No; but from the regularity and vigilance of the police. The Parisians of the last age were more devout and greater thieves. Virtue, therefore, is the work of the laws and not of religion.—Suppose we would increase the number of thieves, what must be done? Augment the taxes and the wants of the people; oblige every tradesman to travel with a purse of gold; place fewer patrols on the highways; and, lastly, abolish

abolish the punishment for robbery. We should then soon see impunity multiply transgressions. It is not, therefore, on the truth of a revelation, or the purity of a worship, but solely on the sagacity or absurdity of the laws, that the virtues or vices of the citizens depend. In short, it is reason improved by experience, that alone can demonstrate to nations the interests they have to be just, humane, and faithful to their promises. Superstition does not in this case produce the effects of reason. The religious system destroys all proportion between the rewards decreed for the actions of men, and the utility of those actions to the public.

HELVE TIUS.

THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGIOUS PRINCIPLES ON THE CONDUCT OF MANKIND.

IT is certain, from experience, that the smallest grain of natural honesty and benevolence has more effect on mens conduct, than the most pompous views suggested by theological theories and systems.—A man's natural inclination works incessantly upon him; it is for ever present to the mind; and mingles itself with every view and consideration: Whereas, religious motives, where they act at all, operate only by starts and bounds; and it is scarcely possible for them to become altogether habitual to the mind.—Another advantage

tage of inclination, it engages on its side all the wit and ingenuity of the mind; and when set in opposition to religious principles, seeks every method and art of eluding them: in which it is almost always successful.—Who can explain the heart of man, or account for those strange falvos and excuses with which people satisfy themselves when they follow their inclinations in opposition to their religious duty? This is well understood in the world; and none but fools ever repose less trust in a man, because they hear, that, from study and philosophy, he has entertained some speculative doubts with regard to theological subjects.—And when we have to do with a man who makes a great profession of religion and devotion, has this any other effect upon several, who pass for prudent, than to put them on their guard, lest they be cheated and deceived by him? We must further consider, that philosophers, who cultivate reason and reflection, stand in less need of such motives to keep them under the restraint of morals: and that the vulgar, who alone may need them, are utterly incapable of so pure a religion as represents the Deity to be pleased with nothing but virtue in human behaviour.—The recommendations to the Divinity are generally supposed to be either frivolous observances, or rapturous ecstasies, or a bigotted credulity.—We need not run back into antiquity, or wander into
remote

remote regions, to find instances of this degeneracy.—Amongst ourselves, some have been guilty of that atrociousness unknown to the Grecian and Egyptian superstitions, of declaiming, in express terms, against morality; and representing it as a sure forfeiture of the divine favour, if the least trust or reliance be laid upon it. But even though superstition or enthusiasm should not put itself in direct opposition to morality, the very diverting of the attention, the raising up a new and frivolous species of merit, the preposterous distribution which it makes of praise and blame, must have the most pernicious consequences, and weaken extremely mens attachment to the natural motives of justice and humanity. Such a principle of action likewise, not being any of the familiar motives of human conduct, acts only by intervals on the temper; and must be roused by continual efforts, in order to render the pious zealot satisfied with his own conduct, and make him fulfil his devotional task.—Many religious exercises are entered into with seeming fervour, where the heart at the time feels cold and languid: A habit of dissimulation is by degrees contracted; and fraud and falsehood become the predominant principle.—Hence the reason of that vulgar observation, That the highest zeal in religion and the deepest hypocrisy, so far from being inconsistent, are often, or commonly united in the same individual charac-

character.—The steady attention alone to so important an interest as that of eternal salvation, is apt to extinguish the benevolent affections, and beget a narrow, contracted selfishness. And when such a temper is encouraged, it easily eludes all the general precepts of charity and benevolence.

Thus the motives of vulgar superstition have no great influence on general conduct; nor is their operation very favourable to morality, in the instances where they predominate.

HUME.

THE STATE OF RELIGION IN PENNSYLVANIA.

IN Pennsylvania there is no religion established by government: each one adopts that he likes best. The priest is no charge to the state. The individuals provide them as they find it convenient, and tax themselves accordingly. The priest is there, like the merchant, maintained at the expence of the consumer. He who has no priest, and consumes no part of the commodity he deals in, pays no part of his expence. Pennsylvania is a proper model for other nations.

HELVETIUS.

THE

THE RELIGIONS OF THE ANCIENTS.

WHEN we consider the compound nature of man, neither a merely sensitive being, nor yet a merely intellectual or moral agent; it will afford no small entertainment to let our thoughts wander over the various ways that the different religions of the Greeks, Romans, and other nations of antiquity, were calculated to act upon and occupy all the senses and the imagination, as well as the understanding, of the people. Even the ancient Jewish religion was not ill constructed for this purpose, by its pompous and magnificent feasts, its music, its sacrifices, its numerous ceremonies, and their frequency. The ancients seem to have grounded themselves upon a persuasion, that all this external of things, this feasting, and occupation of the senses, was indispensably necessary for the bulk of mankind; whose situations in life utterly disqualified them for philosophy, subtle calculations and deductions; and who could be but little affected, and that but for a very short time, by any set of abstract speculative opinions; which, by despising the toys and puppet-show work of superstition and weakness, would leave nothing to amuse the weak and ignorant, who are very numerous, and not always confined to the lower class. Their religions were accordingly constructed

structed in such a manner, as to afford a sort of general pursuit and occupation, which grew up with every man, at the same time as he was pursuing his particular avocation of life; and those who were disappointed in these particular pursuits, found an asylum and resource in the matter with which religion was amply stored, and with which they could fill up the vacuity of their minds, thus sickened and forsaken by its other prospects.

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UNIVERSAL RELIGION.

AN universal religion cannot be founded but on principles eternal and invariable, that are drawn from the nature of man and things; and that, like the propositions of geometry, are capable of the most rigorous demonstration. Are there such principles, and can they be equally adapted to all nations? Yes, doubtless: or if they vary, it will be only in some of their applications to those different countries where chance has placed the different nations. Heaven requires that man by his reason should co-operate to his own happiness, and that of the numerous societies of the earth.

God has said to man, I have created thee, I have given thee sensations, memory, and consequently reason. It is my will that thy reason, sharp-

Sharpened at first by want, and afterward enlightened by experience, shall provide thee food, teach thee to cultivate the land, to improve the instruments of labour, of agriculture; in a word, of all the sciences of the first necessity. It is also my will, that by cultivating this same reason, thou mayest come to the knowledge of my moral will; that is, of thy duties towards society, of the means of maintaining order, and, lastly, of the best legislation possible.

This is the only natural religion to which mankind should elevate their minds, that only which can become universal, that which is alone worthy of God, which is marked with his seal, and that of the truth. All others must bear the impression of man, of fraud and falsehood. The will of God, just and good, is, that the children of the earth should be happy, and enjoy every pleasure compatible with the public welfare.

HELVETIUS.

IN RELIGIOUS OPINIONS EVERY MAN
THINKS HIMSELF RIGHT.

WE meet every day with people so sceptical with regard to history, that they assert it impossible for any nation ever to believe such absurd principles as those of Greek and Egyptian Paganism: and at the same time so dogmatical with
regard

regard to religion, that they think the same absurdities are to be found in no other communion. Cambyfes entertained like prejudices, and very impiously ridiculed, and even wounded, Apis, the great god of the Egyptians, who appeared to his profane senses nothing but a large spotted bull. But Herodotus judiciously ascribes this folly of passion to a real madness or disorder of the brain. Otherwise, says the historian, he never would have openly affronted any established worship. For on that head, continues he, every nation are best satisfied with their own, and think they have the advantage over every other nation.—It must be allowed that the Roman Catholics are a very learned sect; and that no one communion, but that of the church of England, can dispute their being the most learned of all the Christian churches: yet Averroes, the famous Arabian, who, no doubt, had heard of the Egyptian superstitions, declares, that of all religions, the most absurd and nonsensical is that, whose votaries eat, after having created, their deity.—There is, indeed, no tenet in all Paganism, which can give so fair a scope to ridicule as this of the *real presence*. It is so absurd, that it eludes the force of all arguments. But to these doctrines we are so accustomed, that we never wonder at them; though in a future age, it will probably become difficult to persuade some nations that any human

two-legged creature could ever embrace such principles. And it is a thousand to one but these nations themselves shall have something full as absurd in their own creed, to which they will give a most implicate and most religious assent.—I lodged once at Paris, in the same hotel with an ambassador from Tunis, who, having passed some years at London, was returning home that way. One day I observed his Moorish excellency diverting himself under the porch with surveying the splendid equipages that drove along; when there chanced to pass that way some *Capuchin* friars, who had never seen a Turk; as he, on his part, though accustomed to the European dresses, had never seen the grotesque figure of a *Capuchin*: and there is no expressing the mutual admiration with which they inspired each other. Had the chaplain of the embassy entered into a dispute with these Franciscans, their reciprocal surprise had been of the same nature. Thus all mankind stand staring at one another; and there is no beating it out of their heads, that the turban of the African is not just as good or as bad a fashion as the cowl of the European. *He is a very honest man*, said the prince of Sallee, speaking of De Ruyter; *it is a pity he were a Christian*.—How can you worship leeks and onions? we shall suppose a *Sorbonnist* to say to a priest of Sais. If we worship them, replies the latter, at least we do

not eat them at the same time. But what strange objects of adoration are cats and monkies? says the learned doctor. They are at least as good as the relicts and rotten bones of martyrs, answers his no less learned antagonist. Are you mad, insists the Catholic, to cut one another's throats about the preference of a cabbage or cucumber? Yes, says the Pagan, I allow it, if you will confess that those are still madder, who fight about the preference among volumes of sophistry, ten thousand of which are not equal in value to one cabbage or cucumber.

Every by-stander will easily judge (but unfortunately the by-standers are few), that if nothing more were requisite to establish any popular system, but exposing the absurdities of other systems, every votary of every superstition could give a sufficient reason for his blind and bigotted attachment to the principles in which he has been educated. It is with our religion, as with our watches; those of others go either too fast or too slow, ours only gives the true hour of the day.

HUME.

ABSURDITY ESSENTIAL TO POPULAR RELIGIONS.

POPULAR theology, especially the scholastic, has a kind of appetite for absurdity and contradiction.

tion. If that theology went not beyond reason and common sense, her doctrines would appear too easy and familiar. Amazement must of necessity be raised; mystery affected; darkness and obscurity sought after; and a foundation of merit afforded the devout votaries who desire an opportunity of subduing their rebellious reason.—Ecclesiastical history sufficiently confirms these reflections. When a controversy is started, some people pretend always with certainty to foretel the issue. Whichever opinion, say they, is most contrary to plain sense, is sure to prevail; even where the general interest of the system requires not that decision. 'Though the reproach of heresy for some time be bandied about among the disputants, it always rests at last on the side of reason. Any one, it is pretended, that has but learning enough of this kind to know the definition of Arian, Pelagian, Erastian, Socinian, Sabellian, Eutychian, Nestorian, Monothelite, &c. not to mention Protestants, whose fate is yet uncertain, will be convinced of the truth of this observation.—To oppose the torrent of scholastic religion by such feeble maxims as these, *That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be, that the whole is greater than a part, that two and three make five*, is pretending to stop the ocean with a bullrush. Will you set up profane reason against sacred mystery? No punishment is

great enough for your impiety. And the same fires which were kindled for heretics, will serve also for the destruction of philosophers.

HUME.

THE BAD INFLUENCE OF MOST POPULAR RELIGIONS ON MORALITY.

IT is certain, that, in every religion, however sublime the verbal definition which it gives of its divinity, many of the votaries, perhaps the greater number, will still seek the Divine favour, not by virtue and good morals, which alone can be acceptable to a perfect Being, but either by frivolous observances, by intemperate zeal, by rapturous ecstasies, or by the belief of mysterious and absurd opinions. The least part of the Sadder, as well as the Pentateuch, consists in precepts of morality; and we may be assured always, that that part was also the least observed and regarded. When the old Romans were attacked with a pestilence, they never ascribed their sufferings to their vices, or dreamed of repentance and amendment. They never thought that they were the general robbers of the world, whose ambition and avarice made desolate the earth, and reduced opulent nations to want and beggary. They only created a dictator *clavis figendæ causæ*, in order to drive a nail into a door; and by that means, they

they thought that they had sufficiently appeased their incensed deity.—If we should suppose, what seldom happens, that a popular religion were found, in which it was expressly declared, that nothing but morality could gain the Divine favour; if an order of priests were instituted to inculcate this opinion, in daily sermons, and with all the arts of persuasion; yet so inveterate are the people's prejudices, that, for want of some other superstition, they would make the very attendance on those sermons the essentials of religion, rather than place them in virtue and good morals. The sublime prologue of Zaleucus's laws inspired not the Locrians, so far as we can learn, with any sounder notions of the measures of acceptance with the Deity than were familiar to the other Greeks.

This observation, then, holds universally: but still one may be at some loss to account for it. It is not sufficient to observe, that the people every where degrade their deities into a similitude with themselves. This will not remove the difficulty. For there is no man so stupid, as that, judging by his natural reason, he would not esteem virtue and honesty the most valuable qualities which any person could possess. Why not ascribe the same sentiment to his deity? Why not make all religion, or the chief part of it, to consist in these attainments?—Nor is it satisfactory to

say, that the practice of morality is more difficult than that of superstition; and is therefore rejected. For, not to mention the excessive penances of the Brachmans and Talapoins, it is certain, that the Rhamadan of the Turks, the four lents of the Muscovites, and the austerities of some Roman Catholics, must be more severe than the practice of any moral duty, even to the most vicious and depraved of mankind. In short, all virtues, when men are reconciled to it by ever so little practice, is agreeable. All superstition is for ever odious and burdensome.—Perhaps the following account may be received as a true solution of the difficulty. The duties which a man performs as a friend or parent, seem merely owing to his benefactor or children; nor can he be wanting to these duties, without breaking through all the ties of nature and morality. A strong inclination may prompt him to the performance: a sentiment of order and moral beauty joins its force to these natural ties: and the whole man, if truly virtuous, is drawn to his duty without any effort or endeavour. Even with regard to the virtues which are more austere, and more founded on reflection, such as public spirit, filial duty, temperance, or integrity; the moral obligation, in our apprehension, removes all pretence to religious merit; and the virtuous conduct is deemed no more than what we owe to society
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and ourselves. In all this a superstitious man finds nothing which he has properly performed for the sake of his Deity, or which can peculiarly recommend him to the Divine favour and protection. He considers not, that the most genuine method of serving the Divinity is by promoting the happiness of his creatures. He still looks out for some more immediate service of the Supreme Being, in order to allay those terrors with which he is haunted. And any practice, recommended to him, which either serves to no purpose in life, or offers the strongest violence to his natural inclinations; that practice he will more readily embrace, on account of those very circumstances which should make him absolutely reject it. It seems the more purely religious, because it proceeds from no mixture of any other motive or consideration; and if, for its sake, he sacrifices much of his ease and quiet, his claim of merit appears still to rise upon him in proportion to the zeal and devotion which he discovers. In restoring a loan, or paying a debt, his Divinity is nowise beholden to him; because these acts of justice are what he was bound to perform, and what many would have performed, were there no God in the universe. But if he fast a day, or give himself a sound whipping; this has a direct reference, in his opinion, to the service of God. No other motives could engage him to such austerities.

sterities.—Hence the greatest crimes have been found, in many instances, compatible with a superstitious piety and devotion. Hence it is justly regarded as unsafe to draw any certain inference in favour of a man's morals from the fervour or strictness of his religious exercises, even though he himself believes them sincere. The greatest and truest zeal gives us no security against hypocrisy. HUME.

BARBARITY AND CAPRICE, ATTRIBUTES OF THE DEITY IN POPULAR RELIGIONS.

BARBARITY and caprice; these qualities, however nominally disguised, we may universally observe, form the ruling character of the Deity in popular religions. How is the Deity disfigured in our representations of him! What absurdity and immorality are attributed to him! How much is he degraded even below the character, which we should naturally, in common life, ascribe to a man of sense and virtue. Even priests, instead of correcting these depraved ideas of mankind, have often been found ready to foster and encourage them. The more tremendous the Divinity is represented, the more tame and submissive do men become to his ministers. And the more unaccountable the measures of acceptance required by him, the more necessary does it become to abandon
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our natural reason, and to yield to their ghostly guidance and direction. Thus it may be allowed, that the artifices of men aggravate our natural infirmities and follies of this kind, but never originally beget them. Their root strikes deeper into the mind, and springs from the essential and universal properties of human nature. After the commission of crimes, there arise remorse and secret horrors, which give no rest to the mind, but make it have recourse to religious rites and ceremonies as expiations of its offences. Whatever weakens or disorders the internal frame, promotes the interests of superstition. While we abandon ourselves to the natural undisciplined suggestions of our timid and anxious hearts, every kind of barbarity is ascribed to the Supreme Being from the terrors with which we are agitated; and every kind of caprice from the methods which we embrace in order to appease him.

HUME.

**THE TERRORS OF RELIGION PREVAIL
ABOVE ITS COMFORTS.**

IT is allowed that men never have recourse to devotion so readily as when dejected with grief or depressed with sickness. Is not this a proof, that the religious spirit is not so nearly allied to joy as to sorrow?

Men

Men may sometimes find consolation in religion when they are afflicted; but it is natural to imagine, that they will form a notion of those unknown beings suitable to the present gloom and melancholy of their temper, when they betake themselves to the contemplation of them. Accordingly, we find the tremendous images to predominate in all religions; and we ourselves, after having employed the most exalted expression in our descriptions of the Deity, fall into the flattest contradiction, in affirming, that the damned are infinitely superior in number to the elect.

There never was a popular religion which represented the state of departed souls in such a light, as would render it eligible for human kind that there should be such a state. These fine models of religion are the mere product of philosophy. For as death lies between the eye and the prospect of futurity, that event is so shocking to nature, that it must throw a gloom on all the regions that lie behind it; and suggest to the generality of mankind the idea of Cerberus and furies, devils and torrents of fire and brimstone.

It is true, both fear and hope enter into religion; because both these passions, at different times, agitate the human mind, and each of them forms a species of divinity suitable to itself. But when a man is in a cheerful disposition, he
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is fit for business, or company, or entertainment of any kind; and he naturally applies himself to these, and thinks not of religion. When melancholy and dejected, he has nothing to do but brood upon the terrors of the invisible world, and to plunge himself deeper in affliction. It may indeed happen, that after he has in this manner engraved the religious opinions deep into his thoughts and imagination, there may arrive a change of health and circumstances which may restore his good-humour; and raising cheerful prospects of futurity, make him run into the other extreme of joy and triumph. But still it must be acknowledged, that as terror is the primary principle of religion, it is the passion which always predominates in it, and admits but of short intervals of pleasure.

Not to mention, that these fits of excessive, enthusiastic joy, by exhausting the spirits, always prepare the way for equal fits of superstitious terror and dejection; nor is there any state of mind so happy as the calm and equable. But this state it is impossible to support, where a man thinks that he lies in such profound darkness and uncertainty, between an eternity of happiness and an eternity of misery. No wonder that such an opinion disjoins the ordinary frame of the mind, and throws it into the utmost confusion. And though that opinion is seldom so steady in its operation

ration as to influence all the actions; yet it is apt to make a considerable breach in the temper, and to produce that gloom and melancholy so remarkable in all devout people.

HUME.

RE MORSE.

IS a man without fear and above the law, he feels no remorse from the commission of a wicked action; provided, however, that he has not previously contracted a virtuous habit; for then he will not purpose a contrary conduct, without feeling an uneasiness, a secret inquietude; to which is also given the name of remorse. Experience tells us, that every action which does not expose us to legal punishment or to dishonour, is an action performed, in general, without remorse. Solon and Plato loved women and even boys, and avowed it. Theft was not punished in Sparta; and the Lacedæmonians robbed without remorse. The Gauls were anciently divided into a great number of particular societies, that were composed of about a dozen families; the women of which were in common. They lived among themselves without remorse; but no one dared to have a passion for a woman belonging to another society: the law forbade it; and remorse begins where impunity ends. The in-

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quisitor

quisitor can with impunity burn whoever does not think as he does on certain metaphysical points; and it is without remorse that he gluts his vengeance by hideous torments for a mere difference in opinion. Remorse, therefore, owes its existence to the fear of punishment, or of shame.

HELVETIUS.

REPUTATION.

WHATEVER indifference we affect to show for the good opinion of mankind, every one seeks for esteem, and believes himself more worthy of it in proportion as he finds himself generally esteemed: he considers the public suffrage as a surety for the high opinion he has of himself. The pretended contempt, therefore, for reputation, and the sacrifice said to be made of it to fortune and reflection, is always inspired by the despair of rendering ourselves illustrious. We boast of what we have, and despise what we have not. This is the necessary effect of pride; and we should rebel against it were we not its dupes.

HELVETIUS.

RESENTMENT.

TO render resentment completely commendable, the provocation must first of all be such

that we should become contemptible, and be exposed to perpetual insults, if we did not in some measure resent it. Smaller offences are always better neglected; nor is there any thing more despicable than that froward and captious humour which takes fire upon every slight occasion of quarrel. We should resent more from a sense of the propriety of resentment, from a sense that mankind expect and require it of us, than because we feel in ourselves the furies of that disagreeable passion. There is no passion of which the human mind is capable, concerning whose justness we ought to be so doubtful; concerning whose indulgence we ought so carefully to consult our natural sense of propriety; or so diligently to consider what will be the sentiments of the cool and impartial spectator. Magnanimity, or a regard to maintain our own rank and dignity in society, is the only motive which can ennoble the expressions of this disagreeable passion. This motive must characterise our whole style and deportment. These must be plain, open, and direct; determined without positiveness, and elevated without insolence; not only free from petulance and low scurrility, but generous, candid, and full of all proper regards, even for the person who has offended us. It must appear, in short, from our whole manner, without our labouring affectedly to express it, that passion has
not

not extinguished our humanity; and that if we yield to the dictates of revenge, it is with reluctance, from necessity, and in consequence of great and repeated provocations. When resentment is guarded and qualified in this manner, it may be admitted, it is even generous and noble; an opposite conduct would be mean-spiritedness.

A. SMITH.

REVELATION.

THERE is one sort of propositions that challenge the highest degree of our assent upon bare testimony, whether the thing proposed agree or disagree with common experience and the ordinary course of things, or no. The reason whereof is, because the testimony is of such an one as cannot deceive nor be deceived; and that is, of God himself. This carries with it an assurance beyond doubt, evidence beyond exception. This is called by a peculiar name, *revelation*; and our assent to it, *faith*; which as absolutely determines our minds, and as perfectly excludes all wavering, as our knowledge itself; and we may as well doubt of our own being, as we can whether any revelation from God be true. So that faith is a settled and sure principle of assent and assurance, and leaves no manner of room for doubt or hesitation. Only we must be sure that it be a divine revelation,

tion, and that we understood it right; else we shall expose ourselves to all the extravagancy of enthusiasm, and all the error of wrong principles, if we have faith and assurance in what is not divine revelation. And therefore, in those cases, our assent can be rationally no higher than the evidence of its being a revelation, and that this is the meaning of the expressions it is delivered in. If the evidence of its being a revelation, or that this is its true sense, be only on probable proofs, our assent can reach no higher than an assurance or diffidence, arising from the more or less apparent probability of the proofs.

LOCKE.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

IF revelation be as liable to be misunderstood as arguments drawn from reason, it is no surer guide to mankind. If it need reason's assistance to explain it, it is weaker. If it do not open our understandings, so as to make us argue more clearly and on better grounds, it is not a greater light. If it confound reason, it can never produce rational conviction. If it have not plainly the advantage of reason, when compared with that alone, it is not superior to reason; or if reason have the advantage of revelation, when compared, revelation is inferior to reason. If we can
know

know nothing truly by revelation without reason, revelation is no true light at all. Revelation must be entirely true, perfectly plain and easy to be understood; intrinsically pure, just, consistent, and harmonious: its precepts and doctrines must all tend to make men wiser, better, and happier: without these qualifications, it wants the proofs of a divine original; it seems to be given in vain, and cannot be the revelation of perfect wisdom: and men of sense, devoid of the prejudices of education, will conclude it to be no extraordinary light; and that nothing more is necessary to direct the faith and practice of mankind, than adhering in judgment to reason only, freed from all enthusiasm and imposture; and, in practice, to virtue alone, freed from all superstition. * *

REVELATION NOT ADMISSIBLE AGAINST REASON.

IN propositions whose certainty is built upon the clear perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas, attained either by immediate intuition, as in self-evident propositions, or by evident deductions of reason in demonstrations, we need not the assistance of revelation, as necessary to gain our assent, and introduce them into our minds; because the natural ways of know-

ledge could settle them there, or had done it already; which is the greatest assurance we can possibly have of any thing, unless where God immediately reveals it to us; and there, too, our assurance can be no greater than our knowledge is, that it is a revelation from God. But yet nothing, I think, can, under that title, shake or over-rule plain knowledge, or rationally prevail with any man to admit it for true, in a direct contradiction to the clear evidence of his own understanding. For since no evidence of our own faculties, by which we receive such revelations, can exceed, if equal, the certainty of our intuitive knowledge, we can never receive for a truth any thing that is directly contrary to our clear and distinct knowledge: *v. g.* the ideas of one body and one place do so clearly agree, and the mind has so evident a perception of their agreement, that we can never assent to a proposition that affirms the same body to be in two distant places at once, however it should pretend to the authority of a divine revelation: since the evidence, first, that we deceive not ourselves in ascribing it to God, secondly, that we understand it right, can never be so great as the evidence of our own intuitive knowledge, whereby we discern it impossible for the same body to be in two places at once. And therefore no proposition can be received for divine revelation, or obtain the assent

sent due to all such, if it be contradictory to our clear intuitive knowledge; because this would be to subvert the principles and foundations of all knowledge, evidence, and assent whatsoever; and there would be left no difference between truth and falsehood, no measures of credible and incredible in the world, if doubtful propositions shall take place before self-evident; and what we certainly know, give way to what we may possibly be mistaken in. In propositions, therefore, contrary to the clear perception of the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas, it will be in vain to urge them as matters of faith. They cannot move our assent, under that or any other title whatsoever. For faith can never convince us of any thing that contradicts our knowledge: because though faith be founded on the testimony of God (who cannot lie) revealing any proposition to us; yet we cannot have an assurance of the truth of its being a divine revelation, greater than our knowledge; since the whole strength of the certainty depends upon our knowledge that God revealed it; which, in this case, where the proposition supposed revealed contradicts our knowledge or reason, will always have this objection hanging to it, *viz.* that we cannot tell how to conceive that to come from God, the bountiful Author of our Being, which, if received for true, must overturn all the principles and foundations of
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of knowledge he has given us, render all our faculties useless, wholly destroy the most excellent part of his workmanship, our understandings, and put a man in a condition wherein he will have less light, less conduct, than the beast that perisheth. For if the mind of man can never have a clearer (and perhaps not so clear) evidence of any thing to be a divine revelation, as it has of the principles of its own reason, it can never have a ground to quit the clear evidence of its reason, to give a place to a proposition whose revelation has not a greater evidence than those principles have.

Thus far a man has use of reason, and ought to hearken to it, even in immediate and original revelation, where it is supposed to be made to himself: but to all those who pretend not to immediate revelation, but are required to pay obedience and to receive the truths revealed to others, which, by the tradition of writings or word of mouth, are conveyed down to them; reason has a great deal more to do, and is that only which can induce us to receive them. For matter of faith being only divine revelation, and nothing else, faith, as we use the word, (called commonly divine faith), has to do with no propositions but those which are supposed to be divinely revealed. So that I do not see how those who make revelation alone the sole object of faith, can say, that it
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is a matter of faith, and not of reason, to believe that such or such a proposition, to be found in such or such a book, is of divine inspiration; unless it be revealed, that that proposition, or all in that book, was communicated by divine inspiration. Without such a revelation, the believing or not believing that proposition or book to be of divine authority, can never be matter of faith, but matter of reason; and such as I must come to an assent to only by the use of my reason; which can never require or enable me to believe that which is contrary to itself: it being impossible for reason ever to procure any assent to that which to itself appears unreasonable.

In all things therefore, where we have clear evidence from our ideas, and those principles of knowledge I have above mentioned, reason is the proper judge; and revelation, though it may in consenting with it confirm its dictates, yet cannot in such cases invalidate its decrees: nor can we be obliged, where we have the clear and evident sentence of reason, to quit it for the contrary opinion, under a pretence that it is matter of faith; which can have no authority against the plain and clear dictates of reason.

LOCKE.

R E

REVENUES OF THE STATE.

THE revenues of the state are sacred ; it is not only the most infamous theft, but actual treason, to misapply them or pervert them from their original destination. It reflects a great dishonour on Rome, that the integrity of Cato the censor was something so very remarkable ; and that an emperor, on rewarding the talents of a singer with a few crowns, thought it necessary to observe, that the money came from his own private purse, and not from the public treasury. But if we find few Galbas, where shall we look for a Cato ? For when vice is no longer dishonourable, what chiefs will be so scrupulous as to abstain from touching the public revenues left to their discretion, and even not to affect in time to confound their own expensive and scandalous dissipations with the glory of the state, and the means of extending their own influence with that of augmenting its power ? It is particularly with regard to this delicate part of the administration that virtue alone is the only efficacious instrument, and that the integrity of the minister is the only rein capable of restraining his avarice. Books of accounts, instead of serving to expose frauds, tend only to conceal them ; for prudence is never so ready to conceive new precautions as knavery is to elude them.

them. Never mind account-books and papers, therefore; but place the management of the finances in honest hands: this is the only way to have them well employed, however they are accounted for. ROUSSEAU.

REVENUES OF THE CHURCH.

THE revenue of every established church, such parts of it excepted as may arise from particular lands or manors, is a branch, it ought to be observed, of the general revenue of the state, which is thus diverted to a purpose very different from the defence of the state. The tithe, for example, is a real land-tax, which puts it out of the power of the proprietors of land to contribute so largely towards the defence of the state as they otherwise might be able to do. The rent of land, however, is, according to some, the sole fund, and, according to others, the principal fund, from which, in all great monarchies, the exigences of the state must be ultimately supplied. The more of this fund that is given to the church, the less, it is evident, can be spared to the state. It may be laid down as a certain maxim, that, all other things being supposed equal, the richer the church, the poorer must necessarily be, either the sovereign on the one hand, or the people on the other; and, in all cases, the less able must the state be
to

to defend itself. In several Protestant countries, particularly in all the Protestant cantons of Switzerland, the revenue which anciently belonged to the Roman-Catholic church, the tithes and church-lands, has been found a fund sufficient not only to afford competent salaries to the established clergy, but to defray, with little or no addition, all the other expences of the state. The magistrates of the powerful canton of Berne, in particular, have accumulated out of the savings from this fund a very large sum, supposed to amount to several millions; part of which is deposited in a public treasure, and part is placed at interest in what are called the public funds of the different indebted nations of Europe; chiefly in those of France and Great Britain. What may be the amount of the whole expence which the church either of Berne or of any other Protestant canton, costs the state, I do not pretend to know. By a very exact account it appears, that, in 1755, the whole revenue of the clergy of the church of Scotland, including their glebe or church lands, and the rent of their manfes or dwelling-houses, estimated according to a reasonable valuation, amounted only to 68,514l. 1s. 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ d. This very moderate revenue affords a decent subsistence to nine hundred and forty-four ministers. The whole expence of the church, including what is occasionally laid out for the building and reparation

of churches, and of the manſes of miniſters, cannot well be ſuppoſed to exceed eighty or eighty-five thouſand pounds a-year. The moſt opulent church in Chriſtendom does not maintain better the uniformity of faith, the fervour of devotion, the ſpirit of order, regularity, and auſtere morals in the great body of the people, than this very poorly-endowed church of Scotland. All the good effects, both civil and religious, which an eſtabliſhed church can be ſuppoſed to produce, are produced by it as completely as by any other. The greater part of the Proteſtant churches of Switzerland, which in general are not better endowed than the church of Scotland, produce thoſe effects in a ſtill higher degree. In the greater part of the Proteſtant cantons, there is not a ſingle perſon to be found who does not profeſs himſelf to be of the eſtabliſhed church. If he profeſſes himſelf to be of any other, indeed, the law obliges him to leave the canton. But ſo ſevere, or rather indeed ſo oppreſſive a law, could never have been executed in ſuch free countries, had not the diligence of the clergy before-hand converted to the eſtabliſhed church the whole body of the people, with the exception of perhaps a few individuals only. In ſome parts of Switzerland, accordingly, where, from the accidental union of a Proteſtant and Roman-Catholic country, the conversion has not been ſo complete:

both religions are not only tolerated, but established by law.

The proper performance of every service seems to require that its pay or recompence should be, as exactly as possible, proportioned to the nature of the service. If any service is very much underpaid, it is very apt to suffer by the meanness and incapacity of the greater part of those who are employed in it. If it is very much overpaid, it is apt to suffer perhaps still more by their negligence and idleness. A man of a large revenue, whatever may be his profession, thinks he ought to live like other men of large revenues; and to spend a great part of his time in festivity, in vanity, and in dissipation. But, in a clergyman, this train of life not only consumes the time which ought to be employed in the duties of his function; but in the eyes of the common people destroys almost entirely that sanctity of character which can alone enable him to perform those duties with proper weight and authority.

A. SMITH.

THE INHUMANITY OF THE RICH AND POWERFUL.

THE rich and powerful generally pass for men without feeling. In fact, whether men are naturally cruel, whenever they can be so with impunity;

nity; whether the rich and powerful consider the miseries of others as a reproach for their own happiness; or, in short, whether they desire to be delivered from the importunate requests of the unhappy; it is certain that they almost constantly treat the miserable with inhumanity. The least fault a man in distress commits, is a sufficient pretence for the rich to refuse him all assistance: they would have the unhappy entirely perfect.

HELVETIUS.

RICHES, AND THEIR ENJOYMENT.

WITH the greater part of rich people, the chief enjoyment of riches consists in the parade of riches, which, in their eyes, is never so complete as when they appear to possess those decisive marks of opulence which nobody can possess but themselves. In their eyes, the merit of an object, which is in any degree either useful or beautiful, is greatly enhanced by its scarcity, or by the great labour which it requires to collect any considerable quantity of it; a labour which nobody can afford to pay but themselves. Such objects they are willing to purchase at a higher price than things much more beautiful and useful, but more common. These qualities of utility, beauty, and scarcity, are the original foundation of the high price of the precious metals, or of the great quan-

tity of other goods for which they can every where be exchanged. This value was antecedent to and independent of their being employed as coin, and was the quality which fitted them for that employment. That employment, however, by occasioning a new demand, and by diminishing the quantity which could be employed in any other way, may have afterwards contributed to keep up or increase their value.

A. SMITH.

THE ACQUISITION OF RICHES.

TO make a fortune, it requires nothing more than a strongly determined resolution to succeed by patience and boldness: perhaps it is the only success which affords no proof of any kind of genius; for a genius of intrigue and dexterity is not worthy of that name; it is the genius of those who have no other, and wish for none beside. It is by making a long and successful use of this so very common a talent, that persons without merit and without name, are able to arrive at very large fortunes and considerable employments.

D'ALEMBERT.

WHAT-

WHATEVER IS, IS RIGHT.

TO deny that there is any evil in the world, may be said as a banter by a Lucullus, full of health, and feasting in his saloon with his mistresses; but only let him look out of the window, and he will see some unhappy people, and a fever will make the great man himself so.

Lactantius, in his 13th chapter on the Divine anger, puts the following words in the mouth of Epicurus: "Either God would remove evil out of this world, and cannot; or he can, and will not; or he has neither the power nor will; or, lastly, he has both the power and will. If he has the will and not the power, this shows weakness, which is contrary to the nature of God: If he has the power and not the will, it is malignity; and this is no less contrary to his nature. If he is neither able nor willing, it is both weakness and malignity: If he be both willing and able (which alone is consonant to the nature of God) how came it that there is evil in the world?" To this argument Lactantius replies, "That God wills evil, but that he has given us wisdom for acquiring good." This answer must be allowed to fall very short of the objection; as supposing that God, without producing evil, could

not have given us wisdom : if so, our wisdom is a dear bargain.

The origin of evil has ever been an abyss; the bottom of which lies beyond the reach of human eyes : and many philosophers, in their perplexity, had recourse to two principles; one good, the other evil. Typhon was the evil principle among the Egyptians, and Arimanus among the Persians. This divinity is well known to have been espoused by the Manicheans.

Amidst the absurdities which swarm in the world, and may be classed among its evils, it is no slight error to have supposed two almighty beings struggling for the mastery, and making an agreement together, like Moliere's two physicians, Allow me the puke, and I will allow you the bleeding.

Basilides, from the Platonics, affirmed, so early as the first century of the church, that God gave our world to be made by the lowest angels ; and that by their ignorance things are as they are. This theological fable falls to pieces before the terrible objection, that it is not in the nature of an infinitely wise and powerful God to cause a world to be constructed by ignorant architects, who know not how to conduct such a task. Simon, aware of this objection, obviates it by saying, that the angel who acted as surveyor is damned

damned for his bungling: But this bungling of the angel does not mend our case.

Neither does the Grecian story of Pandora solve the objection any better. The box with all evils in it, and Hope remaining in the bottom, is indeed a charming allegory; but this Pandora was made by Vulcan purely to be revenged of Prometheus, who had formed a man of mud.

The Indians are not in any respect nearer the mark: God, they say, in creating man gave him a drug, by which he was to enjoy perpetual health: the man put this drug on his ass; the ass being thirsty, the serpent showed it the way to a spring; and whilst the ass was drinking, the serpent made off with the drug.

The Syrians had a conceit, that the man and the woman having been created in the fourth heaven, they took a fancy to eat a bit of cake instead of ambrosia their natural regale. Ambrosia perspired through the pores: but after eating the cake, they had a motion to go to stool; and asked an angel the way to the privy. Do you see, said the angel, yon little planet, scarce visible? That is the privy of the universe; make the best of your way thither. They marched; and there they were left to continue; and ever since this our world has been what it is.

But the Syrians know not what to answer, when they are asked, Why God permitted man to
eat

eat of the cake, and why it should be productive of such dreadful evils to us?

The hypothesis, That *whatever is, is right*, is favoured and supported by Bolingbroke, Pope, and Shaftsbury. In the treatise of Shaftsbury, intituled *The Moralist*, are these words: “ Much
 “ is alleged in answer, to show why nature errs,
 “ and how she came thus impotent and erring,
 “ from an unerring hand. But I deny she errs—
 “ it is, on the contrary, from this order of in-
 “ ferior and superior things, that we admire the
 “ world’s beauty, founded thus on contrarities;
 “ whilst from such various and disagreeing prin-
 “ ciples an universal concord is established.

“ Thus in the several orders of terrestrial forms
 “ a resignation is required, a sacrifice and yielding
 “ of natures one to another. The vegetables by
 “ their death sustain the animals; and animal
 “ bodies dissolved enrich the earth, and raise again
 “ the vegetable world. Numerous insects are
 “ reduced again by the superior kinds of birds
 “ and beast; and these again are checked by
 “ man; who in his turn submits to other natures,
 “ and resigns his form a sacrifice in common to
 “ the rest of things. And if in natures so little
 “ exalted and pre-eminent above each other, the
 “ sacrifice of interest can appear so just; how
 “ much more reasonably may all inferior natures
 “ be subjected to the superior nature of the
 “ world!

“ world ! The central powers, which hold the
 “ lasting orbs in their just poise and movement,
 “ must not be controlled to save a fleeting form, and
 “ rescue from the precipice a puny animal, whose
 “ brittle frame, however protected, must of itself
 “ so soon dissolve. The ambient air, the inward
 “ vapours, the impending meteors, or whatever
 “ else is nutrimental or preservative of the earth,
 “ must operate in a natural course ; and other
 “ constitutions must submit to the good habit and
 “ constitution of the all-sustaining globe.”——
 This hypothesis is not more satisfactory than the
 others. Their *whatever is, is right*, imports no
 more than that all is directed by immutable laws ;
 and who knows not that ? Flies are produced to
 be devoured by spiders, by swallows, &c. &c.
 We see a clear and stated order throughout every
 species of creatures ; in short, there is order in all
 things.

Had we no feeling, no objection would lie
 against such a system : but that is not the point ;
 what we ask is, Whether there are no sensible
 evils, and whence they have originated ? Pope, in
 his 4th epistle, on *Whatever is, is right*, says,
 “ There is no evil, or partial evil is universal
 “ good.” An odd general good, indeed, com-
 posed of the gout, the stone, pains, afflictions,
 crimes, sufferings, death and damnation !

This system of, *whatever is, is right*, represents
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the Author of nature merely as powerful; as a cruel king, who, if he does but compass his designs, is very easy about the death, distresses, and afflictions of his subjects.

Were our first parents to be driven out of paradise, where they were to have lived for ever had they not eaten an apple? Were they in wretchedness to beget children loaded with a variety of wretchedness, and making others as wretched as themselves? Were they to undergo such diseases? to feel such vexations? to expire in pain? and, by way of refreshment, to be burned through all the ages of eternity? Will these sufferings prove, that *whatever is, is right*? So very far is the opinion of the best world possible from being consolatory, that it puzzles those very philosophers who embrace it; and the question of good and evil remains an inexplicable chaos to candid inquirers.

VOLTAIRE.

ORIGIN OF RIGHT AND DUTY.

THAT may be said to be my duty to do (understand political duty) which you (or some other person or persons) have a right to have me made to do. I have then a duty towards you: you have a right as against me. What you have a right to have me made to do (understand a political right) is that which I am liable, according

ding to law, upon a requisition made on your behalf, to be punished for not doing.—I say punished: for without the notion of punishment (that is, of pain annexed to an act, and accruing on a certain account, and from a certain source) no notion can we have of either right or duty.—One may conceive three sorts of duties; political, moral, and religious; correspondent to the three sorts of sanctions by which they are enforced: or the same point of conduct may be a man's duty on these three several accounts.—Political duty is created by punishment; or at least by the will of persons who have punishment in their hands; persons stated and certain—political superiors.—Religious duty is also created by punishment; by punishment expected at the hands of a person certain—the Supreme Being.—Moral duty is created by a kind of motive, which from the uncertainty of the persons to apply it, and of the species and degree in which it will be applied, has hardly yet got the name of punishment: by various mortifications resulting from the ill-will of persons uncertain and variable—the community in general; that is, such individuals of that community as he, whose duty is in question, shall happen to be connected with.—When in any of these three senses a man asserts a point of conduct to be a duty, what he asserts is the existence, actual or probable, of an external event, viz. of

a punishment issuing from one or other of these sources in consequence of a contravention of the duty: an event extrinsic to, and distinct from, as well the conduct of the person spoken of as the sentiment of him that speaks. If he persists in asserting it to be a duty, but without meaning it should be understood that it is on any of these three accounts that he looks upon it as such, all he then asserts is his own internal sentiment; all he means then is, that he feels himself pleased or displeased at the thoughts of the point of conduct in question, but without being able to tell why. J. BENTHAM.

STANDARD OF RIGHT AND WRONG.

THE different principles sought for in different times by different men as standards of right and wrong, may be reduced to the following.

1. The principle of the Monks; or, as it is commonly called, Asceticism, or the Ascetic Principle. *See the article MONKS.*

2. The principle of sympathy and antipathy. *See the article SYMPATHY.*

3. The principle of utility. *See the article UTILITY.*

The *theological* principle; meaning that principle which professes to recur for the standard of right and wrong to the revealed will of God,
 4 more

more closely examined, seems to be never any thing more or less than one or other of the three before-mentioned principles, presenting itself under another shape.

The happiness of the individuals, of whom a community is composed, that is, their pleasures and their security, being the end, and the sole end, which the legislator ought to have in view; and the sole standard, in conformity to which each individual ought, as far as depends upon the legislator, to be *made* to fashion his behaviour, [none but the principle of utility, as the only one which is capable of being constantly pursued, can be the proper standard of right and wrong, and the true foundation of a wise code of laws.

J. BENTHAM.

RIGHT AND WRONG.

THE various systems that have hitherto been formed concerning the standard of *right and wrong*, may all be reduced to the principle of sympathy and antipathy. One account may serve for all of them. They consist all of them in so many contrivances for avoiding the obligation of appealing to any external standard, and for prevailing upon the reader to accept of the author's sentiment or opinion as a reason for itself. The phrases different, but the principle the same.

It is curious enough to observe the variety of

inventions men have hit upon, and the variety of phrases they have brought forward, in order to conceal from the world, and, if possible, from themselves, this very general, and therefore very pardonable, self-sufficiency.

1. One man says, he has a thing made on purpose to tell him what is right and what is wrong; and that it is called a *moral sense*: and then he goes to work at his ease; and says, such a thing is right, and such a thing is wrong—Why? “because my moral sense tells me it is.”

2. Another man comes and alters the phrase; leaving out *moral*, and putting in *common*, in the room of it. He then tells you, that his common sense teaches him what is right and wrong, as surely as the other's moral sense did: meaning, by common sense, a sense of some kind or other, which, he says, is possessed by all mankind; the sense of those, whose sense is not the same as the author's, being struck out of the account as not worth taking. This contrivance does better than the other: for a moral sense being a new thing, a man may feel about him a good while without being able to find it out; but common sense is as old as the creation, and there is no man but would be ashamed to be thought not to have as much of it as his neighbours. It has another great advantage; by appearing to share power, it lessens envy: for when a man gets up upon this ground, in order
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der to anathematize those who differ from him, it is not by a *sic volo sic jubeo*, but by a *velitis jubeatis*.

3. Another man comes, and says, that as to a moral sense indeed, he cannot find that he has any such thing; that however he has an *understanding*, which will do quite as well. This understanding, he says, is the standard of right and wrong: it tells him so and so. All good and wise men understand as he does: if other mens understandings differ in any point from his, so much the worse for them; it is a sure sign they are either defective or corrupt.

4. Another man says, that there is an eternal and immutable rule of right; that that rule of right dictates so and so: and then he begins giving you his sentiments upon any thing that comes uppermost; and these sentiments (you are to take for granted) are so many branches of the eternal rule of right.

5. Another man, or perhaps the same man (it is no matter) says, that there are certain practices conformable, and others repugnant, to the fitness of things: and then he tells you, at his leisure, what practices are conformable, and what repugnant; just as he happens to like a practice or dislike it.

6. A great multitude of people are continually talking of the law of nature, and then they go on

giving you their sentiments about what is right and what is wrong; and these sentiments, you are to understand, are so many chapters and sections of the law of nature.

7. Instead of the phrase, law of nature, you have sometimes, law of reason, right reason, natural justice, natural equity, good order. Any of them will do equally well. This latter is most used in politics. The three last are much more tolerable than the others, because they do not very explicitly claim to be any thing more than phrases: they insist but feebly upon being looked upon as so many positive standards of themselves, and seem content to be taken, upon occasion, for phrases expressive of the conformity of the thing in question to the proper standard, whatever that may be. On most occasions, however, it will be better to say *utility*: *utility* is clearer, as referring more explicitly to pain and pleasure.

8. We have one philosopher who says, there is no harm in any thing in the world but in telling a lie: and that if, for example, you were to murder your own father, this would only be a particular way of saying he was not your father. Of course, when this philosopher sees any thing that he does not like, he says, it is a particular way of telling a lie. It is saying, that the act ought to be done, or may be done, when, *in truth*, it ought not to be done.

9. The

9. The fairest and openest of them all is that sort of man who speaks out, and says, I am of the number of the elect: now God himself takes care to inform the elect what is right; and that with so good effect, that let them strive ever so, they cannot help not only knowing it but practising it. If therefore a man wants to know what is right and what is wrong, he has nothing to do but to come to me.

It is upon the principle of antipathy that such and such acts are often reprobated on the score of their being *unnatural*: the practice of exposing children, established among the Greeks and Romans, was an unnatural practice. Unnatural, when it means any thing, it means unfrequent: and there it means something, although nothing to the present purpose. But here it means no such thing: for the frequency of such acts is perhaps the great complaint. It therefore means nothing; nothing, I mean, which there is in the act itself. All it can serve to express is, the disposition of the person who is talking of it; the disposition he is in to be angry at the thoughts of it. Does it merit his anger? Very likely it may: but whether it does or no is a question, which, to be answered rightly, can only be answered upon the principle of utility.

Unnatural, is as good a word as *moral sense*, or *common sense*; and would be as good a foundation.

dation for a system. Such an act is unnatural; that is, repugnant to nature: for I do not like to practise it; and consequently do not practise it. It is therefore repugnant to what ought to be the nature of every body else.

The mischief common to all these ways of thinking and arguing (which, in truth, as we have seen, are but one and the same method couched in different forms of words) is their serving as a cloak, and pretence, and aliment, to despotism: if not a despotism in practice, a despotism however in disposition; which is but too apt, when pretence and power offers, to show itself in practice. The consequence is, that with intentions very commonly of the purest kind, a man becomes a torment either to himself or his fellow-creatures. If he be of the melancholy cast, he sits in silent grief, bewailing their blindness or depravity: if of the irascible, he declaims with fury and virulence against all who differ from him; blowing up the coals of fanaticism, and branding, with the charge of corruption and insincerity, every man who does not think, or profess to think, as he does.

If such a man happens to possess the advantages of style, his book may do a considerable deal of mischief before the nothingness of it is understood.

These principles, if such they can be called, it
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is more frequent to see applied to morals than to politics; but their influence extends itself to both. In politics, as well as morals, a man will be at least equally glad of a pretence for deciding any question in the manner that best pleases him, without the trouble of inquiry. If a man is an infallible judge of what is right and wrong in the actions of private individuals, why not in the measures to be observed by public men in the direction of such actions of those individuals? Accordingly (not to mention other chimeras) I have more than once known the pretended law of nature set up in legislative debates, in opposition to arguments derived from the principle of utility.

“ But is it never, then, from any other confide-
“ rations than those of utility, that we derive our
“ notions of right and wrong ?” I do not know :
I do not care. Whether a moral sentiment can be originally conceived from any other source than a view of utility, is one question; whether upon examination and reflection it can, in point of fact, be actually persisted in and justified on any other ground, by a person reflecting within himself, is another; whether in point of right it can properly be justified on any other ground, by a person addressing himself to the community, is a third. The two first are questions of speculation; it matters not, comparatively speaking, how they are decided. The last is a question of practice; the decision of
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it is of as much importance as that of any can be.

“ I feel in myself,” say you, “ a disposition to
 “ approve of such or such an action in a moral
 “ view: but this is not owing to any notions I
 “ have of its being a useful one to the commu-
 “ nity. I do not pretend to know whether it be
 “ an useful one or not: it may be, for aught I
 “ know, a mischievous one.” “ But is it then,”
 say I, “ a mischievous one? examine; and if you
 “ can make yourself sensible that it is so, then, if
 “ duty means any thing, that is, moral duty, it is
 “ your *duty* at least to abstain from it; and more
 “ than that, if it is what lies in your power, and
 “ can be done without too great a sacrifice, to
 “ endeavour to prevent it. It is not your cherish-
 “ ing the notion of it in your bosom, and giving
 “ it the name of virtue, that will excuse you.”

“ I feel in myself,” say you again, “ a disposi-
 “ tion to detest such or such an action in a moral
 “ view; but this is not owing to any notions I
 “ have of its being a mischievous one to the com-
 “ munity. I do not pretend to know whether it
 “ be a mischievous one or not: it may be not a
 “ mischievous one; it may be, for aught I know,
 “ an useful one.”—“ May it indeed,” say I, “ an
 “ useful one? But let me tell you then, that un-
 “ less duty, and right and wrong, be just what
 “ you please to make them, if it really be not a

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“ a mischievous one, and any body has a mind to
“ do it, it is no duty of your’s; but, on the con-
“ trary, it would be very wrong in you to take
“ upon you to prevent him: detest it within your-
“ self as much as you please; that may be a very
“ good reason (unless it be also a useful one) for
“ your not doing it yourself; but if you go about,
“ by word or deed, to do any thing to hinder him,
“ or make him suffer for it, it is you, and not he,
“ that have done wrong: it is not your setting
“ yourself to blame his conduct, or branding it
“ with the name of vice, that will make him cul-
“ pable, or you blameless. Therefore, if you can
“ make yourself content that he shall be of one
“ mind, and you of another, about that matter,
“ and so continue, it is well; but if nothing will
“ serve you, but that you and he must needs be
“ of the same mind, I’ll tell you what you have
“ to do; it is for you to get the better of your an-
“ tipathy, not for him to truckle to it.”

J. BENTHAM.

THE DECLINE OF ROMAN LEARNING, AND THE REVIVAL OF LETTERS.

THOSE who cast their eye on the general re-
volutions of society, will find, that as all the
improvements of the human mind had reached
nearly to their state of perfection about the age
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of Augustus, there was a sensible decline from that point or period; and men thenceforth relapsed gradually into ignorance and barbarism. The unlimited extent of the Roman empire, and the consequent despotism of the monarchs, extinguished all emulation, debased the generous spirits of men, and depressed that noble flame by which all the refined arts must be cherished and enlivened. The military government, which soon succeeded, and rendered even the lives and properties insecure and precarious, proved destructive to those vulgar and more necessary arts of agriculture, manufactures, and commerce; and, in the end, to the military art and genius itself, by which alone the immense fabric of the empire could be supported. The irruption of the barbarous nations, which soon followed, overwhelmed all human knowledge, which was already far in its decline; and men sunk every age deeper into ignorance, stupidity, and superstition; till the light of ancient science and history had very nearly suffered a total extinction in all the European nations.

But there is an ultimate point of depression, as well as of exaltation, from which human affairs naturally return in a contrary progress, and beyond which they seldom pass, either in their advancement or decline.—The period in which the people of Christendom were the lowest sunk in
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ignorance, and consequently in disorders of every kind, may justly be fixed at the eleventh century, about the age of William the Conqueror; and from that æra, the sun of science beginning to reascend, threw out many gleams of light, which preceded the full morning when letters were revived in the fifteenth century. The Danes and other northern people, who had so long infested the coasts, and even the inland parts of Europe, by their depredations, having now learned the arts of tillage and agriculture, found a settled subsistence at home, and were no longer tempted to desert their industry, in order to seek a precarious livelihood by rapine, and by the plunder of their neighbours.—The feudal governments also, among the more southern nations, were reduced to a kind of system; and though that strange species of civil polity was ill fitted to ensure either liberty or tranquillity, it was preferable to universal licence and disorder, which had every where preceded it.—But perhaps there was no event which tended further to the improvement of the age, than one which has not been much remarked, the accidental finding a copy of Justinian's Pandects, about the year 1130, in the town of Amalfi in Italy. It is easy to see what advantages Europe must have reaped by its inheriting at once from the ancients so complete an art, which was of itself so necessary for giving security to all other arts;

arts; and which by refining, and still more by bestowing solidity on the judgment, served as a model to further improvements. The sensible utility of the Roman law, both to public and private interest, recommended the study of it, at a time when the more exalted and speculative sciences carried no charms with them: and thus the last branch of ancient literature, which remained uncorrupted, was, happily, the first transmitted to the modern world. For it is remarked, that, in the decline of Roman learning, when the philosophers were universally infected with superstition and sophistry, and the poets and historians with barbarism, the lawyers, who in other countries are seldom models of science and politeness, were yet able, by the constant study and close imitation of their predecessors, to maintain the same good sense in their decisions and reasonings, and the same purity in their language and expression.

HUME.

THE CAUSE OF THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC.

WHEN the interest of a state is changed, and the laws, which, at the first foundation, were useful, are become prejudicial; those very laws, by the respect constantly preserved for them, must necessarily draw the state to its ruin. Who doubts that the destruction of the Roman republic was

the effect of a ridiculous veneration for the ancient laws, and that this blind respect forged the fetters with which Cæsar loaded his country? After the destruction of Carthage, when Rome attained the summit of her glory, the Romans, from the opposition they then found between their interests, their manners, and their laws, ought to have foreseen the revolution with which the empire was threatened; and to have been sensible, that, to save the state, the republic in a body ought to have pressed the making those reformatations which the times and circumstances required; and above all, to hasten the prevention of those changes that personal ambition, the most dangerous to the legislature, might introduce. The same laws which had raised the Romans to the highest elevation, could not support them in that state: an empire, like a vessel which the winds have driven to a certain latitude, where, being opposed by other winds, it is in danger of being lost, if, to avoid shipwreck, the pilot does not speedily change his course. This political truth was well known to Mr Locke, who, on the establishment of the legislature of Georgia, proposed that his laws should be in force only one century; and at that time being expired, they should become void if they were not afresh examined and confirmed. He was sensible that a military or commercial government supposed very different laws; and that a legislation

proper to favour commerce and industry, might one day become fatal to that colony, if its neighbours entered into a war among themselves, and circumstances made it necessary for that people to become more warlike than commercial.

HELVETIUS.

THE INHUMANITY OF THE ROMANS.

A LOVE for their country, popularity, and generosity, were virtues common to the ancients; but true philanthropy, a regard for public welfare and general order, are sentiments to which the past ages were absolutely strangers. And how, indeed, could such sentiments have existed amongst men, accustomed from their infancy to behold thousands of gladiators mutually slaughtering one another, and perishing even amidst the acclamations of the women?—Such exalted feelings as these could never have animated a people, who so frequently saw prisoners of war, chiefs, and kings publicly conducted, in pursuance of a decree, to execution, and completing by their deaths the festivity of a triumph. The Romans were so rigorous in all their criminal prosecutions, as never to suppose that the number of the guilty could suggest a reason why any should be pardoned. Amidst all the atrocious actions of which the Romans were guilty, the greatest reproach which

which they have incurred, is on account of their having never treated man, in general, as a kind of fellow-creature. The extreme rigour of their punishments might, perhaps, have been excusable, had it been founded on a love of order, and had it been extended with equal severity against all. But who will not be surpris'd, at perceiving, that these sanguinary judges inflicted no other punishment, but the punishment of sending into exile, on a Roman citizen, even although he might have committed a thousand assassinations. It must be confessed, that virtue hath been, in every æra, what beauty still is amongst different nations; not that which nature hath produced the most perfect, but the greatest perfection of features which she may have given to each nation, and in each climate. As in the antique statues, the countenances of a Venus or an Helen preserve a certain expression of austerity in our eyes, extremely inconsistent with those graces diffused through other forms; so the virtues of the ancients were continually tinged with the vices of their age.

CHATELUR.

THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF THE ROMANS.

THE Romans well understood that policy which teaches the security arising to the chief govern-

ment from separate states among the governed, when they restored the liberty of the states of Greece (oppressed, but united, under Macedon) by an edict that every state should live under its own laws. They did not even name a governor. Independence of each other, and separate interests, (though, among a people united by common manners, language, and I may say religion, inferior neither in wisdom, bravery, nor the love of liberty, to the Romans themselves), was all the security the sovereigns wished for their sovereignty. It is true they did not call themselves sovereigns. They set no value on the title: they were contented with possessing the thing; and possess, as they did, even without a standing army. (What can be a stronger proof of the security of their possession?) And yet, by a policy similar to this throughout, was the Roman world subdued and held; a world composed of above an hundred languages and set of manners different from those of their masters. When the Romans had subdued Macedon and Illyricum, they were both formed into republics by a decree of the Senate; and Macedon was thought safe from the danger of a revolution by being divided into a division common among the Romans; as we learn from the accounts of the tetrarchs in Scripture. In the first instance, it was their pleasure that the Macedonians and Illyrians should be free; that it might

might be clear to all nations that the arms of the Roman people did not bring slavery upon the free, but, on the contrary, freedom to those who were enslaved. Nations in a state of liberty were to feel that liberty, safe and perpetual, under the patronage of the people of Rome: those that lived under kings were to find their kings milder and juster at the instant, out of respect to the Roman people; and if war should at any time take place between the Roman people and their kings, they were to believe that it must end in victory to the Romans, and liberty to themselves. It was their pleasure also, that Macedon should be divided into four districts, and each have a separate council of its own; and that it should pay the Roman people only half the tribute it had been used to pay to their kings. Their determinations were of the same temper respecting Illyricum. *Livy, b. 45. c. 18.*—All the Greek states, whether in Europe or Asia, had their liberty and their own laws. *Livy, b. 33. c. 30.* FRANKLIN.

THE POLICY OF THE ROMAN CHURCH.

THE policy of the court of Rome has been commonly much admired; and men, judging by success, have bestowed the highest eulogies on that prudence by which a power, from such slender beginnings, could advance, without force of arms, to establish an universal and almost absolute

monarchy in Europe. But the wisdom of such a long succession of men who filled the Papal throne, and who were of such different ages, tempers, and interests, is not intelligible, and could never have place in nature. The instrument, indeed, with which they wrought, the ignorance and superstition of the people, is so gross an engine, of such universal prevalence, and so little liable to accident or disorder, that it may be successful even in the most unskilful hand; and scarce any indiscretion can frustrate its operations. While the court of Rome was openly abandoned to the most flagrant disorders, even while it was torn with schisms and factions, the power of the church made daily a sensible progress in Europe. The clergy, feeling the necessity of protection against the violence of princes or the vigour of the laws, were well pleased to adhere to a foreign head, who, being removed from the fear of the civil authority, could freely employ the power of the whole church in defending their ancient or usurped properties and privileges, when invaded in any particular country. The monks, desirous of an independence on their diocesans, professed still a more devout attachment to the triple crown; and the stupid people possessed no science or reason which they could oppose to the most exorbitant pretensions. Nonsense passed for demonstration: the most criminal

minal means were sanctified by the piety of the end. Treaties were supposed not to be binding where the interests of God were concerned: the ancient laws and customs of state had no authority against a divine right: impudent forgeries were received as ancient monuments of antiquity: and the champions of the holy church, if successful, were celebrated as heroes; if unfortunate, were worshipped as martyrs: and all events thus turned out equally to the advantage of clerical usurpations. HUME.

THE ROMAN CHURCH.

FEW ecclesiastical establishments have been fixed upon a worse foundation than that of the church of Rome, or have been attended with circumstances more hurtful to the peace and happiness of mankind. The large revenues, privileges, immunities, and power of the clergy, rendered them formidable to the civil magistrate, and armed with too extensive authority an order of men who always adhere closely together, and who never want a plausible pretence for their encroachments and usurpations. The higher dignities of the church served indeed to the support of gentry and nobility; but, by the establishment of monasteries, many of the lowest vulgar were taken from the useful arts, and maintained in those

those receptacles of sloth and ignorance. The supreme head of the church was a foreign potentate, who was guided by interests always different, sometimes contrary, to those of the community. And as the hierarchy was necessarily solicitous to preserve an unity of faith, rites, and ceremonies, all liberty of thought ran a manifest risk of being extinguished; and violent persecutions, or, what was worse, a stupid and abject credulity, took place every where. To increase these evils, the church, though she possessed large revenues, was not contented with her acquisitions, but retained a power of practising further on the ignorance of mankind. She even bestowed on each individual priest a power of enriching himself by the voluntary oblations of the faithful, and left him still a powerful motive for diligence and industry in his calling. And thus that church, though an extensive and burthenfome establishment, was liable to many of the inconveniences which belong to an order of priests, who trusted entirely to their own art and invention for attaining a subsistence. The advantages attending the Romish hierarchy were but a small compensation for its inconveniences. The ecclesiastical privileges during barbarous times, had served as a check to the despotism of kings: The union of all the western churches under the supreme Pontiff facilitated the intercourse of nations, and tended to
bind

bind all the parts of Europe into a close connection with each other: And the pomp and splendour of worship which belonged to so opulent an establishment, contributed in some respects to the encouragement of the fine arts, and began to diffuse a general elegance of taste, by uniting it with religion. HUME.

THE POWER OF THE ROMAN CHURCH, AND ITS DECLINE.

IN the ancient constitution of the Christian church, the bishop of each diocese was elected by the joint votes of the clergy and of the people of the episcopal city. The people did not long retain their right of election; and while they did retain it, they almost always acted under the influence of the clergy, who in such spiritual matters appeared to be their natural guides. The clergy, however, soon grew weary of the trouble of managing them, and found it easier to elect their own bishops themselves. The abbot, in the same manner, was elected by the monks of the monastery, at least in the greater part of abbacies. All the inferior ecclesiastical benefices comprehended within the diocese were collated by the bishop, who bestowed them upon such ecclesiastics as he thought proper. All church-preferments were in this manner in the disposal of the church.

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The sovereign, though he might have some indirect influence in those elections, and though it was sometimes usual to ask both his consent to elect, and his approbation of the election, yet had no direct or sufficient means of managing the clergy. The ambition of every clergyman naturally led him to pay court, not so much to his sovereign, as to his own order, from which only he could expect preferment.

Through the greater part of Europe the Pope gradually drew to himself, first, the collation of almost all bishoprics and abbacies, or of what were called consistorial benefices, and afterwards, by various machinations and pretences, of the greater part of inferior benefices comprehended within each diocese; little more being left to the bishop than what was barely necessary to give him a decent authority with his own clergy. By this arrangement the condition of the sovereign was still worse than it had been before. The clergy of all the different countries of Europe were thus formed into a sort of spiritual army; dispersed in different quarters indeed, but of which all the movements and operations could now be directed by one head, and conducted upon one uniform plan. The clergy of each particular country might be considered as a particular detachment of that army, of which the operations could easily be supported and seconded by all the other detachments

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quartered in the different countries round about. Each detachment was not only independent of the sovereign of the country in which it was quartered, and by which it was maintained, but dependent upon a foreign sovereign, who could at any time turn its arms against the sovereign of that particular country, and support them by the arms of all the other detachments.

Those arms were the most formidable that can well be imagined. In the ancient state of Europe, before the establishment of arts and manufactures, the wealth of the clergy gave them the same sort of influence over the common people, which that of the great barons gave them over their respective vassals, tenants, and retainers. In the great landed estates, which the mistaken piety both of princes and private persons had bestowed upon the church, jurisdictions were established of the same kind with those of the great barons; and for the same reason. In those great landed estates, the clergy, or their bailiffs, could easily keep the peace without the support or assistance either of the king or of any other person; and neither the king nor any other person could keep the peace there without the support and assistance of the clergy. The jurisdictions of the clergy, therefore, in their particular baronies or manors, were equally independent, and equally exclusive of the authority of the king's courts, as those of the great
tempo-

temporal lords. The tenants of the clergy were, like those of the great barons, almost all tenants at will, entirely dependent upon their immediate lords, and therefore liable to be called out at pleasure, in order to fight in any quarrel in which the clergy might think proper to engage them. Over and above the rents of those estates, the clergy possessed, in the tythes, a very large portion of the rents of all the other estates in every kingdom of Europe. The revenues arising from both those species of rents were, the greater part of them, paid in kind; in corn, wine, cattle, poultry, &c. The quantity exceeded greatly what the clergy could themselves consume; and there were neither arts nor manufactures for the produce of which they could exchange the surplus. The clergy could derive advantage from this immense surplus in no other way than by employing it, as the great barons employed the like surplus of their revenues, in the most profuse hospitality, and in the most extensive charity. Both the hospitality and the charity of the ancient clergy, accordingly, are said to have been very great. They not only maintained almost the whole poor of every kingdom, but many knights and gentlemen had frequently no other means of subsistence than by travelling about from monastery to monastery, under pretence of devotion, but in reality to enjoy the hospitality of the clergy. The retainers of some

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particular prelates were often as numerous as those of the greatest lay-lords; and the retainers of all the clergy taken together were, perhaps, more numerous than those of all the lay-lords. There was always much more union among the clergy than among the lay-lords. The former were under a regular discipline and subordination to the papal authority. The latter were under no regular discipline or subordination, but almost always equally jealous of one another, and of the king. Though the tenants and retainers of the clergy, therefore, had both together been less numerous than those of the great lay-lords, and their tenants were probably much less numerous, yet their union would have rendered them more formidable. The hospitality and charity of the clergy too, not only gave them the command of a great temporal force, but increased very much the weight of their spiritual weapons. Those virtues procured them the highest respect and veneration among all the inferior ranks of people, of whom many were constantly, and almost all occasionally, fed by them. Every thing belonging or related to so popular an order, its possessions, its privileges, its doctrines, necessarily appeared sacred in the eyes of the common people; and every violation of them, whether real or pretended, the highest act of sacrilegious wickedness and profaneness. In this state of things, if the sove-

reign frequently found it difficult to resist the confederacy of a few of the great nobility, we cannot wonder that he should find it still more so to resist the united force of the clergy of his own dominions, supported by that of the clergy of all the neighbouring dominions. In such circumstances the wonder is, not that he was sometimes obliged to yield, but that he was ever able to resist.

The privileges of the clergy in those ancient times (which to us who live in the present times appear the most absurd) their total exemption from the secular jurisdiction, for example, or what in England was called the benefit of clergy, were the natural or rather the necessary consequences of this state of things. How dangerous must it have been for the sovereign to attempt to punish a clergyman for any crime whatever, if his own order were disposed to protect him, and to represent either the proof as insufficient for convicting so holy a man, or the punishment as too severe to be inflicted upon one whose person had been rendered sacred by religion. The sovereign could, in such circumstances, do no better than leave him to be tried by the ecclesiastical courts; who, for the honour of their own order, were interested to restrain, as much as possible, every member of it from committing enormous crimes, or even
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from giving occasion to such gross scandal as might disgust the minds of the people.

In the state in which things were through the greater part of Europe during the tenth, eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries, and for some time both before and after that period, the constitution of the church of Rome may be considered as the most formidable combination that ever was formed against the authority and security of civil government, as well as against the liberty, reason, and happiness of mankind; which can flourish only where civil government is able to protect them. In that constitution the grossest delusions of superstition were supported in such a manner by the private interests of so great a number of people, as put them out of all danger from any assault of human reason: because, though human reason might perhaps have been able to unveil, even to the eyes of the common people, some of the delusions of superstition; it could never have dissolved the ties of private interest. Had this constitution been attacked by no other enemies but the feeble efforts of human reason, it must have endured for ever. But that immense and well-built fabric, which all the wisdom and virtue of man could never have shaken, much less have overturned, was by the natural course of things, first weakened, and afterwards in part destroyed; and is now likely, in the course of a few

centuries more, perhaps, to crumble into ruins altogether.

The gradual improvements of arts, manufactures, and commerce, the same causes which destroyed the power of the great barons, destroyed in the same manner, through the greater part of Europe, the whole temporal power of the clergy. In the produce of arts, manufactures, and commerce, the clergy, like the great barons, found something for which they could exchange their rude produce, and thereby discovered the means of spending their whole revenues upon their own persons, without giving any considerable share of emth to other people. Their charity became gradually less extensive, their hospitality less liberal or less profuse. Their retainers became consequently less numerous, and by degrees dwindled away altogether. The clergy too, like the great barons, wished to get a better rent from their landed estates, in order to spend it in the same manner, upon the gratification of their own private vanity and folly. But this increase of rent could be got only by' granting leases to their tenants, who thereby became in a great measure independent of them. The ties of interest, which bound the inferior ranks of people to the clergy, were in this manner gradually broken and dissolved. They were even broken and dissolved sooner than those which bound the same ranks of people to

to the great barons; because the benefices of the church being, the greater part of them, much smaller than the estates of the great barons, the possessor of each benefice was much sooner able to spend the whole of its revenue upon his own person. During the greater part of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the power of the great barons was, through the greater part of Europe, in full vigour. But the temporal power of the clergy, the absolute command which they had once had over the great body of the people, was very much decayed. The power of the church was by that time very nearly reduced, through the greater part of Europe, to what arose from her spiritual authority; and even that spiritual authority was much weakened when it ceased to be supported by the charity and hospitality of the clergy. The inferior ranks of people no longer looked upon that order, as they had done before, as the comforters of their distress, and the relievers of their indigence. On the contrary, they were provoked and disgusted by the vanity, luxury, and expence of the richer clergy, who appeared to spend upon their own pleasures what had always before been regarded as the patrimony of the poor.

A. SMITH.

S.

THE INHUMANITY OF SAVAGES.

IN every part of the deportment of man in his savage state, whether towards his equals of the human species, or towards the animals below him, we recognise the same character, and trace the operations of a mind intent on its own gratifications, and regulated by its own caprice, without much attention or sensibility to the sentiments and feelings of the beings around him. So little is the breast of a savage susceptible of those sentiments which prompt men to that feeling attention which mitigates distress, that, in some provinces of America, the Spaniards found it necessary to enforce the common duties of humanity by positive

tive laws, and to oblige husbands and wives, parents and children, under severe penalties, to take care of each other during their sickness.

ROBERTSON.

THE CONNECTION OF SCIENCE AND VIRTUE.

GOOD morals and knowledge are almost inseparable in every age, though not in every individual. Whatever we may imagine concerning the usual truth and sincerity of men who live in a rude and barbarous state, there is much more falsehood, and even perjury, among them than among civilized nations; and virtue, which is nothing but a more enlarged and more cultivated reason, never flourishes to any degree, nor is founded on steady principles of honour, except where a good education becomes general; and men are taught the pernicious consequences of vice, treachery, and immorality. Even superstition, though more prevalent among ignorant nations, is but a poor supply for the defects of knowledge and education; and our European ancestors, who employed every moment the expedient of swearing on extraordinary crosses and relics, were less honourable in all engagements than their posterity, who from experience have omitted those ineffectual securities.

HUME.

POLI-

POLITICAL SECURITY.

A GOVERNMENT which excludes all persons except one, or a very few, from having access to the chief magistracy, or from having votes in the choice of magistrates, and which keeps all the power of the state in the same hands, or the same families, is easily marked out, and is the extreme of political slavery. For such is the state of mankind, that persons possessed of unbounded power will generally act as if they forgot the proper nature and design of their station, and pursue their own interest, though it be opposite to that of the community at large. Provided those who make laws submit to them themselves, and, with respect to taxes in particular, so long as those who impose them bear an equal share with the rest of the community, there will be no complaint. But in all cases, when those who lay the tax upon others exempt themselves, there is tyranny; and the man who submits to a tax of a penny, levied in this manner, is liable to have the last penny extorted from him. Men of equal rank and fortune with those who compose the British House of Commons, have nothing to fear from the imposition of taxes, so long as there is any thing like rotation in that office; because those who impose them are liable to pay them them-

themselves, and are no better able to bear the burden. But persons of lower rank, and especially those who have no votes in the election of members, may have reason to fear, because an unequal part of the burden may be laid upon them: They are necessarily a distinct order in the community, and have no direct method of controuling the measures of the legislature. Our increasng game-laws have all the appearance of the haughty decrees of a tyrant, who sacrifices every thing to his own pleasure and caprice. Upon these principles, it is evident, that there must have been a gross inattention to the very first principles of liberty, to say no worse, in the first scheme of taxing the inhabitants of America in the British parliament.

PRIESTLEY.

SELF-LOVE.

THOSE who have affirmed self-love to be the basis of all our sentiments and all our actions are much in the right. There is no occasion to demonstrate that men have a face; as little need is there of proving to them that they are actuated by self-love. This self-love is the means of our preservation; and, like the instrument of the perpetuation of the species, it is necessary, it is dear to us; it gives us pleasure, but still is to be concealed.

VOLTAIRE.

ON

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

IF our selfish principles were so much predominant above our social, as is asserted by some philosophers, we ought undoubtedly to entertain a contemptible notion of human nature.

There is much of a dispute of words in all this controversy. When a man denies the sincerity of all public spirit or affection to a country and community, I am at a loss what to think of him. Perhaps he never felt this passion in so clear and distinct a manner as to remove all his doubts concerning its force and reality: but when he proceeds afterwards to reject all private friendship, if no interest or self-love intermixes itself, I am then confident that he abuses terms, and confounds the ideas of things; since it is impossible for any one to be so selfish, or rather stupid, as to make no difference between one man and another, and give no preference to qualities which engage his approbation and esteem. Is he also, say I, as insensible to anger as he pretends to be to friendship? And does injury and wrong no more affect him than kindness or benefits? Impossible; he does not know himself. He has forgot the movements of his mind; or rather he makes use of a different language from the rest of his countrymen, and calls not things by their pro-

proper names. What say you of natural affection? (I subjoin); is that also a species of self-love? Yes; all is self-love. *Your* children are loved only because they are yours; *your* friend, for a like reason; and *your* country engages you only so far as it has connection with *yourself*. Were the idea of self removed, nothing would affect you: you would be altogether inactive and insensible: or if you ever gave yourself any movement, it would only be from vanity, and a desire of fame and reputation to this same self. I am willing (reply I) to receive your interpretation of human actions, provided you admit the facts. That species of self-love, which displays itself in kindness to others, you must allow to have great influence over human actions, and even greater, on many occasions, than that which remains in its original shape and form. For how few are there, who, having a family, children, and relations, do not spend more on the maintenance and education of these than on their own pleasures? This, indeed, you justly observe, may proceed from self-love, since the prosperity of their family and friends is one, or the chief of their pleasures, as well as their chief honour. Be you also one of those selfish men, and you are sure of every one's good opinion and good will; or, not to shock your nice ears with these expressions, the self-love of every one,

one, and mine among the rest, will then incline us to serve you and speak well of you.

In my opinion, there are two things which have led astray those philosophers that have insisted so much on the selfishness of man. In the first place, they found that every act of virtue or friendship was attended with a secret pleasure; whence they concluded, that friendship and virtue could not be disinterested. But the fallacy of this is obvious. The virtuous sentiment and passion produces the pleasure, and does not arise from it. I feel a pleasure in doing good to my friend, because I love him; but do not love him for the sake of that pleasure.

In the second, it has always been found that the virtuous are far from being indifferent to praise; and therefore they have been represented as a set of vain-glorious men, who had nothing in view but the applauses of others. But this also is a fallacy. It is very unjust in the world, when they find any tincture of vanity in a laudable action, to depreciate it upon that account, or ascribe it entirely to that motive. The case is not the same with vanity as with other passions. Where avarice, or revenge, enter into any seemingly virtuous action, it is difficult for us to determine how far it enters; and it is natural to suppose it the sole actuating principle. But vanity is so closely allied to virtue, and to love the fame of

laudable actions approaches so near the love of laudable actions for their own sake, that the passions are more capable of mixture than any other kinds of affection; and it is almost impossible to have the latter without some degree of the former. Accordingly we find, that this passion for glory is always warped and varied according to the particular taste or sentiment of the mind on which it falls. Nero had the same vanity in driving a chariot that Trajan had in governing the empire with justice and ability. To love the glory of virtuous actions is a sure proof of the love of virtuous actions.

HUME.

SELF-SATISFACTION.

SELF-SATISFACTION, at least in some degree, is an advantage which equally attends the *fool* and the *wise man*. But it is the only one; nor is there any other circumstance in the conduct of life where they are upon an equal footing. Business, books, conversation; for all of these a fool is totally incapacitated; and, except condemned by his station to the coarsest drudgery, remains a useless burden upon the earth. Accordingly, it is found, that men are extremely jealous of their character in this particular; and many instances are seen of profligacy and treachery, the

most avowed and unreserved; none of bearing patiently the imputation of ignorance and stupidity. Dicearchus the Macedonian general, who, as Polybius tells us, openly erected one altar to Impiety, another to Injustice, in order to bid defiance to mankind; even he, I am well assured, would have started at the epithet *of fool*, and have meditated revenge for so injurious an appellation. Except the affection of parents, the strongest and most indissoluble bond in nature, no connection has strength sufficient to support the disgust arising from this character. Love itself, which can subsist under treachery, ingratitude, malice, and infidelity, is immediately extinguished by it, when perceived and acknowledged; nor are deformity and old age more fatal to the dominion of that passion. So dreadful are the ideas of an utter incapacity for any purpose or undertaking, and of continued error and misconduct in life.

When it is asked, Whether a quick or slow apprehension be most valuable? Whether one that at first view penetrates far into a subject, but can perform nothing upon study; or a contrary character, which must work out every thing by dint of application? Whether a clear head or a copious invention? Whether a profound genius or a sure judgment? in short, What character or particular turn of judgment is more excellent than another? it is evident we can answer none of

of these questions, without considering which of those qualities capacitates a man best for the world, and carries him further in any undertaking.

If refined and exalted sense be not useful as common, their rarity, their novelty, and the nobleness of their objects, make some compensation, and render them the admiration of mankind: As gold, though less serviceable than iron, acquires, from its scarcity, a value which is much superior.—The defects of judgment can be supplied by no art or invention: but those of memory frequently may, both in business and in study, by method and industry, and by diligence in committing every thing to writing; and we scarcely ever hear of short memory given as a reason for a man's want of success in any undertaking. But, in ancient times, when no man could make a figure without the talent of speaking, and when the audience were too delicate to bear such crude, undigested harangues as our extemporary orators offer to public assemblies; it was of the utmost consequence, and was accordingly much more valued than at present. Scarce any great genius is mentioned in antiquity, who is not celebrated for this talent; and Cicero enumerates it among the other sublime qualities of Cæsar himself.

HUME.

SENSATION.

THOUGHTS seem to us something strange; but sensation is no less wonderful; a divine power equally shows itself in the sensation of the meanest insect as in Newton's brain.—We receive our first knowledge from our sensations, and our memory is no more than a continued sensation: a man born without any of his five senses would, could he live, be totally void of any ideas. It is owing to our senses that we have even our metaphysical notions: for how should a circle or a triangle be measured, without having seen or felt a triangle? How can we form an idea, imperfect as it is, of infinitude, but by enlarging boundaries? And how can we throw down boundaries, without having seen or felt them? An eminent philosopher in his *Traité des Sensations*, tom. ii. p. 128. says, Sensation includes all our faculties.

VOLTAIRE.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

WE find in bodies two sorts of properties; the existence of one of which is permanent and unalterable; such are its impenetrability, gravity, mobility, &c. These qualities appertain to physics in general. There are in the same bodies other
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properties whose transient and fugitive existence is by turns produced and destroyed by certain combinations, analyses, or motions, in their interior parts. These sorts of properties form the different branches of natural history, chemistry, &c. and belong to particular parts of physics. —Iron, for example, is a composition of phlogiston and a particular earth. In this composite state it is subject to the attractive power of the magnet. When this iron is decomposed, that property vanishes: the magnet has no influence over a ferruginous earth deprived of its phlogiston.

When a metal is combined with another substance, as a vitriolic acid, this union likewise destroys in iron the property of being attracted by the magnet. —Fixed alkali and nitrous acid have each of them separately an infinity of different qualities; but when they are united, there does not remain any vestige of those qualities. —In the common heat of the atmosphere, nitrous acid will disengage itself from all other bodies to combine with fixed alkali. —If this combination be exposed to a degree of heat proper to put the nitre into a red fusion, and any inflammable matter be added to it, the nitrous acid will abandon the fixed alkali to unite with the inflammable substance; and in the act of this union arises the elastic force, whose effects are so surprising

prising in gunpowder.—All the properties of fixed alkali are destroyed when it is combined with sand and formed into glass; whose transparency, indissolubility, electric power, &c. are, if I may be allowed the expression, so many new creations, that are produced by this mixture, and destroyed by the decomposition of the glass.—Now, in the animal kingdom, why may not organisation produce in like manner that singular quality we call the faculty of sensation? All the phenomena that relate to medicine and natural history prove, that this power is in animals nothing more than the result of the structure of their bodies; that this power begins with the formation of their organs, lasts as long as they subsist, and is at last destroyed by the dissolution of the same organs.—What then becomes of the *faculty of sensation* in an animal? That which becomes of the quality of attracting the magnet in iron decomposed.

HELVETIUS.

SENSATION AND JUDGMENT DISTINCT QUALITIES OF THE HUMAN MIND.

TO perceive, is only to feel or be sensible of things; to compare them, is to judge of their existence: to judge of things, and to be sensible of them, are very different. Things present themselves to our sensations as single and detached from

from each other, such as they barely exist in nature; but in our intellectual comparison of them they are removed from place to place, disposed on and beside each other, to enable us to pronounce concerning their difference and similitude. The characteristic faculty of an intelligent, active being, is that of giving a sense to the word Exist. In beings merely sensitive, there is not the like force of intellect. Such passive beings perceive every object single, or by itself; or if two objects present themselves, they are perceived as united into one. Such beings having no power to place one in competition with, beside, or upon the other, they cannot compare them, or judge of their separate existence.

To see two objects at once, is not to see their relations to each other, nor to judge of their difference; as to see many objects, though distinct from one another, is not to reckon their number. I may possibly have in my mind the ideas of a great stick and a little one, without comparing those ideas together, or judging that one is less than the other; as I may look at my hand without counting my fingers. The comparative ideas of *greater* and *less*, as well as the numerical ideas of *one*, *two*, &c. are certainly no sensations, altho' the understanding produces them only from our sensations.

It has been pretended, that sensitive beings distinguish

stinguish sensations one from the other, by the actual difference there is between those sensations: this, however, demands an explanation. When such sensations are different, a sensitive being is supposed to distinguish them by their difference: but when they are alike, they can then only distinguish them because they perceive one without the other; for otherwise, how can two objects exactly alike be distinguished in a simultaneous sensation? Such objects must necessarily be blended together, and taken for one and the same.

When two comparative sensations are perceived, they make both a joint and separate impression; but their relation to each other is not necessarily perceived in consequence of either. If the judgement we form of this relation were indeed a mere sensation, excited by the objects, we should never be deceived in it; for it can never be denied that I truly perceive what I feel.

How, therefore, can I be deceived in the relation between these two sticks, particularly if they are not parallel? Why do I say, for instance, that the little one is a third part as long as the great one, when it is in reality only a fourth? Why is not the image, which is the sensation, conformable to its model, which is the object? It is because I am active when I judge; the operation which forms the comparison is defective, and my
under-

understanding, which judges of relations, mixes its errors with the truth of those sensations which are representative of objects.

To this we may add, that if we were merely passive in the use of our senses, there would be no communication between them; so that it would be impossible for us to know, that the body we touched with our hands, and the object we saw with our eyes, were one and the same. Either we should not be able to perceive external objects at all, or they would appear to exist as five perceptible substances, of which we should have no method of ascertaining the identity.

Whatever name is given to that power of the mind which assembles and compares my sensations, call it Attention, Reflection, &c. certain it is, that it exists in me, and not in the objects of those sensations: it is I alone who produce it, although it be displayed only in consequence of the impressions made on me by those objects.

ROUSSEAU.

COMMON SENSE.

THERE is sometimes to be found in idiomatical and vulgar expressions, an image of what passes in the hearts of all mankind. *Sensus communis* signified among the ancient Romans, not only common sense, but also humanity and sensibility.

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As we are much inferior to the Romans, it signifies with us only the half of its import with them. It means only common understanding, a simple capacity of reason, the mere comprehension of ordinary things, a kind of mean between stupidity and genius. To say that a man wants common sense, is a gross affront. To say that he does not want common sense, is an affront also; as it is as much as to say, that although he is not altogether stupid, he has neither genius nor wit. But whence comes this expression Common Sense, if not from the senses? In the invention and use of this term, mankind plainly confesses, that nothing enters into the mind but through the senses; would they, else, have used the word Sense, to signify common understanding? We sometimes say, that common sense is very rare. What is the meaning of that phrase? Certainly no more than that the progress or exercise of reason is interrupted in some men by their prejudices and prepossessions. Hence we see a man capable of reasoning very justly on one subject, err most grossly in arguing upon another. An Arabian, who may be an exact calculator, an ingenious chemist, and a good astronomer, believes nevertheless that Mahomet could put one-half of the moon in his sleeve. Wherefore is it that he is superior to mere common sense in judging of these three sciences, and inferior to it in his conception of the half-moon in Mahomet's sleeve? In
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the first place, he sees with his own eyes, and judges with his own understanding; in the second, he sees with the eyes of others, shutting his own, and perverting that understanding which nature gave him.

In what manner can this strange perversion of reason be effected? How can those ideas which succeed each other so regularly and constantly in our contemplations on numerous other objects, be so miserably confused in our reflecting upon another a thousand times more obvious and palpable? The capacity of the man, that is, his principles of intelligence, being still the same, some of his organs, therefore, must be depraved: as we sometimes see in the nicest epicure, a vitiated taste with regard to some species of viands. But how came the organ of the Arab, who sees an half-moon in Mahomet's sleeve, to be thus depraved? By *fear*. He hath been told, that, if he does not believe in this story of the half-moon and sleeve, his soul, in passing over the narrow bridge, immediately after his death, will be tumbled into the gulf beneath, there to perish eternally. Again, he is further told, that if he should doubt the truth of the sleeve, one dervise will accuse him of impiety; a second will prove him to be destitute of common sense, in that having all possible motives of credibility laid before him, he yet refuses to submit his proud reason to the force of evidence; a third will have him

him brought before the petty divan of a petty province, and get him legally impaled.—All this strikes a panic into the good Arabian. He does not want for sense in judging of other matters; but his conceptions are hurt in regard to this particular. But does the Arab really believe this story of Mahomet's sleeve? No. He endeavours to believe it; he says to himself, It is impossible, but it is true; I believe what I do not believe. Thus a confused heap of ideas are formed in his brain, which he is afraid to unravel; and this causes him to want common sense in reasoning upon this subject. VOLTAIRE.

SENSIBILITY.

DISINTERESTED principles are of different kinds: consequently the actions that flow from them are more or less beneficial, and more or less intitled to praise. We are moved by inconsiderate impulse to the performance of beneficent actions; as we are moved by inconsiderate impulse to the perpetration of guilt. You see an unhappy person; you discern the visitation of grief in his features; you hear them in the plaintive tones of his voice; you are warmed with sudden and resistless emotion; you never inquire concerning the propriety of your feelings, or the merits of the sufferer; and you hasten to relieve him. Your conduct

duct proceeds from inconsiderate impulse. It intitles you to the praise of sensibility, but not of reflection. You are again in the same situation; but the symptoms of distress do not produce in you the same ardent effects: you are moved with no violent agitation, and you feel little sympathy; but you perceive distress; you are convinced that the sufferer suffers unjustly; you know you are bound to relieve him; and, in consequence of these convictions, you offer him relief. Your conduct proceeds from sense of duty; and though it intitles you to the credit of rational humanity, it does not intitle you in this instance to the praise of fine sensibility.

Those who perform beneficent actions, from immediate feeling or impetuous impulse, have a great deal of pleasure. Their conduct, too, by the influence of sympathetic affection, imparts a pleasure to the beholder. The joy felt both by the agent and the beholder is ardent, and approaches to rapture. There is also an energy in the principle, which produces great and uncommon exertions; yet both the principle of action, and the pleasure it produces, are shifting. “Beauteous
“as the morning cloud or early dew;” like them too, they pass away. The pleasure arising from knowledge of duty, is less impetuous: it has no approaches to rapture; it seldom makes the heart throb, or the tear descend; and as it produces no

transporting enjoyment, it seldom leads to uncommon exertion; but the joy it affords is uniform, steady, and lasting. As the conduct is most perfect, so our happiness is most complete, when both principles are united: when our convictions of duty are animated with sensibility, and sensibility guided by convictions of duty.

Those who are guided by inconsiderate feeling, will often appear variable in their conduct, and of course irresolute. There is no variety of feeling to which persons of great sensibility are more liable, than that of great elevation or depression of spirits. The sudden unaccountable transitions from the one to the other, are not less striking, than the vast difference of which we are conscious in the one mood or the other. In an elevated state of spirits we form projects, entertain hopes, conceive ourselves capable of great exertions, and, in this hour of transport, undervalue obstacles and opposition. In a moment of depression, the scene is altered; nature ceases to smile; or, if she smiles, it is not for us; we feel ourselves feeble, forsaken, and hopeless; and the spirit formerly so full of ardour, so enterprising and supercilious, becomes humble and passive.

Inconsistency of conduct, and of consequence irresolution, occasioned by irregular and undirected feelings, proceed from other states of mind than depression of spirits, of which we have many
examples

examples in history, and which illustrate the general position.

Lorenzo de Medicis had a lively fancy; he was a courtier, ambitious, and had his mind filled with ideas of pageantry. He wished to enjoy pre-eminence: but his brother Alexander, the reigning prince, was an obstacle to be removed; and this could only be done by spoiling him of his life. The difficulty was great; yet it figured less to his heated imagination, than the dignity and enjoyment he had in view. Elegant in his manners, accomplished in every pleasing endowment of soft and insinuating address, he had, nevertheless, no secret counsellor in his breast to plead in behalf of justice. Thus prompted, and thus unguarded, he perpetrates the death of his brother. He sees his blood streaming; hears him groan in the agonies of death; beholds him convulsed in the pangs of departing life. A new set of feelings arise: the delicate accomplished courtier, who could meditate atrocious injury, cannot, without being ashamed, witness the bloody object: he remains motionless, irresolute, appalled at the deed; and in this state of amazement, neither prosecutes his design, nor thinks of escaping. Thus, without struggle or opposition, he is seized and punished as he deserves.

Voltaire gives a similar account of his hero Lewis. After describing in lively colours the de-

folation perpetrated by his authority in the Palatinate ; the conflagration of cities, and the utter ruin of the inhabitants ; he subjoins, that these orders were issued from Versailles, from the midst of pleasures ; and that, on a nearer view, the calamities he thus occasioned would have filled him with horror. That is, Lewis, like all men of irregular sensibility, was governed by the influences of objects operating immediately on his senses ; and so, according to such accidental mood as depended on present images, he was humane or inhuman. Lewis and Lorenzo, in those instances, were men of feeling, but not of virtue. They were akin to Lady Macbeth, who advised and determined the murder of Duncan, and who would have executed the deed herself ; but with the dagger lifted in act to strike, of such sensibility, so tender, she could not proceed. “ Had he not,” says she, “ resembled my father as he slept, I had done it.”

In minds where principles of regular and permanent influence have no authority, every feeling has a right to command ; and every impulse, how sudden soever, is regarded, during the season of its power, with entire approbation. All such feelings and impulses are not only admitted, but obeyed ; and lead us, without hesitation or reflection, to a corresponding deportment. Great sensibility produces extravagant desires : these lead to disappointment ;

pointment; and, in minds that are undisciplined, which are governed by irregular feelings, disappointment begets moroseness and anger. Moved by an ardent mood, they regard the objects of their affection with extravagant transport. They transfer to them their own dispositions; they make no allowance for differences of condition or state of mind; and expect returns suitable to their own unreasonable warmth. Even suppose them successful, their enjoyments are not equal to their hopes. Their desires are excessive; and no gratification whatever can allay the vehemence of their ardour. They are disappointed; they feel pain: in proportion to the violence of the disappointed passion, is the pang of repulse. This rouses a sense of wrong, and excites their resentment. The new feelings operate with as much force as the former. No inquiry is made concerning the reasonableness of the conduct they would produce. Resentment and indignation are felt; and merely because they are felt, they are deemed just and becoming. These dispositions are displayed according to the condition or character of him who feels them. Men of feeble constitutions, and without power over the fortunes of other men, under such malign influences, become fretful, invidious, and misanthropical. Persons of firmer structure, and unfortunately possessed of power, under such direction become inhuman. Herod

was a man of feeling : witness his conduct to Mariamne. At one time elegant, courteous, and full of tendernefs, his fondnefs was as unbounded as the virtues and graces of Mariamne were peerlefs. At other times, offended becaufe her expreffions of mutual affection were not as extravagant as the extravagance of his own emotions, he became fufpicious without caufe. Thus affectionate, fond, fufpicious, refentful, and powerful, in the frenzy of irregular feeling he put to death Mariamne.

Thus we fee mere fenfibility, undirected by reflection, leads men to an extravagant expreffion both of focial and unfocial feelings ; renders them capricioufly inconstant in their affections ; variable, and of courfe irrefolute in their conduct ; and liable to the moft outrageous excefs. Transported by their own emotions, they mifapprehend the condition of others : they are prone to exaggeration ; and even the good actions they perform excite amazement rather than approbation. Senfibility and the knowledge of duty fhould always be united ; for unlefs an exquisite feeling be regulated by that knowledge of duty which arifes from reflection on our own condition, and an acquaintance with human nature, it may produce unhappinefs both to ourfelves and others, but chiefly to ourfelves.

RICHARDSON.
SEN-

SENSIBILITY AND COMPASSION.

MAN is rendered sociable by his weakness: it is our common misery which inclines our heart to humanity. Every attachment is a sign of insufficiency. If we stood in no need of assistance, we should hardly think of uniting ourselves to each other: so that human felicity, uncertain as it is, proceeds from our infirmities. A being absolutely happy must be alone and independent. God only enjoys absolute happiness; but of that happiness who can have any idea? If an imperfect being could be supposed to have an independent existence, what, according to our ideas, would be his enjoyment? In being alone, he would be miserable. He who wants nothing, will love nothing; and I cannot conceive that he who loves nothing, can be happy. Hence it follows, that our attachment to our fellow-creatures is rather owing to our sympathizing with their pains than with their pleasures; for in the first we more evidently perceive the identity of our nature, and a security for their attachment to us. If our common necessities unite us from a principle of interest, our common miseries unite us by affection. The sight of a happy man is more apt to inspire envy than love: we readily accuse him of usurping a privilege to which he has no exclusive right;

right; and our self-love suffers in the idea that he has no need of our assistance.

Compassion is a grateful sensation; because, though we sympathise with the sufferer, we secretly rejoice that his pains are not our own. Envy, on the contrary, is painful; because, so far from sympathising in the happiness of others, we grudge them their enjoyments. The first seems to exempt us from the evil he suffers, and the latter to deprive us of the blessings he enjoys. It is not in the power of the human heart to sympathise with those who are happier than ourselves, but with those only who are more miserable. If there are any exceptions to this maxim, they are rather apparent than real. We do not sympathise with the rich or great to whom we are attached: even in our most sincere attachment, we only appropriate a part of their well-being. Sometimes we really love people in their misfortunes; but so long as they are in prosperity, they have no sincere friends, except such as are not dupes to appearances, and who rather pity than envy them notwithstanding their condition. We pity in others those evils only from which we think ourselves not exempt:

Non ignara mali, miseris succurrere disco.
What can be more beautiful, more affecting, and more true, than this line!

Why have kings no compassion for their subjects?

jects? Because they never intend to become men. Why are the rich so obdurate to the poor? Because they are not afraid of poverty. Why are the lower class of people despised by the nobility? Because the nobles are in no danger of becoming plebeians. Why are the Turks in general more humane, more hospitable, than we are? Because their government being arbitrary, and consequently the fortune and grandeur of particulars precarious, they are not entirely out of the reach of poverty and distress: he who is to-day the most powerful, may to-morrow be in the situation of the beggar he relieves. Our pity for the misfortunes of others is not measured by the quantity of evil, but by the supposed sensibility of the sufferer. We pity the wretched only in proportion as we believe them sensible of their own wretchedness. The mere physical sensation of evil is not so violent as it generally seems: it is the memory which makes us sensible of its continuance; it is the imagination, extending it beyond the present moment, which makes it really deserving compassion. Probably this may be the reason why we are less affected at the sufferings of animals than of men. We do not pity a dray-horse when we see him in the stable; because we do not suppose, that, in eating his hay, he remembers the inhumanity of his driver, or is apprehensive of the fatigues which he must undergo. In
like

like manner, we never pity a sheep in its pasture, though we know it to be doomed to slaughter; because we suppose it to have no foreknowledge of its destiny. By extending these ideas, we also become indifferent to the sufferings of our own species; and the rich excuse their conduct towards the poor, by supposing them too stupid to be sensible of their own misery.

It is generally remarked, that the sight of blood or wounds, the sound of cries and groans, the apparatus of painful operations, and all those objects which excite the idea of suffering, make a more early and more general impression upon mankind than that of death. The idea of final dissolution being more complex, is not so striking. The image of death impresses our minds later, and more faintly, because we have no experience to assist our conception. To form any idea of the agonies of death, we must first have beheld the consequence thereof in the lifeless body: but when once the image is perfectly formed in our minds, no spectacle can be more horrible; whether it proceeds from the appearance of total dissolution, or from the reflection, that, death being inevitable, we ourselves shall sooner or later be in the same situation. These impressions have their different modifications and degrees, according to the character and habits of each individual; but the impressions themselves are universal.

sal. There are other impressions which are slower and less general, and which are peculiar to persons of great sensibility; I mean those which are received from the mental sufferings, sorrow and affliction, of our fellow-creatures. There are people who are incapable of being moved, except by cries and tears: the long and silent grief of a heart torn with distress, never drew a sigh from their breasts: they are not affected at the sight of a dejected countenance, pale complexion, and hollow eyes, exhausted of their tears. On such hearts the sufferings of the mind have no effect. They are judges without feeling, from whom we have nothing to expect but inflexible rigour and cruelty. Possibly they may be just; but never humane, generous, and compassionate. They may be just, if it be possible for a man to be just without being merciful.

ROUSSEAU.

THE PECULIAR DESTINATION OF THE SEXES.

WOMAN and man were made for each other; but their mutual dependence is not the same. The men depend on the women only on account of their desires; the women on the men both on account of their desires and their necessities: we could subsist better without them than they without

out us. Their very subsistence and rank in life depend on us; and the estimation in which we hold them, their charms, and their merit. By the law of nature itself, both women and children lie at the mercy of the men: it is not enough they should be really estimable; it is requisite they should be actually esteemed: it is not enough they should be beautiful; it is requisite their charms should please: it is not enough they should be sensible and prudent; it is necessary they should be acknowledged as such: their glory lies not only in their conduct, but in their reputation; and it is impossible for any, who consents to be accounted infamous, to be ever virtuous. A man secure in his own good conduct, depends only on himself, and braves the public opinion: but a woman in behaving well, performs but half her duty; as what is thought of her, is as important to her as what she really is. Opinion is the grave of virtue among the men, but its throne among the women. ROUSSEAU.

SINGULARITY.

THE knowledge of little things supposes, generally, the ignorance of those that are great: every man who lives like the rest of the world, has no ideas but those that are common to all. If they who are so curious in dressing, figuring, and
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speaking in assemblies, are generally incapable of any thing great; it is not only, because by acquiring an infinity of minute talents and accomplishments they lose that time which they might employ in the discovery of interesting ideas; but because the very pursuit of such trivial objects implies a debility and narrowness in their minds. Accordingly great men are seen for the most part utterly negligent of the minute observances necessary to attract respect; they are below their attention. "In that young man," said Sylla speaking of Cæsar, "who walks so unmannerly along the streets, I see several Marius's." Every man absorbed in deep reflection, and employed about great and general ideas, lives in the forgetfulness of those forms, and in the ignorance of those customs, which compose the knowledge of a great part of the world. Every man who is concentrated in the study of great objects, finds himself alone in the midst of the world; he always acts like himself, and scarcely ever like any body else.

HELVETIUS.

THE LABOUR OF SLAVES DEARER TO THEIR MASTERS THAN THAT OF FREE MEN.

THE wear and tear of a slave, it has been said, is at the expence of his master; but that of a free servant is at his own expence. The wear

and tear of the latter, however, is, in reality as much at the expence of his master as that of the former. The wages paid to journeymen, and servants of every kind, must be such as may enable them, one with another, to continue the race of journeymen and servants, according as the increasing, diminishing, or stationary demand of the society may happen to require. But though the wear and tear of a free servant be equally at the expence of his master, it generally costs him much less than that of a slave. The fund destined for replacing or repairing, if I may say so, the wear and tear of the slave, is commonly managed by a negligent master or careless overseer. That destined for performing the same office with regard to the free man, is managed by the free man himself. The disorders which generally prevail in the œconomy of the rich, naturally introduce themselves into the management of the former: The strict frugality and parsimonious attention of the poor, as naturally establish themselves in that of the latter. Under such different management, the same purpose must require very different degrees of expence to execute it. It appears, accordingly, from the experience of all ages and nations, I believe, that the work done by freemen comes cheaper in the end than that performed by slaves. It is found to do so even at Boston, New York,

York, and Philadelphia, where the wages of common labour are so very high. A. SMITH.

CONSIDERATIONS ON SLAVES AND SLAVERY.

IN the ancient state of Europe, the occupiers of land were all tenants at will. They were all, or almost all, slaves; but their slavery was of a milder kind than that known among the ancient Greeks and Romans, or even in our West Indian colonies. They were supposed to belong more directly to the land than to their master. They could, therefore, be sold with it, but not separately. They could marry, provided it was with the consent of their master; and he could not afterwards dissolve the marriage by selling the man and wife to different persons. If he maimed or murdered any of them, he was liable to some penalty, though generally but to a small one. They were not, however, capable of acquiring property. Whatever they acquired was acquired to their master, and he could take it from them at pleasure. Whatever cultivation and improvement could be carried on by means of such slaves, was properly carried on by their master. It was at his expence. The seed, the cattle, and the instruments of husbandry were all his. It was for his benefit. Such slaves could acquire nothing but their

their daily maintenance. It was properly the proprietor himself, therefore, that in this case occupied his own lands, and cultivated them by his own bondmen. This species of slavery still subsists in Russia, Poland, Hungary, and other parts of Germany. It subsisted in Bohemia and Moravia, till lately that it was abolished by the present emperor Joseph II. It is only in the western and south-western provinces of Europe that it has gradually been abolished altogether.

But if great improvements are seldom to be expected from great proprietors, they are least of all to be expected when they employ slaves for their workmen. The experience of all ages and nations, I believe, demonstrates that the work done by slaves, though it appears to cost only their maintenance, is in the end the dearest of any. A person who can acquire no property, can have no other interest but to eat as much, and to labour as little, as possible. Whatever work he does beyond what is sufficient to purchase his own maintenance, can be squeezed out of him by violence only, and not by any interest of his own. In ancient Italy, how much the cultivation of corn degenerated, how unprofitable it became to the master, when it fell under the management of slaves, is remarked by both Pliny and Columella. In the time of Aristotle it had not been much better in ancient Greece. Speaking of the ideal
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republic described in the laws of Plato, to maintain five thousand idle men (the number of warriors supposed necessary for its defence) together with their women and servants, would require, he says, a territory of boundless extent and fertility, like the plains of Babylon.

The pride of man makes him love to domineer; and nothing mortifies him so much as to be obliged to condescend to persuade his inferiors. Wherever the law allows it, and the nature of the work can afford it, therefore, he will generally prefer the service of slaves to that of freemen. The planting of sugar and tobacco can afford the expence of slave-cultivation. The raising of corn, it seems, in the present times, cannot. In the English colonies, of which the principal produce is corn, the far greater part of the work is done by freemen. The late resolution of the Quakers in Pennsylvania to set at liberty all their negro slaves, may satisfy us that their number cannot be very great. Had they made any considerable part of their property, such a resolution could never have been agreed to. In our sugar colonies, on the contrary, the whole work is done by slaves, and in our tobacco colonies a very great part of it. The profits of a sugar-plantation in any of our West Indian colonies are generally much greater than those of any other cultivation that is known either in Europe or America: And the

profits of a tobacco plantation, though inferior to those of sugar, are superior to those of corn, as has already been observed. Both can afford the expence of slave-cultivation, but sugar can afford it still better than tobacco. The number of negroes accordingly is much greater, in proportion to that of whites, in our sugar than in our tobacco colonies.

To the slave cultivators of ancient times, gradually succeeded a species of farmers known at present in France by the name of Metayers. They are called in Latin, *Coloni Partiarum*. They have been so long in disuse in England that at present I know no English name for them. The proprietor furnished them with the seed, cattle, and instruments of husbandry; the whole stock, in short, necessary for cultivating the farm. The produce was divided equally between the proprietor and the farmer, after setting aside what was judged necessary for keeping up the stock, which was restored to the proprietor when the farmer either quitted, or was turned out of the farm.

Land occupied by such tenants is properly cultivated at the expence of the proprietor, as much as that occupied by slaves. There is, however, one very essential difference between them. Such tenants, being freemen, are capable of acquiring property, and having a certain proportion of the produce of the land, they have a plain interest
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that the whole produce should be as great as possible, in order that their own proportion may be so. A slave, on the contrary, who can acquire nothing but his maintenance, consults his own ease by making the land produce as little as possible over and above that maintenance. It is probable that it was partly upon account of this advantage, and partly upon account of the encroachments which the sovereign, always jealous of the great lords, gradually encouraged their villains to make upon their authority, and which seem at last to have been such as rendered this species of servitude altogether inconvenient, that tenure in villenage gradually wore out through the greater part of Europe. The time and manner, however, in which so important a revolution was brought about, is one of the most obscure points in modern history. The church of Rome claims great merit in it; and it is certain that so early as the twelfth century, Alexander III. published a bull for the general emancipation of slaves. It seems, however, to have been rather a pious exhortation, than a law to which exact obedience was required from the faithful. Slavery continued to take place almost universally for several centuries afterwards, till it was gradually abolished by the joint operation of the two interests above mentioned; that of the proprietor on the one hand, and that of the sovereign on the other. A villain enfranchised,

franchised, and at the same time allowed to continue in possession of the land, having no stock of his own, could cultivate it only by means of what the landlord advanced to him, and must therefore have been what the French call a Metayer.

In all European colonies the culture of the sugar-cane is carried on by negro slaves. The constitution of those who have been born in the temperate climate of Europe, could not, it is supposed, support the labour of digging the ground under the burning sun of the West Indies; and the culture of the sugar-cane, as it is managed at present, is all hand labour, though, in the opinion of many, the drill plough might be introduced into it with great advantage. But, as the profit and success of the cultivation which is carried on by means of cattle, depend very much upon the good management of those cattle; so the profit and success of that which is carried on by slaves, must depend equally upon the good management of those slaves; and in the good management of their slaves, the French planters, I think it is generally allowed, are superior to the English. The law, so far as it gives some weak protection to the slave against the violence of his master, is likely to be better executed in a colony where the government is in a great measure arbitrary, than in one where it is altogether free. In every country where the unfortunate law of slavery is established,
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the magistrate, when he protects the slave, intermeddles in some measure in the management of the private property of the master; and, in a free country, where the master is perhaps either a member of the colony assembly, or an elector of such a member, he dares not do this but with the greatest caution and circumspection. The respect which he is obliged to pay to the master, renders it more difficult for him to protect the slave. But in a country where the government is in a great measure arbitrary, where it is usual for the magistrate to intermeddle even in the management of the private property of individuals, and to send them, perhaps, a *lettre de cachet* if they do not manage it according to his liking, it is much easier for him to give some protection to the slave; and common humanity naturally disposes him to do so. The protection of the magistrate renders the slave less contemptible in the eyes of his master, who is thereby induced to consider him with more regard, and to treat him with more gentleness. Gentle usage renders the slave not only more faithful, but more intelligent, and therefore, upon a double account, more useful. He approaches more to the condition of a free servant, and may possess some degree of integrity and attachment to his master's interest; virtues which frequently belong to free servants, but which never can belong to a slave, who is treated as slaves commonly are

are in countries where the master is perfectly free and secure.

That the condition of a slave is better under an arbitrary than under a free government, is, I believe, supported by the history of all ages and nations. In the Roman history, the first time we read of the magistrate interposing to protect the slave from the violence of his master, is under the emperors. When Veditius Pollio, in the presence of Augustus, ordered one of his slaves, who had committed a slight fault, to be cut into pieces and thrown into his fish-pond in order to feed his fishes, the emperor commanded him, with indignation, to emancipate immediately, not only that slave, but all the others that belonged to him. Under the republic no magistrate could have had authority enough to protect the slave, much less to punish the master.

A. SMITH.

S L E E P.

EVERY thing relating to sleep is a very puzzling phenomenon, on the supposition of the distinction between the soul and the body; especially on the little evidence that can be pretended of the soul being employed at all in a state of really sound sleep, exclusive of dreaming. And surely, if there be a soul distinct from the body, and it be sensible

fible of all the changes that take place in the corporeal system to which it is attached, why does it not perceive that state of the body which is termed Sleep; and why does it not contemplate the state of the body and brain during sleep, which might afford matter enough for reasoning and reflection? If no new ideas could be transmitted to it at that time, it might employ itself upon the stock which it had acquired before, if they had really adhered in it and belonged to it. All this we should naturally expect if the soul was a substance really distinct from the body, and if the ideas properly belonged to this substance, so that it was capable of carrying them all away with it, when the body was reduced to dust. The soul, during the sleep of the body, might be expected to approach to the state in which it would be when the body was dead, death being often compared to a more sound sleep. For if it be capable of thinking and feeling when the powers of the body shall entirely cease, it might be capable of the same kind of sensation and action when those powers are only suspended.

PRIESTLEY.

THE FIRST PRINCIPLE OF HUMAN SOCIETY.

WHETHER the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another, be one of those
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original principles in human nature, of which no further account can be given; or whether, as seems more probable, it be the necessary consequence of the faculties of reason and speech, it belongs not to our present subject to inquire. It is common to all men, and to be found in no other race of animals, which seem to know neither this nor any other species of contracts. Two greyhounds, in running down the same hare, have sometimes the appearance of acting in some sort of concert. Each turns her towards his companion, or endeavours to intercept her when his companion turns her towards himself. This, however, is not the effect of any contract, but of the accidental concurrence of their passions in the same object at that particular time. Nobody ever saw a dog make a fair and deliberate exchange of one bone for another with another dog. Nobody ever saw one animal by its gestures and natural cries signify to another, this is mine, that yours; I am willing to give this for that. When an animal wants to obtain something either of a man or of another animal, it has no other means of persuasion but to gain the favour of those whose service it requires. A puppy fawns upon its dam; and a spaniel endeavours, by a thousand attractions, to engage the attention of its master who is at dinner, when it wants to be fed by him. Man sometimes uses the same arts with his brethren;

and when he has no other means of engaging them to act according to his inclinations, endeavours, by every fervile and fawning attention, to obtain their good will. He has not time, however, to do this upon every occasion. In civilized society he stands at all times in need of the co-operation and assistance of great multitudes, while his whole life is scarce sufficient to gain the friendship of a few persons. In almost every other race of animals, each individual, when it is grown up to maturity, is entirely independent, and in its natural state has occasion for the assistance of no other living creature. But man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren; and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only. He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in their favour, and show them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them. Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind proposes to do this. Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want, is the meaning of every such offer; and it is in this manner that we obtain from one another the far greater part of those good offices which we stand in need of. It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves not to their

humanity, but to their self-love; and never talk to them of our own necessities, but of their advantages. Nobody but a beggar chooses to depend chiefly upon the benevolence of his fellow-citizens. Even a beggar does not depend upon it entirely. The charity of well-disposed people, indeed, supplies him with the whole fund of his subsistence: but though this principle ultimately provides him with all the necessaries of life which he has occasion for, it neither does nor can provide him with them as he has occasion for them. The greater part of his occasional wants are supplied in the same manner as those of other people, by treaty, by barter, and by purchase. With the money which one man gives him he purchases food; the old cloaths which another bestows upon him he exchanges for other old cloaths which suit him better, or for lodging, or for food, or for money, with which he can buy either food, cloaths, or lodging, as he has occasion.

As it is by treaty, by barter, and by purchase, that we obtain from one another the greater part of those mutual good offices which we stand in need of, so it is this same trucking disposition which originally gives occasion to the division of labour. In a tribe of hunters or shepherds, a particular person makes bows and arrows, for example, with more readiness and dexterity than any other. He frequently exchanges them for
cattle

cattle or for venison with his companions; and he finds at last that he can in this manner get more cattle and venison than if he himself went to the field to catch them. From a regard to his own interest, therefore, the making of bows and arrows grows to be his chief business, and he becomes a sort of armourer. Another excels in making the frames and covers of their little huts or moveable houses. He is accustomed to be of use in this way to his neighbours; who reward him in the same manner with cattle and with venison, till at last he finds it his interest to dedicate himself entirely to this employment, and to become a sort of house-carpenter. In the same manner a third becomes a smith or a brazier, a fourth a tanner or dresser of hides or skins, the principal part of the cloathing of savages. And thus the certainty of being able to exchange all that surplus part of the produce of his own labour which is over and above his own consumption, for such parts of the produce of other mens labour as he may have occasion for, encourages every man to apply himself to a particular occupation, and to cultivate and bring to perfection whatever talent or genius he may possess for that particular species of business.

The difference of natural talents in different men, is in reality much less than we are aware of; and the very different genius which appears

to distinguish men of different professions when grown up to maturity, is not upon many occasions so much the cause as the effect of the division of labour. The difference between the most dissimilar characters, between a philosopher and a common street-porter, for example, seems to arise not so much from nature, as from habit, custom, and education. When they came into the world, and for the first six or eight years of their existence, they were very much alike; and neither their parents nor play-fellows could perceive any remarkable difference. About that age, or soon after, they come to be employed in very different occupations. The difference of talents comes then to be taken notice of; and widens by degrees, till at last the vanity of the philosopher is willing to acknowledge scarce any resemblance. But without the disposition to truck, barter, and exchange, every man must have procured to himself every necessary and conveniency of life which he wanted. All must have had the same duties to perform, and the same work to do; and there could have been no such difference of employment as could alone give occasion to any great difference of talents.

As it is this disposition which forms that difference of talents so remarkable among men of different professions, so it is this same disposition which renders that difference useful. Many tribes
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of animals acknowledged to be all of the same species, derive from nature a much more remarkable distinction of genius than what, antecedent to custom and education, appears to take place among men. By nature a philosopher is not in genius and disposition half so different from a street-porter as a mastiff is from a greyhound, or a greyhound from a spaniel, or this last from a shepherd's dog. Those different tribes of animals, however, though all of the same species, are of scarce any use to one another. The strength of the mastiff is not in the least supported either by the swiftness of the greyhound, or by the sagacity of the spaniel, or by the docility of the shepherd's dog. The effects of those different geniuses and talents, for want of the power or disposition to barter and exchange, cannot be brought into a common stock, and do not in the least contribute to the better accommodation and conveniency of the species. Each animal is still obliged to support and defend itself separately and independently, and derives no sort of advantage from that variety of talents with which nature has distinguished its fellows. Among men, on the contrary, the most dissimilar geniuses are of use to one another: the different produces of their respective talents, by the general disposition to truck, barter, and exchange, being brought, as it were, into a common stock, where every man may purchase whatever

part of the produce of other mens talents he has occasion for. A. SMITH.

THE ORIGIN OF SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT.

MAN, thrown as it were by chance upon this globe; furrounded by all the evils of nature; obliged continually to defend and protect his life against the storms and tempests of the air, against the inundations of water, against the fire of volcanos, against the intemperature of frigid and torrid zones, against the sterility of the earth which refuses him aliment, or its baneful fecundity which makes poisons spring up beneath his feet: in short, against the claws and teeth of savage beasts, who dispute with him his habitation and his prey; and, attacking his person, resolved to render themselves rulers of this globe, of which he thinks himself to be the master: Man, in this state, alone and abandoned to himself, could do nothing for his preservation. It was necessary therefore that he should unite himself and associate with his like, in order to bring together their strength and intelligence in common stock. It is by this union that he has triumphed over so many evils, that he has fashioned this globe to his use, restrained the rivers, subjugated the seas, insured his subsistence, conquered a part of

of the animals, in obliging them to serve him; and driven others, far from his empire, to the depths of deserts or of woods, where their number diminishes from age to age. What a man alone would not have been able to effect, men have executed in concert, and all together they preserve their work. Such is the origin, such the advantage, and the end of all society.—Government owes its birth to the necessity of preventing and repressing the injuries which the associated individuals had to fear from one another. It is the sentinel who watches in order that the common labours be not disturbed.—Thus society originates in the wants of men; government in their vices. Society tends always to good, government ought always to tend to the repressing of evil. Society is the first, it is in its origin independent and free; government was instituted for it, and is but its instrument. It is for one to command, it is for the other to obey. Society created the public power; government, which has received it from society, ought to consecrate it entirely to its use. In short, society is essentially good; government, as is well known, may be, and is but too often, evil. It has been said, that we were all born equal; that is not so: that we had all the same rights; that is unintelligible nonsense. What are rights where there is an inequality of talents or of strength, and no security nor sanction? It has

has been said, that nature offered to us all the same dwelling and the same resources; that is not so: that we were all endued with the same means of defence; that is not so: nor can it be true, in any sense, that we all enjoy the same qualities of mind and body. There is amongst men an original inequality which nothing can remedy. It must last for ever; and all that can be obtained by the best legislation, is, not to destroy it, but to prevent the abuse of it. But in making distinctions between her children like a stepmother, in creating some children strong and others weak, has not Nature herself formed the germ or principle of tyranny? I do not think it can be denied; especially if we look back to a time anterior to all legislation; a time in which man will be seen as passionate and as void of reason as a brute.

What then have founders of nations, what have legislatures proposed to themselves, to obviate all the disasters arising from this germ, when it is expanded by a sort of artificial equality, which might reduce all the members of a society, without exception, under an impartial, sole authority? It is a sword which moves gently, equably, and indifferently over every head: but this sword was ideal; it was necessary that there should be a hand, a corporeal being, who should hold it.—What has resulted thence? Why, that the history of civilized man is but the history of his misery. All the pages of it are stained with blood;

blood; some with the blood of the oppressors, others with the blood of the oppressed.—In this point of view, man appears more wicked and more miserable than a beast. Different species of beasts subsist on different species; but societies of men have never ceased to attack each other. Even in the same society, there is no condition but devours and is devoured, whatever may have been or are the forms of the government or artificial equality which have been opposed to the primitive and natural inequality.—But are these forms of government, supposing them made by the choice, and the free choice, of the first settlers in a country, and whatever sanction they may have received, whether that of oaths, or of unanimous accord, or of their duration; are they obligatory upon their descendants? There is no such thing: if the people are happy under their form of government, they will keep it; if they are unhappy, the impossibility of suffering more and longer will determine them to change it: that is the just exercise of a natural and unalienable right of the man who is oppressed, and even of the man who is not oppressed.—A man wills and chooses for himself; he cannot will nor choose for another; and it would be a madness to will and to choose for him who is yet unborn, for him who will not exist for ages. There is no individual but who, discontented with the form of the government of his country,

country, may go elsewhere to seek a better. There is no society but which has the same right to change as their ancestors had to adopt their form of government. Upon this point it is with societies as if they were at the first moment of their civilization. Without which there would be a great evil; nay, the greatest of evils would be without a remedy. Millions of men would be condemned to misery without end.

The conclusions naturally following from these principles are, That there is no form of government which has the prerogative to be immutable:—No political authority, which, created yesterday or a thousand years ago, may not be abrogated in ten years time or to morrow:—No power, however respectable, however sacred, that is authorized to regard the state as its property.—All authority in this world has begun either by the consent of the subjects or by the power of the master. In both one and the other case it may justly end. There is no prescription in favour of tyranny against liberty.

The truth of these principles is so much the more essential, because all power by its very nature tends to despotism.—The public happiness is the first law of nations as the first duty. The first obligation of these great bodies is with themselves; they owe, before all other things, liberty and justice to the members which compose them.

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Every child which is born to the state, every new citizen who comes to breathe the air of the country he has chosen or nature given him, is intitled to the greatest happiness he can enjoy. Every obligation which cannot be reconciled with that is broken; every contrary claim is a wicked attempt upon his rights: Such a claim is opposite to all the ideas of policy and order, and violates every principle of morality. RAYNAL.

THE DUTIES OF A SOVEREIGN.

THE sovereign is completely discharged from a duty, in the attempting to perform which he must always be exposed to innumerable delusions, and for the proper performance of which no human wisdom or knowledge could ever be sufficient; the duty of superintending the industry of private people, and of directing it towards the employments most suitable to the interest of the society. According to the system of natural liberty, the sovereign has only three duties to attend to; three duties of great importance, indeed, but plain and intelligible to common understandings: first, the duty of protecting the society from the violence and invasion of other independent societies; secondly, the duty of protecting, as far as possible, every member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other member

member of it, or the duty of establishing an exact administration of justice; and, thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining certain public works and certain public institutions, which it can never be for the interest of any individual, or small number of individuals, to erect and maintain; because the profit could never repay the expence to any individual or small number of individuals, though it may frequently do much more than repay it to a great society.

A. SMITH.

THE ORIGIN OF THE POPULAR OPINIONS CONCERNING THE SOUL.

THE notion of the soul of man being a substance distinct from the body hath not been known to the writers of the Scriptures, and especially those of the Old Testament. According to the uniform system of revelation, all our hopes of a future life are built upon another, and a seeming opposite foundation, viz. that of the resurrection of something belonging to us that dies and is buried; that is, the body, which is always considered as the man. This doctrine is manifestly superfluous, on the idea of the soul being a substance so distinct from the body as to be unaffected by its death, and able to subsist, and even to be more free and happy, without the body. This opinion,

therefore,

therefore, not having been known to the Jews, and being repugnant to the scheme of revelation, must have had its source in heathenism; but with respect to the date of its appearance, and the manner of its introduction, there is room for conjecture and speculation.—This opinion is evidently not the growth of Greece and Rome; but was received by the philosophers of those countries either from Egypt, or the countries more to the East. The Greeks in general refer it to the Egyptians, but Pausanias gives it to the Chaldeans or the Indians. Though every thing relating to so very obscure a subject, must be in a great measure conjectural; yet it seems reasonable to think with Mr Toland, that this doctrine was derived from the Egyptians, and that it might possibly have been suggested to them by some of their known customs respecting the dead, whom they preserved with great care, and disposed of with a solemnity unknown to other nations; though it might have arisen among them from other causes, without the help of those peculiar customs.—The authority of Herodotus, the old Greek historian, who had himself travelled in Egypt, is very express to this purpose. He says, that “the Egyptians were the first who maintained that the soul of man is immortal; that when the body dies, it enters into that of some other animal; and when it has transmigrated

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“ through all terrestrial, marine, and flying animals, it returns to the body of a man again. “ This revolution is completed in three thousand “ years.” He adds, that “ several Greeks, whose “ names he could not mention, had published “ that doctrine as their own.”

It is, however, probable, that the notion of there being something in man distinct from his body, and the cause of his feeling, thinking, and willing, and his other mental operations and affections, might very well occur in these rude ages without such a step as this; though, no doubt, the custom abovementioned would much contribute to it. Nothing is more common than to observe how very ready all illiterate persons are to ascribe the cause of any difficult appearance to an invisible agent, distinct from the subject on which the operation is exerted: But the notion of a proper immaterial being, without all extension or relation to place, did not appear till of late years in comparison; what the ancients meant by an immaterial substance being nothing more than an attenuated matter, like air, ether, fire, or light, considered as fluids, beyond which their idea of incorporeity did not go. Pfellus says, that the ancient Heathens, both Greeks and others, called only the grosser bodies *τα παχύτερα των σωμάτων* corporeal.——Indeed the vulgar notion of a soul or spirit, wherever it has been found to exist, has been

been the same in all ages ; and in this respect even the learned of ancient times are only to be considered as the vulgar. We gather from Homer, that the belief of his time was, that the ghost bore the shape of, and exactly resembled, the deceased person to whom it belonged ; that it wandered upon the earth, near the place where the body lay, till it was buried ; at which time it was admitted to the shades below. In both these states it was possessed of the entire consciousness, and retained the friendships and enmities of the man. — We learn from Ossian, that it was the opinion of the times in which he lived, that the souls of heroes went immediately after death to the hills of their country, and the scenes which they had frequented in the most happy times of their lives. It was thought, too, that dogs and horses saw the ghosts of the deceased. They also imagined, that the ghosts shrieked near the place where a death was to happen soon after : from which circumstances, as well as several others, it is evident, that, in their idea, the soul was material, something like the *εἰδωλον* of the Greeks. All the Pagans of the East, says Loubiere, do truly believe that “ there
 “ remains something of a man after his death,
 “ which subsists independently and separately
 “ from his body. But they give extension and
 “ figure to that which remains ; and attribute to
 “ it all the same members, all the same substan-

“ces, both solid and liquid, which your bodies
 “are composed of. They only suppose, that souls
 “are of a matter subtle enough to escape being
 “seen or handled.”—We find it also to be one of
 the oldest opinions in Heathen antiquity, that the
 heavenly bodies were animated as well as men.
 This opinion was held by Origen and other philo-
 sophising Christians.

Upon the whole, we may conjecture with some
 probability, that this doctrine was derived from
 the Egyptians; but how far the Egyptians really
 carried their notions concerning the state of hu-
 man souls before or after death, doth not distinctly
 appear, because we have no Egyptian writings.
 But it is probable, that their ideas never ripened
 into such a system as was afterwards found in the
 East, on account of their empire and civil polity
 having been so soon overturned, and the country
 having undergone such a number of revolutions.
 Accordingly we find, that those who introduced
 as much of this system as was received in Greece,
 did in general travel into the East for it.

PRIESTLEY.

THE SOUL.

THE powers of sensation or perception and
 thought, as belonging to man, have never been
 found but in conjunction with a certain organi-
 zed

zed system of matter. Had we formed a judgement, therefore, concerning the necessary seat of thought, by the circumstances that universally accompany it, which is our rule in all other cases, we could not but have concluded, that in man it is a property of the nervous system, or rather of the brain; because, as far as we can judge, the faculty of thinking, and a certain state of the brain, always accompany and correspond to one another; which is the very reason why we believe that any property is inherent in any substance whatever. There is no instance of any man retaining the faculty of thinking when his brain was destroyed; and whenever that faculty is impeded or injured, there is sufficient reason to believe that the brain is disordered in proportion; and therefore we are necessarily led to consider the latter as the seat of the former.

Moreover, as the faculty of thinking in general ripens and comes to maturity with the body, it is also observed to decay with it; and if, in some cases, the mental faculties continue vigorous when the body in general is enfeebled, it is evidently because in those particular cases the brain is not much affected by the general cause of weakness: but, on the other hand, if the brain alone be affected, as by a blow on the head, by actual pressure within the skull, by sleep, or by inflammation, the mental faculties are universally affected

in proportion.—Likewise, as the mind is affected in consequence of the affections of the body and brain, so the body is liable to be reciprocally affected by the affections of the mind, as is evident in the visible effects of all strong passions; hope or fear, love or anger, joy or sorrow, exultation or despair. These are certainly irrefragable arguments, that it is properly no other than one and the same thing that is subject to these affections, and that they are necessarily dependent upon one another. In fact, there is just the same reason to conclude, that the powers of sensation and thought are the necessary result of a particular organization, as that sound is the necessary result of a particular concussion of the air; for in both cases equally the one constantly accompanies the other, and there is not in nature a stronger argument for a necessary connection of any cause and any effect. —Dr Haller has observed, in his discourses, “That the powers of thought, speech, and motion, “appear equally to depend upon the body, and “run the same fate in case of mens declining in “old age. When a man dies through old age, I “perceive his powers of speech, motion, and “thought, decay and die together, and by the “same degrees. The moment he ceases to move “and breathe, he appears to cease to think too.— “When I am left to mere reason, it seems to me “that my power of thought as much depends “upon

“ upon my body as my power of sight or hear-
 “ ing. I could not think in infancy. My
 “ powers of thought, of sight, and of feeling, are
 “ equally liable to be obstructed by the body. A
 “ blow on the head has deprived a man of thought,
 “ who could yet see, and feel, and move: So that
 “ naturally the power of thinking seems as much
 “ to belong to the body as any power of man
 “ whatsoever. Naturally there appears no more
 “ reason to suppose that a man can think out of
 “ the body than he can hear sounds or feel cold
 “ out of the body.”

It is true, that we have a very imperfect idea
 of what the *power of perception* is; and it may be
 as naturally impossible that we should have a clear
 idea of it as that the eye should see itself: but
 this very ignorance ought to make us cautious in
 asserting with what other properties it may or
 may not exist. Nothing but a precise and definite
 knowledge of the nature of perception and thought
 can authorise any person to affirm, whether they
 may not belong to an extended substance, which
 has also the properties of attraction and repulsion.
 —It is very unaccountable in Mr Locke to sup-
 pose as he did, and as he largely contends, that,
 for any thing that we know to the contrary, the
 faculty of thinking may be a property of the body,
 and yet to think it more probable that this faculty
 inhered in an immaterial soul. A philosopher
 ought

ought to have been apprised, that we are to suppose no more *causes* than are necessary to produce the *effects*; and therefore that we ought to conclude that the whole man is material, unless it should appear that he has some powers or properties absolutely incompatible with matter.—
That the faculty of thinking necessarily depends, for its exercise, at least, upon a stock of ideas, about which it is always conversant, will hardly be questioned by any person; but there is not a single idea of which the mind is possessed but what may be proved to have come to it from the bodily senses, or to have been consequent upon the perceptions of sense. Could we, for instance, have any idea of colour, as red, blue, &c. without the eyes and optic nerves; of sound, without the ears; of smell, without the nostrils, &c. &c. It is even impossible to conceive how the mind could have become possessed of any of its present ideas without just such a body as we have; and consequently, judging from present appearances (and we have no other means of forming any judgment at all), without a body of some kind or other, we could have had no ideas at all, any more than a man without eyes could have any particular ideas belonging to colours. The notion, therefore, of the *possibility* of thinking in man without an organized body, is not only destitute of all evidence from actual appearances, but is directly contrary to
to

to them; and yet these appearances ought alone to guide the judgment of philosophers.—It is a great advantage to the system of materialism, that we thereby get rid of a great number of *difficulties*; such, for instance, as these: *What becomes of the soul during sleep*; in a *swoon*; when the body is *seemingly dead* (as by drowning or other accidents), and especially *after death*?—also, *What was the condition of it before it became united to the body*; and at what time did that union take place? &c. &c. &c.

If the soul be immaterial and the body material, neither the generation nor the destruction of the body can have any effect with respect to it. This foreign principle must have been united to it either at the time of conception or at birth; and must either have been created at the time of such union, or have existed in a separate state prior to that union. Must the divine power be necessarily employed to produce a soul whenever the human species copulate? Or must some of the pre-existent spirits be obliged, immediately upon that event, to descend from the superior regions to inhabit the new-formed embryo? These are suppositions hardly to be considered at all, without being immediately rejected as extremely improbable if not absurd.

If a *man* be actuated by a principle distinct from his body, every brute animal must have an immaterial

material soul also; for they differ from us in *degree* only, and not at all in *kind*; having all the same mental as well as corporeal powers and faculties that we have, though not in the same extent; and they are possessed of them in a greater degree than those of our race that are idiots or that die infants. Are these souls of brutes originally and naturally the same beings with the souls of men? Have they pre-existed, and are they to continue for ever? If so, *how* and *where* are they to be disposed of after death? and are they also to be re-united to their present bodies as well as the souls of men? These are only a few of the difficulties which must occur to any person who adopts the opinion of the immateriality of the soul.

It is contended, that spirit and body can have no common properties; and when it is asked, How then can they act upon one another; and how can they be so intimately connected as to be continually and necessarily subject to each other's influence? it is acknowledged to be a difficulty and a mystery that we cannot comprehend. But had this question been considered with due attention, what has been called a difficulty would have been deemed an impossibility. It is impossible to conceive even the possibility of mutual action without some common property, by means of which the things that act and react upon each other

other may have some connection. A substance that is hard may act upon, and be acted upon, by another hard substance, or even one that is soft; but it is certainly impossible that it should affect, or be affected by a substance that can make *no resistance at all*.——But admitting, that substances which have no common property can nevertheless affect and be affected by each other, to be no more than a difficulty, it is, however, a difficulty of such magnitude, as far to exceed that of conceiving that the principle of sensation may possibly consist with matter; and therefore, if of two difficulties it be most philosophical to take the least, we must of course abandon the hypothesis of two *heterogeneous* and incompatible principles in man, which is clogged with the greater difficulty of conception, and admit that of the *uniformity of his nature*, which is only attended with a less difficulty.

If the operations ascribed to mind may result from the powers of matter, why should we suppose a being which is useless, and which solves no difficulty? It is easy to see, that the properties of matter do not exclude those of intelligence; but it cannot be imagined how a being, which has no property besides intelligence, can make use of matter. In reality, how can this substance, which bears no relation to matter, be sensible of it, or perceive it? In order to see things, it is necessary

cessary that they make an impression upon us, that there be some relation between us and them; but what can be this relation? It is affirmed, that we have as clear an idea of spirit as we have of matter, each being equally the unknown support of known properties; matter of extension and solidity, and spirit of sensation and thought. But still since the substance is confessedly *unkown* to us, it must also be *unknown* to us what properties it is capable of supporting; and therefore, unless there be a real inconsistency in the properties themselves, those which have hitherto been ascribed to both substances may belong to either of them. For this reason Mr Locke, who maintains the immateriality of the soul, and yet maintains that, for any thing we know to the contrary, matter may have the property of thought added to it, ought to have concluded that this is really the case; since, according to the rules of philosophising, we ought not to multiply causes without necessity. PRIESTLEY.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

IT is maintained in the schools, That *as* thought *does not belong to extension and matter*, it is evident that the soul is spiritual. What in fact is the meaning of the word thought? Either it is void of meaning, or, like the word *motion*, it merely

ly expresses a mode of a man's existence. Now to say that a mode or manner of being is not a body, or has no extension, nothing can be more clear: but to make of this mode a being, and even a spiritual being, nothing is more absurd.

HELVETIUS.

THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

THE horror mankind have for death and annihilation, would have been sufficient, without the aid of revelation, to have made them invent the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. Man would be immortal in his present state; and would believe himself so, if all the bodies that surround him did not every instant prove the contrary. Forced to yield to this truth, he has still the same desire of immortality. Esau's cauldron of rejuvenescence proves the antiquity of this desire. To make it perpetual, it was necessary to found it on some probability at least: to effect this, they made the soul of a matter extremely subtle; they supposed it an indestructible atom that survived the dissolution of all the other parts; in a word, a principle of life.—The being, under the name of soul, was to preserve after death all the affections of which it was susceptible during its union with the body. This system supposed, men doubted the less of the immortality of the soul, as neither

experience nor observation could contradict such belief; for neither of them can form any judgement of an imperceptible atom. Its existence, indeed, was not demonstrated; but what proof do we want of what we wish to believe, and what demonstration is strong enough to prove the falsity of a favourite opinion? It is true we never meet with any souls in our walks; and it is to show the reason of this, that men, after having created souls, thought themselves obliged to create a country for their habitation. Each nation, and even each individual, according to his inclinations and the particular nature of his wants, has formed a particular plan. Sometimes the savage nations placed this habitation in a vast forest, full of wild-fowl, and watered with rivers stocked with fish: Sometimes they placed it in an open level country, abounding in pasture, in the middle of which rose a bed of strawberries as large as a mountain; different parts of which they portioned off for the nourishment of themselves and families.—People less exposed to hunger, and, besides, more numerous and better instructed, placed on this spot all that is delightful in nature, and gave it the name of Elysium. Covetous mortals formed it after the plan of the garden of Hesperides; and stocked it with trees, whose golden branches were loaded with fruits of diamonds. The more voluptuous nations placed in it trees of sugar and rivers of milk,

milk, and furnished it with delicious animals, Imagination, directed by different wants and inclinations, operated every where in the same manner. Each people furnished the country of souls with what was on earth the object of their desires.

HELVETIUS.

THE IMMATERIALITY OF THE SOUL.

IF it be asked, Whether the soul be a spiritual or a material substance? it must be granted, that neither opinion is capable of demonstration; and consequently, that, by weighing the reasons on both sides, balancing the difficulties, and determining in favour of the greater number of probabilities, we should form only conditional judgments. It is the fate of this problem, as it hath been of many others, to be resolvable only by the assistance of the calculation of probabilities.—Whatever may have been affirmed by the Stoics, Seneca was not fully convinced of the spirituality of the soul: “Your letter (says he to one of his
“ friends) came at an improper time, being delivered to me when I was taking a walk in the
“ temple of Hope. There I freed myself from all
“ doubts with regard to my soul’s immortality.
“ My imagination, gently warmed by the reasoning of some great men, firmly believed in that

“immortality which they promise more than they
 “prove. I began to be displeased with my exist-
 “ence, and to despise the remains of an unhappy
 “life, when I had opened to myself with delight
 “the gates of eternity; but your letter awakened
 “me, and of so pleasing a dream left me only the
 “regret of knowing it was a dream!”—A proof,
 says Mr Deslandes in his Critical History of Philo-
 sophy, that formerly neither the immortality nor
 immateriality of the soul were believed, is, that in
 the time of Nero, the people of Rome complained
 that the introduction of the new-fangled doctrine
 of the other world enervated the courage of the
 soldiers, and rendered them timorous; that it de-
 prived the unhappy of their principal consolation,
 and added double terror to death, by threatening
 them with new sufferings after this life. Without
 examining if it be the interest of the public to ad-
 mit the doctrine of the immortality of the soul,
 it may be observed, that at least this dogma has
 not always been regarded as politically useful. It
 took its rise in the schools of Plato: but Ptolemy
 Philadelphus king of Egypt thought it so danger-
 ous, that he forbid it to be preached in his domi-
 nions on pain of death.

HELVETIUS.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

NEWTON, like almost all true philosophers,
 was.

was persuaded that the soul is an incomprehensible substance; that we have not a sufficient knowledge of nature for us to dare to affirm, that it is impossible for God to add the gift of thought to any extended substance whatsoever. But the great difficulty is rather to know how matter can become cogitative. Thought, indeed, seems to have nothing in common with the known attributes in that extended being which we call body. But are we acquainted with all the properties of bodies? Does it not seem very bold to say to God, You have been able to give a being motion, gravitation, vegetation, and life, but cannot give it thought?

They who say, that if matter could receive the gift of cogitation, the soul would not be immortal, seem to have drawn an unfair consequence. Is it more difficult to preserve than to make? Besides, if an undivisible atom be eternal, why shall not the faculty of cogitation it enjoys last as long? If I am not mistaken, they who deny God to have the power of annexing ideas to matter, are forced to say, that what we call spirit is a being whose essence is to think exclusive of any extended being whatsoever. Now, if it be the nature of spirit to think essentially, then it thinks necessarily and thinks incessantly, as every triangle has necessarily and always three angles, independently of God. How! on God's creating something which is not matter, must that something absolutely think? Weak and

bold as we are, do we know whether God has not formed millions of beings, with neither the properties of spirits nor matter as known to us? We are like a herdsman, who, having seen no other beasts than oxen, should say, *If God pleases to make any other*, they must have horns *and chew the cud*. Which will be thought more reverential to the Deity, to affirm that there are beings without the divine attribute of cogitation abstractedly from him, or to apprehend that God can grant that attribute to any being he shall please to choose?— It must be observed, that Newton was very far from venturing to define the soul, as so many others have presumed to do; he thought it was possible there might be millions of other thinking beings, whose nature might be entirely different from that of our soul; so that the division of all nature into matter and spirits seems the definition of a deaf and blind man defining the senses, without any idea or conception of sight and hearing. How indeed can any one say, that God has not filled the immense space with an infinity of substances, having nothing in common with mankind?

Most ancient nations conceived nothing beyond matter, and looked on ideas in our understanding as the impression of the seal on wax. This perplexed opinion was rather a rude instinct than ratiocination. Succeeding philosophers, who were
for

for proving that matter thinks of itself, have erred still more. The vulgar were mistaken without any previous reasoning: these erred from principles; not one of them being ever able to discover any thing in matter that tended to prove it was intelligent. Locke alone appears to have removed the contradiction between matter and thought; recurring at once to the Creator of all thought and of all matter, and modestly saying, "Cannot he
" who can do every thing, give cogitation to a
" material being, to an atom, to an element of
" matter?" He stopped at this possibility, as became a man of his wisdom. To affirm that matter does actually think because God can impart such a faculty to it, would be the highest presumption; but is it less to assert the contrary?

The most generally received opinion, is that which considers the soul and body as two distinct and quite different substances, created by God to act on each other. The only proof of this reciprocal action is the experience which every one believes to have of it. We feel our bodies sometimes obeying our will, and sometimes tyrannizing over it: we conceive that they in reality act on each other because we feel it, and we cannot carry our investigations further. An objection, however, lies to this system not easily removed. An external object, for instance, communicates a vibration to the nerves; which motion either ex-
tends

tends to the soul or not: if it reaches the soul, it imparts motion to it, which would suppose the soul corporeal; if it does not, there is no longer any action. All the answer that can be given is, this action is one of those things the mechanism of which will for ever remain unknown: a sad conclusion, but almost the only one becoming man in more than one point of metaphysics.

VOLTAIRE.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

Know Thyself, is an excellent precept, which God alone can practise. Who but he can know his essence?

We call soul that which animates; and so contracted is our understanding, that we know little more of it. Three-fourths of our species do not go that length, and little concern themselves about the thinking being; the other fourth is seeking, what nobody has found or ever will find.

Thou, poor pedant, seest a vegetating plant; and thou sayest vegetation, or even vegetative soul. Thou observest bodies have and give motion, and this with thee is strength. Thy hound's aptness in learning to hunt under thy instruction thou callest instinct, sensitive soul; and thou hast combined ideas, that thou termest spirit.

What is to be understood by these words, This
flower

flower vegetates? Is there a real being named vegetation? One body impels another; but is there in it a distinct being called strength? This hound brings thee a partridge; but is there a being called instinct? Should we not laugh at a philosopher who should tell us all animals live; therefore there is in them a being, a substantial form, which is life.

The first philosophers, both Chaldeans and Egyptians, said, there must be something in us that produces our thoughts. This something must be very subtle; it is a breath, it is a fire, it is æther, it is a light, it is an entelechia, it is a number, it is harmony. According to the divine Plato, it is a compound of the same and of the other; and Epicurus, from Democritus, has said, that it is thinking atoms in us. But how does an atom think? It is said, that the soul is an immaterial being; and that its nature is to think, because it does think. But on this subject we seem to be as ignorant as Epicurus. The nature of a stone is to fall, because it falls; but what makes it fall still remains a question.

We know a stone has no soul; we know that a negative and affirmative are not divisible,—are not parts of matter: but matter, otherwise unknown to us, has qualities that are not divisible, as gravitation towards a centre, given it by God. This gravitation has no parts,—is not divisible.

The

The motory force of bodies is not a being composed of parts; neither can it be said, that the vegetation of all organized bodies, their life, their instinct, are distinct or divisible beings. You can no more cut in two the vegetation of a rose, the life of a horse, the instinct of a dog, than you can cut in two a sensation, a negation, or an affirmation. Thus the argument taken from the indivisibility of thought proves nothing. Our idea of the soul is no other than of a power unknown to us of feeling and thinking.

But is this power of feeling and thinking the same as that by which we digest and walk? It certainly is not. The Greeks were well aware that thought often had no concern with the play of our organs. Instead of those organs they substituted a sensitive soul; and for the thoughts a more fine and more subtile soul. But it is certain this sensitive soul has no existence; it is nothing but the motion of our organs; nor does our reason afford us any more proof of the existence of the other soul.

Let us take a view of the fine systems which philosophy has struck out concerning souls. One says, that the soul of a man is part of the substance of God himself; another, that it is part of the great All; a third, that it has been created from all eternity; a fourth, that it is made, and not created. Others affirm, that God makes them

them as they are wanted; and that they come at the instant of copulation. One cries, They are lodged in the feminal animalcules: Not at all, says another; they take up their residence in the Fallopian tubes. Some affirm, that the soul stays six weeks till the foetus be formed, and then possesses itself of the pineal gland; but if the germ prove addle, it goes away to whence it came till a better opportunity. The last opinion makes its abode to be in the callous body of the brain.— If any man has discovered a ray of light in this region of darkness, perhaps it is Mallebranche, notwithstanding the general prejudices against his system. It does not differ greatly from that of the Stoics; and who knows but these two opinions, properly rectified, come nearest the truth? There is something very sublime in that ancient notion: *We exist in God; our thoughts, our sentiments, are derived from the Supreme Being.*

It must, however, be confessed, that we know little concerning the soul but only by faith. We live upon this earth in the same manner as the man in the iron mask spent his days in the prison, without knowing his original, or the reason of his being confined. We are born, we live, we act, we think, we sleep, we wake, without knowing how. God has given us the faculty of thinking as he
has

has given us all our other apparenances; and had he not come, at the time appointed by his providence, to inform us that we had an immaterial and immortal soul, we should have been without any proof of it. **VOLTAIRE.**

END OF THE THIRD VOLUME.

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